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ABSTRACT
The distribution of labor market activity across U.S. individuals has changed dramat-
ically since 1960. While nearly all prime-age men used to participate in the labor force,
men without a college education now experience substantial joblessness. At the same
time, married women–—especially those with college degrees–—have taken up careers in
increasing numbers. This dissertation explores relationships between American marriage
and labor markets. It reveals new channels through which changing marriage-and-family
arrangements have affected the evolution of labor market behaviors across gender and
education subgroups. Its results help define the current landscape of labor and marriage
inequality in the United States, and inform current debates over policies to promote job
and family security.
The first chapter presents a model in which young men find employment to enhance
their value as marriage partners. When the effect of employment on marital value declines,
young men’s employment declines as well, in preparation for a less favorable marriage
market. Taking this prediction to U.S. data, I estimate that fewer young men sought em-
ployment after 2 interventions that reduced the value of gender-role-specialization within
marriage: i) the adoption of unilateral divorce legislation, and ii) demand-driven improve-
ments in women’s employment opportunities. I then use a structural estimation of the
model to investigate interaction between the marriage market and male labor market
shocks. Simulations find that the indirect effect of a negative shock to wages on young
men’s employment, operating through the marriage market, is nearly as large as the direct
effect that operates purely through the labor market. These findings highlight the chang-
ing marriage market as an important driver of secular decline in young men’s labor market
involvement.
The second chapter leverages the genealogical structure and long duration of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics to estimate intergenerational employment relationships. Pre-
vious measurements of the intergenerational transmission of women’s employment status
have been limited by a lack of detailed data on mothers’ and daughters’ employment be-
haviors. The intergenerational relationship is found to be strongest at the full-time em-
ployment margin for college-educated mothers, and substantially weaker at less-intensive
xii
employment margins and for less-educated mothers. The paper also documents a stark
rise in inequality in mothers’ full-time employment propensities in the 21st century, and
attributes roughly 36% of this trend to differential intergenerational transmission across
education groups. These results suggest a disproportionate influence in high-SES families
of the childhood environment on gender identity, and that family-level transmission pro-
cesses deepen the long-run effects of unequal labor market opportunities on inequality in
mothers’ career outcomes.
The third chapter, from a work with David Lam, builds on standard marital matching
models to address the question of whether it is possible to infer the existence of a “male
breadwinner norm” among American families. We show that a variety of underlying social
preferences about a given trait all generate positive assortative matching on that trait, and
hence the same distribution of spousal trait differences in equilibrium. Applying this result
to U.S. Census and administrative earnings data, we find that simple models of assortative
matching can very closely replicate the observed distribution of spousal earnings differ-
ences, in which very few wives out-earn their husbands. We conclude that the distribution
of spousal earnings differences in the U.S. provides little information about the existence
of a male breadwinner norm or its effects on gender inequality in the labor market.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Why Bother? The Effect of Declining Marriage Prospects
on Employment of Young Men
Abstract
Why have so many young men withdrawn from the U.S. labor force since 1965? This paper
presents a model in which men invest time in employment to enhance their value as mar-
riage partners. When the marriage market return on this investment declines, young men’s
employment declines as well, in preparation for a less favorable marriage market. Taking
this prediction to data, I show that fewer young men sought employment after 2 interven-
tions that reduced the value of gender-role-specialization within marriage: i) the adoption
of unilateral divorce legislation, and ii) demand-driven improvements in women’s employ-
ment opportunities. I then show, using a structural estimation, that half of the employment
effect of a labor market shock to men’s wages is determined by endogenous adjustment of
the marriage market to the shock. These findings establish the changing marriage market
as an important driver of decline in young men’s labor market involvement.
JEL Codes: E24 , J12 , J21 , J22 , J24
Keywords: labor-force participation; marriage market; bargaining power; human capital
investment
1.1 Introduction
Between 1965 and 2015, the share of U.S. men aged 25-34 not participating in the
labor force more than tripled (Figure 1.1). Most of this aggregate change came from
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noncollege-educated men, for whom non-participation increased nearly seven-fold.1 Ris-
ing joblessness of young men poses implications for human capital accumulation, family
incomes, investments in children, and inequality in these outcomes.
A leading explanation for this development is that reductions in labor demand cur-
tailed the labor market opportunities of noncollege men and induced their exit from the
workforce (Juhn, Murphy and Topel, 1991; Juhn, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Moffitt,
2012; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2016; CEA, 2016; Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2017; Jaimovich and Siu, 2018; Charles, Hurst and Schwartz, 2018). As shown
in Panel A of Figure 1.2, declines in noncollege men’s labor-force participation throughout
the 1970s, 80s and 2000s occurred alongside declines in hourly earnings. These declines
of quantity and price support the notion that the demand curve has been shifting inward.
Two important features of the data, however, suggest that falling labor demand is not a
complete explanation. First, prominent labor demand forces were found in a recent review
to account for less than half of observed decline in U.S. employment since 1999 (Abraham
and Kearney, 2018). Second, it is not obvious that labor demand shifts should cause large
changes to men’s employment. Most estimates of the wage elasticity of male labor supply
are small,2 suggesting that male employment responds little to persistent wage changes.
And in the 90 years preceding 1970, dramatic wage increases accompanied virtually no
change in men’s employment (Pencavel, 1986).3 Therefore, factors beyond falling labor
demand appear necessary to explain post-1965 change in noncollege men’s employment.
This paper argues that changes in the labor market have interacted with changes in an-
other market—the marriage market—and that such interaction provides a more complete
explanation of the data. Figure 1.3 shows that noncollege men experienced a tremendous
decline in marriage propensities at the same time that they withdrew from the workforce.4
Previous reviews of this well-known “retreat from marriage” (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers,
2007; Cherlin, 2014; Lundberg, Pollak and Stearns, 2016) have argued that changes to
marriage and labor markets have reduced the attractiveness of the gender-role-specialized
1This is according to data from the March supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Through-
out this paper I consider noncollege-educated men to be men with at most one year of completed college. I
often refer to this group as “noncollege” for brevity.
2The relevant elasticity here is the uncompensated (Marshallian) labor supply elasticity, as this describes
the effect of a persistent wage change on labor supply. Coglianese (2018) surveys the literature and finds
uncompensated elasticity estimates ranging from −0.02 to 0.14 (with a mean of 0.04).
3This relationship is evident in Panel B of Figure 1.2, which uses U.S. Census data to extend the wage and
participation series back to 1940.
4Some of the secular decline in marriage has been offset by a rise in non-marital cohabitation and a delay
in the age at first marriage. However, this is more important before age 35, as many cohabitations either
turn into marriages or dissolve by this age (Mernitz, 2018). The graph presents marriage propensities for
men aged 35-39 to avoid some of these complications, and still shows a steady secular decline in marriage.
See the beginning of Section 1.3 for further discussion.
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marriage—the predominant arrangement of working-class families in 1960. This paper
argues that these changes have also reduced the value a stably-employed noncollege man
could extract from the marriage market. As a consequence, young noncollege men stood
to gain less from investing time in employment in 2015 than they did in 1965.
The foundation for this argument is the hypothesis that one reason young men may
work hard is to improve their prospects on the marriage market. I begin by deriving such a
hypothesis from a general economic framework. Male agents first choose how much time
to invest in employment, taking labor market opportunities as given. Then, they participate
in a competitive marriage market. The driving assumption is that the economic value
of marriage depends positively on the quantity of labor men supply before the marriage
market. Thus, men who have sacrificed leisure to build the most promising careers have
the most to offer prospective marriage partners. I show that in equilibrium, men who
expect to marry work more before entering the marriage market than men who expect to
remain single. These men earn a marriage market return on pre-marital employment that
depends on i) the effect of pre-marital employment on the economic value of marriage;
and ii) the terms of marriage—that is, the share of economic value that the husband gets
to claim for himself.
The framework generates two implications for secular decline in noncollege men’s em-
ployment. I illustrate these with comparative statics. First, I consider a marriage market
shock that lowers the value of gender-role-specialization within marriage. In response to
this shock, the model predicts that i) fewer marriages involving noncollege men form; ii)
the shares of marital value claimed by noncollege husbands decline; and iii) the employ-
ment propensity of young noncollege men declines. Thus, a marriage market shock causes
a shift of noncollege men’s labor supply curve at a given set of labor market opportunities.
Second, I consider a labor market shock that reduces noncollege men’s wage offers. The
model predicts the same 3 responses. Thus, a labor market shock causes an employment
response in part through its effect on marriage prospects. This endogenous response of
the marriage market to a labor market shock rotates noncollege men’s labor supply curve,
magnifying men’s employment sensitivity to such shocks.
I empirically assess the first implication in the context of two interventions in U.S.
marriage markets. One intervention occurred during the 1960s-80s as states switched
from consent-based to unilateral divorce regimes—greatly reducing legal barriers to mar-
riage dissolution. Previous work, discussed below, has exploited differential timings of this
switch across states to show that unilateral divorce led to less gender-role-specialization
within marriage and less marriage formation. A second intervention occurred as techno-
logical change in the U.S. economy expanded service-related jobs and contracted manufacturing-
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related jobs. I exploit the fact that women and men have historically specialized in different
industries to identify gender-specific employment shocks, at the local labor market level,
over the period 1980-2015.5 Holding male opportunities constant, a positive local shock to
female employment opportunities should also erode the value of gender-role-specialization
within marriage.
Difference-in-difference regression designs based on U.S. Census data confirm the model’s
predictions: following both interventions, young noncollege men married less and worked
less. Single men experienced particularly large reductions in labor-force participation,
consistent with the marriage market investment channel emphasized by the model. The
results pass tests for internal validity and are relatively robust across an array of specifica-
tions. These interventions appear to be quantitatively important: a back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that they were responsible for 29% of the 1965-2015 decline in labor-
force participation by young men without college.
The second implication of the framework is that, in addition to the “direct” effect of
reduced labor market opportunities on employment emphasized by the literature, a per-
sistent shock to noncollege men’s wage offers causes an “indirect effect” that operates
through the marriage market. Because a reduced-form evaluation of a shock to noncollege
men’s labor market opportunities cannot distinguish the two effects, assessing this impli-
cation requires a structural approach. Guided by the theoretical framework, I specify an
empirical model and estimate its parameters using the Generalized Method of Moments.
I confirm that the model successfully replicates the targeted marriage and employment
behavior of young men circa 1980. Then, I simulate a 10% reduction in the lifetime wages
of noncollege-educated men and solve for the new equilibrium. I find that the indirect em-
ployment effect, operating through the marriage market, is roughly as large as the direct
effect operating through the labor market.
These empirical results shed new light on the secular decline in employment of young,
noncollege-educated men. In an era marked by young women’s unprecedented access to
the labor market,6 decline in the relative labor market positions of noncollege men has
caused a meaningful decline in their marriage market value. As a consequence, such men
have reduced their investments in the labor market. When work is less likely to win a
5This gender-specific variant of the standard Bartik instrument has been applied in several recent papers
(e.g. Page, Schaller and Simon, 2019).
6In addition to the factors I investigate here (liberalized divorce law and an increasingly favorable wage
structure), factors driving the rise in women’s opportunities include declining significance of gender norms
and stigma associated with out-of-wedlock childbearing, increased legal protection against discrimination,
increased access to contraceptive methods and abortion, and the rise of labor-saving home production tech-
nology. See Goldin (2006) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) for discussion, and Goldin (2006) for an
argument that these changes dramatically altered the career aspirations and investments of young women.
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desirable marriage contract, why bother?
The effects emphasized in this paper illuminate a contrast between the period of the late
1800s-mid 1900s and the more recent period. Throughout the former period, young wives
and mothers performed almost no paid work (Goldin, 2006), while a large working class
of young men decided between working for their fathers in family-owned establishments
or pursuing wage labor opportunities that required little formal schooling (Ruggles, 2015).
In response to rising opportunities in cities, young men could establish economic indepen-
dence, although at the likely cost of not inheriting the family home and business. Legal
and social enforcement of patriarchal norms also prevailed during this time: women who
desired marriage had little ability to dictate its terms (Coontz, 1992). For these reasons,
it is plausible that the rise in noncollege men’s wage labor opportunities throughout this
period exerted little impact on the economic value they could extract from the marriage
market. Thus, wage changes may have had less effect on noncollege men’s employment
because they had less effect on marriage prospects.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is not the first to venture outside of the labor market to explain trends in
male employment. For example, much has been written about disability insurance pro-
grams.7 The evidence suggests that rising disability insurance provision contributed im-
portantly to the decline in employment among men older than 45 (Bound and Waidmann,
1992, 2002). Krueger (2017) hypothesized that rising opioid addiction has compromised
the abilities of pain-affected individuals to work.8 It is reasonable that displaced older
workers, especially those in relatively poor health, might stand to gain little from remain-
ing attached to the labor force—especially if they qualify for disability insurance. An im-
portant contribution of this paper, therefore, is to propose a mechanism for declining male
employment that is relevant for younger men. The argument that marriage market forces
have lowered the value of employment for young men provides a contrast to the recent argu-
ment that improved leisure technologies have raised the value of non-employment (Aguiar
et al., 2017).
Some observers have also posited a link between the declining employment of young
noncollege men since 2000 and the growing fraction of such men that have criminal
records. (For evidence on the effect of incarceration on post-release employment, see
7See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) and Liebman (2015) for reviews.
8Initial tests of this hypothesis have reached different conclusions about its magnitude and significance
(Currie, Jin and Schnell, 2018; Aliprantis, Fee and Schweitzer, 2019; Harris et al., 2019).
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Pager, 2007 and Mueller-Smith, 2015.) Introducing the marriage market channel into the
discussion helps rationalize why such men’s employment began declining decades before
the era of mass incarceration. However, the incarceration channel may interact in im-
portant ways with the marriage market channel, enhancing the relevance of both to the
post-2000 period.
Topically, this paper relates to recent work analyzing the impact of changes in gender-
specific wage structures on married men’s labor supply (Knowles, 2012; Alon, Doepke
and Coskun, 2018). There is also a “marriage premium” literature that assesses whether
men’s labor market outcomes improve upon transitioning into marriage (see Ludwig and
Brüderl, 2018 for references and a discussion). In contrast to these papers, I focus on
the labor supply response of unmarried men to anticipated changes in marriage market
conditions. While only 15% of noncollege men aged 25-44 were unmarried in 1965, today
over half of such men—and 65% of those aged 25-34—are unmarried. Moreover, Binder
and Bound (2019) report that declining labor-force participation by husbands accounts for
a small share of the total observed decline. To fully understand the decline in labor-force
participation by noncollege men of prime working age, it is important to account for their
decline in marriage combined with the decline in employment of unmarried men.
Substantively, this paper relates to work on marriage markets with pre-marital invest-
ments in human capital. This work has primarily focused on the education decision (Lafor-
tune, 2013; Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009; Chiappori, Dias and Meghir, 2018). This
paper takes education as given but instead models employment behavior as a pre-marital
investment choice. The framework presented in the main text assumes an efficient match-
ing environment, as in Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009). In the Appendix, I work
through an extended model wherein the arrival of unilateral divorce creates a coordina-
tion problem within marriage. This induces an inefficiently low number of men to work
hard before the marriage market, consistent with what has been established in theoretical
literature on investment-and-matching games (e.g Peters and Siow, 2002; Nöldeke and
Samuelson, 2015).
The empirical model used in this paper builds on the transferable-utility matching
model developed by Choo and Siow (2006) and extended by Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss
(2017).9 Given a distributional assumption on idiosyncratic preferences, these models
apply standard discrete choice techniques to identify marital surpluses based on observed
marital matching patterns. My model operates in the same manner. However, the presence
of a pre-match employment decision also requires identification of the division of the mar-
ital surplus between spouses. This is because a man’s anticipated surplus share guides his
9For further discussion, see the review of Chiappori and Salanié (2016).
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initial employment choice, and this choice in turn affects the total marital surplus. To han-
dle this type of interdependence (between total marital welfare and its allocation between
spouses), I modify an approach developed by Galichon, Kominers and Weber (2018). With
this approach, observed pre-marital employment of noncollege men, together with marital
matching patterns, jointly identify marital surpluses and spousal surplus shares.
Finally, this paper furthers the literature on the long-run impacts of unilateral divorce
(Rasul, 2003; Stevenson, 2007; Fernández and Wong, 2017; Reynoso, 2019). As noted
by Chiappori, Dias and Meghir (2018), beyond their effects on existing families, changes
to economic and family policies can have long-run consequences for marriage formation,
marital matching patterns and human capital investment incentives. In revealing long-
run effects of unilateral divorce on young men’s marriage-market investments, the current
paper contributes to this new research agenda in family economics (see also Chiappori
et al., 2017; Low et al., 2018).
1.3 Young Men’s Employment as Marriage Market Investment: Moti-
vation and Theory
Economists have long recognized the importance of prior job experience and career
interruptions in earnings determination (Mincer, 1958, 1962). Building up experience
with a specific employer, rather than cycling between jobs, has been shown to confer
additional earnings returns (Topel, 1991; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005). Young men thus
reap future gains, in terms of the consumption value of future earnings, from pursuing
stable employment today. In this section, I argue that there is an additional return to such
behavior that is determined in the marriage market. As a result, anticipated changes in the
marriage market plausibly affect young men’s employment.
Before embarking, it is important to note that as marriage has declined in the United
States, non-marital cohabitation and other family arrangements have risen in importance.10
Has the “marriage” market actually changed in a meaningful way, or has marriage simply
been replaced by equivalent arrangements? Some recent work on U.S. family structure has
revealed the following. First, the median cohabitation duration for less-educated couples
was 22-24 months in 2006-2010 data—much shorter than the median marriage duration
(Copen, Daniels and Mosher, 2013). Second, a growing minority of individuals do cohabit
for extended periods of time without marrying (Mernitz, 2018), but this population re-
mains quite small. More salient is an increase in “serial cohabitation:” those whose first
10For a “first-generation” review, see the classic article of Bumpass (1990). For a contemporary discussion,
see the recently-released review of Smock and Schwartz (2020).
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cohabitation has dissolved are increasingly likely to enter a new cohabitation (Eickmeyer
and Manning, 2018). Third, cohabitation has not fully replaced marriage as a childbearing
arrangement in the noncollege population: single mothers account for a steadily growing
share of births as well (Manning, Brown and Stykes, 2015).
As emphasized by Lundberg, Pollak and Stearns (2016), a key difference between mar-
riage and these other family arrangements lies in marriage’s function as a commitment
device. To the extent that the benefits of living with a committed partner accumulate over
the medium-to-long term (e.g. through investment in partnership-specific goods like chil-
dren and housing), I treat the replacement of marriage by unstable cohabitation and single
motherhood as a meaningful change that may impact the labor market investments of non-
college men. That is, my purpose is to model the formation of stable partnerships over the
long-run. Although a dichotomous married/single framework does not adequately charac-
terize American family structure, especially over a short-to-medium-run horizon, I submit
that the dichotomous framework used by economists remains a useful abstraction for my
present purpose.
Same-sex marriage has also become a more common joint living arrangement in the
United States. However, nearly all marriages formed in the United States have been het-
erosexual. As my purpose is to consider how the marriage market may have impacted
secular developments in men’s employment, I restrict focus to heterosexual marriage here.
1.3.1 What men contribute to marriage
Economists think of monogamous marriage as a productive partnership between two
individuals, in which each individual is better off in the partnership than either could be as
single (Becker, 1973). What do men contribute to these partnerships? Gary Becker’s semi-
nal framework involves a marital surplus function that is maximized when spouses exploit
their comparative advantages within the household economy (Becker, 1981). Given per-
sistent gender gaps in labor market opportunities and the biological demands of childbirth,
this tends to result in complementarities between husbands’ earnings and wives’ time at
home in the production of marital happiness. An innovation to the specialization frame-
work recognizes the importance of the jointly-consumed public goods (Lam, 1988). When
economies of scale in public consumption outweigh specialization incentives, complemen-
tarities arise between husbands’ and wives’ earnings. Thus, while women’s contribution to
marriage is determined by competing influences that have changed with time, men who
wish to form a stable marriage have had a clear dictate: form a stable career.
The hypothesis that male earning potential is an important determinant of marital value
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has been subject to numerous quasi-experimental tests in the last decade.11 To the extent
that marital value comes from investing in children, we might expect potential husbands’
labor market positions to affect fertility behavior and children’s outcomes. Black et al.
(2013) found positive male earning shocks, driven by the coal boom of the 1970s, to lead
to greater completed fertility. Leveraging variation in industrial business cycles combined
with gender differences in employment by industry, Schaller (2016) found positive male
labor demand shocks to predict increased fertility, yet positive female demand shocks to
predict decreased fertility. Related work has established a similar pattern of effects on
child health outcomes (Stevens and Schaller, 2011; Lindo, Schaller and Hansen, 2018;
Page, Schaller and Simon, 2019)—large, positive effects of male demand yet small (and
usually negative) effects of female demand. Others have associated negative shocks to
fathers’ lifetime earnings with decline in educational attainment and earnings of affected
children (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008).
In addition to their effects on children, the labor market positions of men appear
to drive marriage formation and stability itself. Following a similar strategy to Schaller
(2016), Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019) partitioned labor market shocks from the rise in
Chinese import competition since 1990 into male-specific and female-specific components.
Communities receiving particularly negative male shocks experienced a relative decline in
marriage and rise in single motherhood, while those receiving negative female shocks saw
smaller increases in marriage. Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) found similar results
and attributed them to gender identity norms—dictating that the husband out-earn his
wife—as well as economic gains from specialization.
It is also plausible that the marriage market rewards men who have worked hard for
reasons additional to the effects of working hard on earning potential. For example,
Charles and Stephens (2004) found that divorce hazards rose following a husband get-
ting laid off, but not from job loss events outside the husband’s control (e.g. suffering
a work disability or a plant closure), even though both types of events conferred similar
lifetime earnings losses. Such a pattern is consistent with stable employment signaling the
man’s level of non-economic suitability as a partner. Lafortune and Low (2018) presented
a framework in which men who enter marriages with sufficient assets are better able to
solve coordination problems within marriage and reap maximum gains from specializa-
tion. Men with stable jobs may also signal to prospective wives that they are committed to
investing in the marriage rather than other pursuits.
11See also Wilson (1996) and Cherlin (2014) for illuminating sociological narratives.
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1.3.2 A simple equilibrium framework with marriage market investment
I consider a 2-period decision-making environment (t = 0, 1) in which men first make
a human capital investment in the labor market and then match with women in a fric-
tionless, competitive marriage market. Figure 1.4 illustrates the environment and shows
the relevant payoff functions. There is no uncertainty and households do not save. In
Appendix Sections A.6 and A.7, I work through a more complex framework with marital
uncertainty and the possibility of unilateral divorce. I discuss additional implications of
this framework in the next section.
Single household’s employment choice. To start, consider a single male household
making consumption and employment decisions over his two periods of life. Each man m
in period t has direct utility function U(cmt, nmt; ∅), where c is consumption of a market-
purchased good and n ∈ [0, 1] describes the share of the period that man spends em-
ployed.12 (The argument after the semicolon in the utility function tracks the individual’s
family status: ∅ if single, and f if married to woman f .)
A standard result from static labor supply theory is that, given leisure preferences
(which are assumed constant across all men of a given education status), an individual’s
hourly wage is sufficient to characterize his consumption, labor supply, and utility. I there-
fore use the indirect utility function V (wm1; ∅), where w is hourly wage, to summarize
period 1. Each man faces the Mincerian wage equation:
ln(wm1) = ln(wm0)− δ + (r + δ) · nm0 (1.1)
where initial wages are exogenous, δ is a depreciation factor, and r + δ captures wage
growth from stable employment.
Without saving, the period-0 consumption choice is pinned down by the man’s period-0
employment choice: cm0 = wm0nm0 + ym0, where y is exogenous non-labor income. This
yields the following employment decision problem:
max
nm0
U(cm0(nm0), nm0; ∅) + βV (wm1(nm0); ∅) (1.2)
where β is a discount factor capturing the importance of period 1 relative to period 0. For
12The implicit length of each period in the model is more than one year: period 0 is meant to represent the
amount of time the average non-college-educated men spends not in school before becoming stably married.
In the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth, the average noncollege men spent 7 years
unmarried between ages 20 and 32. Over such a horizon, I model employment as a continuous choice.
Evidence from longitudinal administrative data presented in Appendix Table A.1 indicate that most men
who spend significant time out of the labor force in a given year return to gainful employment at some point
in the future: that is, men are not either always out or always in the labor force.
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purposes of exposition, I assume a separable utility function:
U(cmt, nmt; ∅) = VALUE(cmt)− COST(nmt),
where VALUE is the value of consumption and COST is the effort cost of working. All
qualitative results, however, generalize to a non-separable function.
It is straightforward to show that the solution to problem (1.2) satisfies the following
first-order condition:
MC(nm0) = wm0 · (MV(cm0) + βr̂V ′(wm1))
= wm0 ·MB(nm0;wm0, r̂) (1.3)
where MV and MC denote marginal consumption value and marginal effort cost functions,
respectively, and r̂ = r + δ. I subsume the expression inside the parentheses into the total
marginal benefit function MB(nm0;wm0, r̂).
The marriage market. Now, suppose that men enter a marriage market in period
1. I consider a frictionless marriage market with equal numbers of men and women. Men
come in two education types: noncollege-educated (NC) and college-educated (C). In the
empirical application, I also consider two education types of women. For now, I consider
an arbitrary number F ≥ 1 of female types f .
As shown in Figure 1.4, the period-1 utility payoff of a man m who marries woman f
can be expressed as the sum of his utility from remaining single and the additional utility he
receives from the marriage. I express this additional utility gain as Gm(wm1, nm0; f). This
gain is itself a sum of two parts: man m’s share in the total economic surplus generated
by the marriage, plus an idiosyncratic preference for the given partner’s type. I represent
idiosyncratic preferences as follows: εfm is man m’s taste for being married to female type
f , εEf is woman f ’s taste for marrying a man of education status E, and ε
∅
i is individual
i’s preference for remaining single. Idiosyncratic tastes ε are distributed iid according to a
mean-0, atomless distribution H(ε). Thus, for a given marriage between noncollege man
m and woman f , individual utility gains are:
Gm(NC; f) = θm(NC; f) · S(NC; f) + εfm − ε∅m (1.4)
Gf (NC; f) = (1− θm(NC; f)) · S(NC; f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Economic gains
+ εNCf − ε∅f︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-economic gains
.
In (1.4), S(NC; f) is the total economic surplus generated by the marriage and θm(NC; f)
is man m’s share in the surplus. The marriage between m and f forms if both utility gains
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exceed zero and if Gf (NC; f) > Gf (C; f) (which is the utility gain woman f receives from
marrying a college man).
It is convenient here to assume transferable utility, wherein the total economic surplus
does not depend on how the surplus is shared: spouses always agree on total-surplus-
maximizing behavior within marriage. This allows us to abstract from the nature of be-
havior of within marriage.13 Marriage market equilibrium consists of an assignment A of
individuals and a set Θ of surplus shares such that the assignment is stable: no two in-
dividuals would prefer to dissolve their current matches and match with each other, and
no matched individual would be strictly better off remaining single. See Appendix A.6 for
more details.
Lastly, I specify the economic surplus function. Consistent with the fact that virtually
all college-educated men in their 20s-40s participate in the labor force, and this has not
changed since the 1960s, I assume college men are employed throughout their working
lives. Relative to each partner remaining single, a marriage between college-educated man
m and woman f produces a surplus of S(C; f). A marriage between noncollege-educated
man m and woman f produces a surplus of
S(NC; f) = S(wmarried;fNC,1 , n
married;f
NC,0 ; f). (1.5)
Consistent with the class of marriage theories discussed in the preceding subsection, I
assume the surplus function S is strictly increasing in its first two arguments: the earning
potential and employment history man noncollege man m brings into the marriage with f .
Marriage market’s impact on employment choice. Consider a noncollege man m
who desires to marry woman f at the given equilibrium surplus share of θm(NC; f). Based
on (1.4) and (1.5), the partial derivative of such a man’s utility gain from marriage with
respect to his employment choice is the following:
∂Gm(NC; f)
∂nmarried;fNC,0
= θm(NC; f)·(r̂ · wNC,0 · Sw(wmarried;fNC,1 , n
married;f










In the above expression, Sw(·) and Sn(·) are the partial derivatives of the total marital sur-
plus with respect to period-1 wage and period-0 employment, respectively. This expression
describes the marriage market return to period-0 employment at equilibrium prices (i.e.
at the given surplus share θm(NC : f)). In words, this is the effect of the man working
13The more complex environment considered in the Appendix takes a stance on behavior within marriage
and results in imperfectly transferable utility, where the magnitude of the total surplus (in an ex-ante sense)
depends on how it is shared. That model nests the qualitative predictions of this more restrictive model.
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harder in period 0 on the total economic benefits of marriage realized in the next period,
scaled by the man’s share in those benefits. For ease of exposition, I shorten the portion of
the expression inside the parentheses by using total derivative notation: dS
dnmarried;fNC,0
.
This expression facilitates an important comparison of employment first-order condi-
tions between a man who chooses to remain single and an otherwise identical man who
chooses to marry:
ALWAYS− SINGLE : MC(nsingleNC,0) = wNC,0 ·MB(n
single
NC,0 ;wNC,0, r̂). (1.6)
TO− BE−MARRIED : MC(nmarried;fNC,0 ) = wNC,0 ·MB(n
married;f
NC,0 ;wNC,0, r̂)︸ ︷︷ ︸




Marginal benefits from marriage market
. (1.7)
Both men share the same marginal effort cost curve, which simply depends on period-0
preferences for employment. However, relative to the always-single man, the man who
will marry faces a marginal benefit curve that is shifted upward by the additional marginal
benefits the man expects to receive in marriage. Recall that, because these benefits arrive
in the next period, they must be scaled by the discount factor β.
Equilibrium. I consider an environment where initial male wage offers and employ-
ment preferences vary only according to education attainment. The initial wage offer for a
noncollege man is wNC,0 and for a college man is wNC,0(1 +p) (where p is the college wage
premium). The economic surplus in a marriage involving a college-educated man is some
constant number SC , while the economic surplus in a marriage involving a noncollege-
educated man is given by (1.5). And, the distribution function of idiosyncratic tastes,
H(ε), is type I extreme value. Equilibrium is defined as follows:
A rational-expectations equilibrium consists of an assignment A of individuals in the mar-
riage market; a set of vectors of economic surplus shares
{Θf}f∈F = (θm(NC; f), θm(C; f), θf (NC; f), θf (C; f))
for each type of woman; and a vector of period-0 employment choices for noncollege-educated
men N = (nsingleNC,0, (n
married;f
NC,0 )f∈F ); satisfying the following conditions:
1. θm(NC; f) + θf (NC; f) = 1 = θm(C; f) + θf (C; f) for all f ∈ F . That is, the divisions
of marital surpluses between partners are feasible.
2. The assignment is stable.
3. Period-0 employment choices satisfy first-order conditions (1.6) and (1.7) for all f ∈ F .
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Existence and uniqueness. In the model, noncollege men make labor market invest-
ments and then move to the marriage market where they are valued in terms of these
prior investments. A rational-expectations equilibrium occurs when noncollege men’s in-
vestment choices are consistent with a set of prices Θ that also, at the given the investment
choices, clear the marriage market (Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009). Uniqueness of
equilibrium is not generally guaranteed in these environments. (See Chiappori, Dias and
Meghir (2018) for an involved discussion on this point.) However, one can show a unique
equilibrium exists in this context under a reasonable boundary condition. I provide a proof
in Appendix A.3.
Figure 1.5 illustrates equilibrium outcomes for noncollege men, assuming F = 1 for
ease of exposition (i.e. women are homogeneous). The upper graph depicts the period-
0 employment choices of noncollege men who will remain single (dotted MB curve) and
noncollege men who will marry (solid MB curve). The steep-sloping blue line in the middle
graph traces the locus of points at which the solid marginal benefit curve intersects the
marginal effort cost curve. That is, it traces the points at which the period-0 employment
choice of to-be married men is rational, as the surplus share θm(NC) varies. The left
graph plots demand and supply curves for noncollege men in the marriage market, given
a period-0 employment choice. The shallow-sloping orange line in the middle graph traces
the locus of points at which these curves intersect. That is, it traces the points at which the
marriage market assignment A is stable, as the employment choice of to-be-married men
nmarriedNC,0 varies. Equilibrium occurs where the two loci in the middle graph intersect: where
the employment choice of to-be married men satisfies first order condition (1.7), given
marriage market conditions; and the marriage market is stable, given the employment
choice.
I can now express the central result of this section: population employment behavior of
noncollege men depends on i) the economic surplus function and ii) the equilibrium surplus
shares. A standard application of the Implicit Function Theorem to first-order conditions
(1.6) and (1.7) yields the following equilibrium employment functions:
nsingleNC,0 = n (wNC,0, r̂)
nmarried;fNC,0 = n
(





That is, the employment rate for always-single men depends on labor market conditions
only (wNC,0 and r̂), while the employment rate for to-be-married men depends on both









With idiosyncratic preferences distributed type I extreme value, it is straightforward to




















Comparative static. For ease of exposition, return to the case where women are ho-
mogeneous: F = 1. Consider a shock that reduces the economic surplus by reducing
noncollege men’s marginal contribution dS
dnNC,0
. The shock of interest is a reduction in the
gains from specialization, driven by an improvement in women’s relative labor market
opportunities; a change in the legal framework surrounding marriage; or a reduction in
the strength of “male breadwinner” norms. Several changes occur. First, the reduction in
dS
dnNC,0
induces noncollege men to work less in period 0. Second, because the marital value
of noncollege relative to college men has gone down, the new equilibrium must occur at
a lower share for noncollege men.14 This further erodes the marriage market return to
period-0 employment. Third, the combination of the first two forces increases the number
of noncollege men remaining single, leading more such men to “opt out” of the high-
employment path dictated by future marriage. In the language of equation (1.8), the first
two forces lead to a reduction in nmarriedNC,0 , while the third force reduces exp(·), hence giving
nsingleNC,0 more weight in the expression. The overall result is a lower population employment
rate, nNC,0, in equilibrium.
Figure 1.6 provides an illustration. The initial shock leads to a downward shift of to-be
married men’s marginal benefit curve. That is, for a given surplus share θm(NC), less pre-
marital employment occurs in the new equilibrium, which implies a leftward shift of the
blue locus in the middle graph. Because marriage is no longer as attractive at the given
surplus share, both marriage market curves in the left graph shift inward, but prospective
wives’ demand curve shifts inward more, since college-educated men have become a better
bargain relative to noncollege men. This causes a downward shift of the orange locus, as
a given employment level is now associated with a lower surplus share. Equilibrium is
restored at a lower value of nmarriedNC,0 , a lower share of noncollege men married, and a lower
surplus share θm(NC).
14See Appendix A.3 for a proof.
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1.3.3 Prima facie evidence from cohort data.
The theoretical framework’s predictions are consistent with the patterns shown in Fig-
ure 1.3. As less-educated men entered their prime years of potential labor-force activity
with diminished expectations of forming stable marriages they may also have found less
to gain from forming strong attachments to the labor market. Equivalently, as secular
changes reduced noncollege men’s marginal contribution to the marital economic surplus,
fewer marriages formed and fewer of these men built up stable attachments to the labor
market while young.
Co-variation between individual employment profiles and marriage outcomes, within
a given set of birth cohorts, conveys a similar message. Figure 1.7 and Table 1.1 record
employment and family structure cross-tabulations based on data from the 1979 cohort of
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79). The NLSY79 contains weekly labor
market histories and annual information on family structure for a population-representative
sample of men who were 14-22 years old when first surveyed in 1979. I divide the sub-
sample of men with no more than one year of completed college into two groups. The
“always-married” group consists of individuals who reported being married at all inter-
views between the ages of 32 and 40; the “always-single” group consists of those not
reporting being married, or cohabiting with an unmarried partner, at any interview over
the same age range.15
Figure 1.7 plots age profiles of participation and employment for each of the two
groups. The difference in participation rates between the two groups is substantial: the
average difference over the 21-31 age range is around 11 percentage points. (This is close
to the cumulative decline in labor-force participation between the 1937-39 and 1982-84
cohorts observed in Figure 1.3.) The difference in employment rates between the two
groups is even larger.
Table 1.1 reports the same comparison after adjustment for differences in initial labor
market opportunities. Considering the original sample of less-educated men, I estimate
regressions of the following form:
LABORi,21−31 = C0 + C1marriedi,32−40 + C2 ln(initial wagei) + errori. (1.9)
That is, I model young male employment behavior as a linear function of future marriage
propensity and one’s initial log hourly wage offer. Such a control is meant to proxy for
15I identified non-marital cohabitations in the NLSY79 using the method of Oppenheimer (2003). The
“always-married” group contains 659 individuals, while the “always-single” group contains 289 individuals.
See Appendix A.2 for further NLSY data processing information.
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persistent differences between individuals in labor market opportunities as well as labor
supply preferences (e.g. motivation to work hard). To construct this control, I average
hourly wages over the first 3 years after the individual leaves school and take the log.16
As shown in the table (which presents estimates of C1), a 0-to-1 increase in marriage
propensity over ages 32-40 is associated with a 7.3 percentage-point increase in labor-
force participation and an 11.9 percentage-point increase in employment during ages 21-
31 (columns 1 and 5). Controlling for wages reduces these associations to 6.7 and 10.8
percentage points—still large and statistically significant (columns 2 and 6). Adding a
control for non-marital cohabitation propensity slightly strengthens the results, as to-be-
cohabiters work slightly more than to-be-singles (remaining columns). Thus, even among
similar initial earners, young men who end up maintaining stable marriages build stabler
employment histories than young men who remain single.
These descriptions of the data suggest the empirical relevance of marriage market in-
vestment to the employment decisions of young men. However, to attribute the observed
variation in employment behavior to exogenous variation in the value of marriage, all
other determinants of employment behavior must be held constant. In the next section,
I leverage two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in the marriage market values of
less-educated men to provide causal interpretations of the marriage market investment
channel.
1.4 Young Men’s Employment as Marriage Market Investment: Evi-
dence from Two Interventions in U.S. Marriage Markets
To isolate marriage market incentives to seek employment in the data, it is necessary to
leverage changes in the marriage market occurring independently of changes in the labor
market. Such a context does not readily arise: as discussed above, men’s labor market
opportunities appear to influence marriage market outcomes. In this section, I propose
and empirically assess two interventions in U.S. marriage markets that plausibly avoid this
identification problem.
16For some individuals, initial wage information was missing, due to either insufficient employment during
the reference period or survey non-response during the reference period. Wage information for many of
these individuals was available later in their career cycles. Using later-in-life wage information, I impute
wages for these individuals based on a Mincerian wage equation. For individuals with chronically missing
wage information due to insufficient employment, I impute wage offers using techniques developed by Juhn,
Murphy and Topel (1991). See Appendix A.2 for further detail.
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1.4.1 Intervention 1: the no-fault divorce revolution
Between the late 1960s and mid 1980s, divorce legislation liberalized dramatically
across many U.S. states. In states without mutual consent requirements for divorce, the
introduction of no-fault grounds for divorce—such as “irreconcilable differences” or “irre-
mediable breakdown of the marriage”—effectively allowed one spouse to initiate a divorce
without consent of the other. These laws changed on a state-by-state basis for a variety
of reasons; family law experts have argued that the changes were effectively random in
nature. Friedberg (1998) and Voena (2015) provide further discussion.
Theoretical predictions. The extended theoretical model presented in Appendices A.6
and A.7 offers clear predictions regarding the impact of a switch in the divorce regime
on the employment behavior of less-educated men. When spouses must mutually con-
sent to a divorce, an unhappy spouse cannot credibly exercise the threat of leaving the
marriage. But in a unilateral regime, the utility a spouse could achieve in a unilateral di-
vorce becomes a credible threat point within marriage. Thus, under a unilateral regime, a
wife may choose to invest in her own career for two related reasons. The first is to insure
against being poor in the event that the marriage turns out badly and the husband initiates
a unilateral divorce. The second is to insure against the husband not sharing his earnings
with her within marriage—if he doesn’t, she can credibly exercise the threat of unilateral
divorce. This action results in lower gains from specialization in the production of marital
public goods, such as children’s welfare and housing quality. To ensure the efficient divi-
sion of household tasks, the husband must promise to transfer to the wife a larger share of
household resources—a commitment that lowers his welfare in marriage and may not be
enforceable. The overall effect is to lower the attractiveness of the traditionally-specialized
marital arrangement.17 This results in ex-ante low-surplus marriages no longer forming,
and fewer young men investing in stable employment to prepare for their traditional mar-
ital role.
Previous empirical research on unilateral divorce has found evidence supporting these
behavioral channels. Stevenson (2007) found evidence that marriages forming after ex-
posure to unilateral divorce featured less specialization and a decreased willingness to
invest in not-easily-divisible assets (such as having a child or supporting a spouse through
school). Moreover, wives realized higher rates of labor-force participation and full-time
work in marriages formed under a unilateral divorce regime. Consistent with these chan-
17The combination of marital uncertainty and the fact that specialization requires the wife to let her labor
market skills depreciate leads to imperfect (i.e. costly) contracting. This implies a failure of the Coase
theorem, which establishes that when contracting is costless, a shift in property rights should not affect the
number of contracts forming.
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nels lowering the attractiveness of the traditional marital arrangement, Rasul (2003) found
a persistent decline in the marriage rate (new marriages per thousand adults, and new
marriages per thousand single adults of marriage age) upon unilateral divorce adoption.
Reynoso (2019) echoed these results and also found an increase in assortative matching
on earning potential, as spouses became less able to realize specialization incentives after
the shift in individual property rights.
In the language of the theoretical framework introduced above, by reducing special-
ization gains and raising the wife’s threat point in the marriage relative to the husband’s,






and a reduction in their surplus shares (θm(NC)). This
results in the additional prediction that noncollege-educated men should gain less on the
marriage market from seeking stable employment while young. Using standard difference-
in-difference methodology, I extend the literature on unilateral divorce by estimating the
impact of this change in the marital environment on young noncollege men’s participation
in the labor force.
Data. Using 1960-1990 U.S. Census samples, I construct a main sample of non-institutionalized
men, not currently enrolled in school, at least 18 years old, with at most one year of com-
pleted college, and with 0-20 years of potential labor market experience. When estimating
labor supply regressions I focus on a slightly younger sub-sample of men with 0-15 years
of potential experience. I consider single men as well as all men within this sample, consis-
tent with the theory’s emphasis on the pre-marital investment value of employment. When
estimating marriage regressions I focus on a slightly older sub-sample of men with 5-20
years of potential experience. I adopt the coding of divorce laws presented in Appendix F
of Voena (2015). See Appendix Section A.2 for further data details.
Regression specification. I adopt the following baseline linear probability model spec-
ification:




The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking the value 1 if male i, living in state
s at time t, obtained the given outcome. The explanatory variable of interest, UDst, is a
binary indicator taking the value 1 if unilateral divorce is available in state s at time t. A
standard requirement of difference-in-difference models is the inclusion of area and time
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fixed effects. I also control for a set of individual characteristics: race, ethnicity, education,
potential experience level, nativity (foreign- or US-born) and urban/rural status.
The baseline specification also controls for the prevailing property division regime on
divorce (title-based, community or equitable). The estimates proved robust to property di-
vision controls; thus, I only present estimates that include these controls.18 For robustness,
I also augment the baseline specification with region-by-year fixed effects or state-specific
linear trends. Because marriage and labor market outcomes have been trending over time
according to individual demographics, I also sometimes control for interactions between
individual demographic characteristics and linear time trends.
1.4.2 Intervention 2: shocks to young women’s employment opportunities
Gender gaps in employment and wages in the United States labor market have nar-
rowed considerably since World War II (Goldin, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2017). For married
women and mothers with young children, relative gains in employment were particularly
strong after 1960 Goldin (2006).
Young women and mothers entered the labor market as it became increasingly dom-
inated by service-sector jobs. Previous studies have emphasized the role of technologi-
cal change, which lowered the relative cost of service provision and consumption, in the
growth of the service economy (Lee and Wolpin, 2006; Buera and Kaboski, 2012). It is
therefore likely that secular shifts in demand for services played an important role in ac-
commodating the secular rise in female employment. According to 1980 U.S. Census data,
women greatly outnumbered men in a variety of service sectors. This was true among
all prime-age workers but especially among noncollege workers. For example, women ac-
counted for 44% of the less-educated workforce, but 63% of retail trade workers and 80%
of those employed in finance, insurance and real estate sectors.
It is likely that the national rise of the service economy affected female employment
differently in different local areas. Although services are on average less tradable than
manufactured goods, recent work has estimated that certain service sectors face relatively
low trade costs and high degrees of geographical concentration across labor market areas
(Gervais and Jensen, 2019). National technological shifts impacting a local economy spe-
cializing in tradable services also raise local demand for less-tradable, personal services
(Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2013). If there exists spatial variation in less-tradable services,
18I do not test for interactions between unilateral divorce and the prevailing property division regime, as
in some previous work. This is because I focus on human capital incentives, neither of which are directly
affected by the property division regime. Modeling physical capital investment (assets), on the other hand,
would warrant a focus on the property division regime in interaction with unilateral divorce (Voena, 2015).
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for example due to local tastes or local production advantages, a national shock to these
sectors exerts differential local impacts as well (Bartik and Sotherland, 2019). Thus, in
the context of technological change and growing national demand for services, areas more
heavily concentrated in services should experience larger shocks to demand for female em-
ployment. Additionally, Page, Schaller and Simon (2019) report variation across areas in
the extent of female specialization in services. This results in further area-level variation
in female-specific employment shocks driven by national service sector expansions.19
In addition to services, women have also historically specialized in certain manufactur-
ing sectors, such as textiles. The same types of technological innovations that expanded
services resulted in contraction of routine-task occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2013). Thus,
while changes in national demand may have facilitated female employment on average,
female employment likely grew far less rapidly, or even declined, in areas concentrated in
female manufacturing sectors.
Theoretical predictions. An expansion of young women’s labor market opportunities
reduces specialization gains and compliance with “male breadwinner norms” within the
marriage market, but also raises the gains associated with joint consumption economies.
To the extent that specialization gains and social norms are a dominant force in marriages
involving less-educated men,20 increased labor market demand for female workers lowers
such men’s contribution to marriage, both in absolute terms as well as relative to the
contributions of college-educated men. As predicted by the model, these forces should
reduce the equilibrium number of marriages involving noncollege-educated men, and also
reduce the labor market activities of such men before the marriage market.
Data. I utilize the commuting zone concept (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996) to define local
labor markets. Reliable mappings from county group identifiers in Census to 1990-defined
commuting zones can be constructed starting with 1970 Census samples.21 I begin the
analysis in 1980 for two reasons. First, 5 percent (rather than 1 percent) samples are
available starting in 1980, which allows for a more precise computation of base-period em-
ployment concentrations by sector. Second, starting the analysis in 1980 makes 1970 data
available for use in a pre-trends test to gauge internal validity of the design. Accordingly,
19Appendix Table A.2 presents cross-commuting-zone (CZ) variation in the 1980 degree of female special-
ization in service-related sectors—both in absolute terms as well as net of male specialization. For example,
among the noncollege population, the share of total female workers engaged in business services ranged
from .35 to .51 between the 10th and 90th percentile CZs. The share of total female workers net of the share
of total male workers engaged in business services ranged from .26 to .41 between the 10th and 90th per-
centile CZs. For all service workers, the 10− 90 range was: .61 to .85 for females, and .39 to .64 for females
net of males.
20As reported by Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015), gender identity norms, dictating that the husband
should be the primary breadwinner in the household, are also stronger among noncollege-educated men.
21Code is available on David Dorn’s website: https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm.
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using Census and American Community Survey samples, I create commuting-zone-level-
average data for each of the following years: 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2014-17 (referred
to as 2015 in the analysis). Thus, the total number of observations is 4 time periods ·722
commuting zones in the contiguous U.S. = 2, 888. The underlying population of men is the
same as in the unilateral divorce investigation.
Regression specification. The baseline specification regresses the male outcome level
(such as the share of men currently married or in the labor force), observed in commuting
zone z at time t, on an index of demand for female employment DFzt and other controls:





+ commuting zone FE
+ time FE
+ errorzt.
The baseline regression controls for an index of male labor market demand DMzt : to isolate
the marriage market investment channel of interest, we require that male labor market
opportunities do not change when female labor market demand is varied. Commuting
zone and time fixed effects are controlled, as the underlying experiment is to compare
long-run changes in male behavior within commuting zones receiving different long-run
shocks to female labor market demand. As in the unilateral divorce experiment, I gauge
robustness by augmenting the baseline specification with time-varying regional controls.
Additionally, I sometimes control for base year demographics (cell-level averages of racial,
Hispanic ethnicity, nativity, education and potential experience characteristics) interacted
with linear time trends.
The demand shifters DFzt and D
M
zt are “Bartik instruments,” constructed using shift-
share methodology popularized by Bartik (1991). Considering the sample of noncollege-
educated young workers, I first compute commuting-zone-level shares of the workforce
employed in each of 25 different industry sectors s in the 1980 base year.22 Then, for
each year t, I interact these shares with national changes in employment of noncollege
young workers by industry. I repeat this process for each gender. Thus, DGzt describes
the predicted change in the employment-to-population ratio of noncollege-educated indi-
viduals of gender G in commuting zone z, between 1980 and t, due to national shifts in
22See Appendix A.2 for a description of these sectors, which vary slightly by gender. Consistent with the
above discussion, these sectors distinguish between manufacturing and services, and among broad types of
each.
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National shift, sector s
(1.12)
where EGzs,t is the total year-t employment in commuting zone z and sector s; and P
G
t is
year-t total national population. (Recall that the underlying population is less-educated
individuals with 0-20 years potential experience.) By construction, the instruments take
the value 0 in 1980.
Recent work has clarified the identification assumptions underlying shift-share research
designs (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift, 2018; Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel, 2018).
In this application, we are concerned about the exogeneity of the female Bartik instrument
with respect to residual area-level movements in male outcomes after controlling for the male
Bartik instrument. The preferred identifying assumption is that female base-year industry
shares are exogenous with respect to residualized movements in male outcome variables.
1.4.3 Effects of the interventions
Main results: reductions in marriage and labor-force participation. Previous litera-
ture has found a temporary increase in divorce rates upon the passage of unilateral divorce
(Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006), but also a persistent reduction in marriage rates (Rasul,
2003). Appendix Figure A.1 presents an event-study graph confirming, consistent with
the theoretical model, that unilateral divorce precipitated a long-run reduction in both
ever- and currently-married propensities. Appendix Table A.3 presents regressions of ever-
married propensities on both interventions. It reports statistically significant reductions
of close to the same magnitude as those found for currently-married propensities. Thus,
both interventions reduced marriage in the long-run primarily by preventing or delaying
marriage formations.
Regardless, for a young man deciding whether to maintain stable employment, both
whether he will marry and how long he expects to remain married have implications for
his decision. Accordingly, the main outcomes of interest are current marriage and single
men’s labor-force participation. Results for these outcomes are presented in Table 1.2 and
Table 1.3. In each table, the top panel considers the unilateral divorce intervention, while
the second panel considers the female employment shock intervention—defined as a 10
percentage-point increase in the female Bartik instrument. Each table contains 6 columns
corresponding to 6 different regression specifications. All specifications include the base-
23
line controls, while each contains a unique combination of additional control variables.
Note the fourth row in the unilateral divorce panel. This row reports results of pre-
trends tests. For a given specification, this is an F -test of the hypothesis that the effect of
unilateral divorce on the outcome is 0 before the passage of unilateral divorce. I accomplish
this by grouping the data into 5-year bins defined by event time and estimating event-study
coefficients relative to the bin containing 5-to-1 years before law passage. (See Appendix
Figure A.1 for an illustration of the binning.) The pre-trends test, then, tests whether
the coefficients corresponding to “10-to-6” and “at least 11” years before law passage are
jointly zero. In each table, only in one case can we reject the hypothesis of no pre-trend at
the 5 percent level. Most estimated p-values are above 20 percent. These results support
the internal validity of the research design.
Looking at Table 1.2, estimated effects of the interventions on current marriage are
negative and statistically significant. The average of the 6 point estimates is −1.9p.p. for
unilateral divorce and −1.8p.p. for female Bartik shocks. Looking at Table 1.3, estimated
effects for labor-force participation are also negative, and generally reach statistical sig-
nificance at conventional levels. The average estimate is −1.4p.p. for unilateral divorce
and −1.2p.p. for female Bartik shocks. Considering that base rates of non-participation in
this population of men are 13− 14 percent (third row of each panel), each intervention is
estimated to cause roughly a 10% increase in non-participation behavior. This pattern of
results lends credence to the marriage market investment channel emphasized by the the-
ory. As changes to the legal structure of marriage and women’s labor market opportunities
threatened efficient cooperation within marriage and incentivized young women to pursue
their own careers, the value of marital specialization declined. This led fewer marriages to
form and fewer noncollege-educated men to invest in stable employment.
One alternative interpretation of the data is that the interventions impacted the partic-
ipation rate of singles simply by changing the composition of whom is single, rather than
because of lower marriage market investment. This interpretation, however, does not seem
plausible. The conventional wisdom is that married men are positively selected on labor
market skill and motivation (Antonovics and Town, 2004): if the interventions simply led
some men who would have been married to become single, such a development would
presumably raise, not lower, the participation rate of singles. A calculation presented in
Appendix A.4 shows that, for selection effects to be completely responsible for the unilat-
eral divorce results, the men induced to remain single by unilateral divorce would require
a non-participation rate of roughly 42.5 percent. This is around triple the pre-reform rate
of non-participation among singles.23 Moreover, if composition effects were dominant, one
23A similar calculation can be done for the female Bartik shock results, following the formula presented in
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would expect to find a null effect on participation in the overall population of men. Ap-
pendix Table A.4 reports participation estimates for all men and continues to find negative
overall effects.
Testing the identification assumption: small effects on wages. To attribute observed
effects of these marriage market interventions to the marriage market channel of interest,
we must be sure that men’s labor market opportunities are orthogonal to intervention
exposure. Failure of this condition can be interpreted as a failure of the identification
assumption.
While it is impossible to directly test the identification assumption, the current context
admits a reasonably informative test. This test involves investigating wages as an outcome.
If the given intervention is found to “cause” substantial reductions in both employment
and wage rates, then it is probable that intervention exposure is correlated with a negative
shock to male labor demand. On the other hand, if male labor demand did not change
with the intervention, we should not find large negative wage effects.24
Table 1.4 reports estimated effects of the interventions on log weekly wages of single
men.25 As in Table 1.2, the top panel considers the unilateral divorce intervention, while
the second panel considers the female employment shock intervention. In the second
case, log weekly wages are measured as commuting-zone-year averages, where individual
observations are weighted by weeks worked. For reference, the effect of a 10 percentage-
point male Bartik shock on wages is precisely estimated at 9 to 11 percent across all spec-
ifications. Against this benchmark, the estimated wage effects are small, and are always
statistically insignificant. Effects of unilateral divorce range from−2.4 to 0.5 percent across
specifications, and effects of a female Bartik shock range from −1.6 to 1.9 percent. These
findings suggest that the interventions are uncorrelated with non-trivial changes to male
labor demand.
Relevance for secular decline in male employment. Table 1.5 demonstrates the
importance of the two interventions in explaining secular decline in employment of young,
noncollege-educated men. Consider the first column. According to the average of the
6 estimates reported in Appendix Table A.4, unilateral divorce is associated with a .65
Appendix A.4.
24A marriage-market-caused reduction in employment at a given set of opportunities implies an inward
shift of the labor supply curve: if wages are flexible and capital is inflexible, we should expect an increase in
wages. But if capital also adjusts in the medium-to-long run time frame captured by the regressions (10-year
periods), the initial wage impact of the supply shift may be diffused. In addition, if the marriage market
effect causes less employment and hence less accumulation of labor market skills, we might expect a decline
in wages. The overall expected effect of these marriage market interventions on wages is thus ambiguous.
That said, a substantial negative effect likely implies a failure of the identification assumption.
25Results for hourly wages are similar. See Appendix A.2 for information on wage processing.
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percentage-point decrease in the labor-force participation rate of all noncollege-educated
men with 0 − 15 years potential experience. Between 1965 and 1980, around 54 percent
of this population was exposed to unilateral divorce,26 implying that unilateral divorce
caused a 0.65 · 0.54 = 0.35 percentage-point decline in participation. This amounts to 23%
of the observed 1.5 percentage-point decline that occurred during the period. An analogous
exercise for the female Bartik shock intervention finds that female employment shocks can
account for 1.89p.p., or 30%, of the observed 6.3p.p. decline in labor-force participation
observed between 1980 and 2015.27
Because the two interventions happened in non-overlapping time periods, we can com-
pute the joint effect of the two interventions simply by adding the two individual ef-
fects together. According to rows 3 and 4 of Table 1.5, this accounting exercise yields
−0.35−1.89
−1.5−6.3 = .287. That is, the two interventions can account for 28.7 percent of the total
observed 1965-2015 decline in labor-force participation of young noncollege men.
1.5 The Marriage Market Amplifies Men’s Labor Market Shocks: Evi-
dence from a Structural Model
The results of the last section suggest that young men’s employment responds to a
decline in marriage market prospects. In this section, I examine the effects on young men’s
employment of a decline in labor market opportunities. By reducing marriage market
prospects, such a shock might reduce employment through a marriage market effect, in
addition to the standard labor market effect that has been emphasized by the labor demand
literature.
Figure 1.8 illustrates these two effects. Returning to the theoretical framework of Sec-
tion 1.3, consider a reduction in noncollege men’s earning potential. This is driven either
by a reduction in the initial wage offer wNC,0 or a reduction in returns to experience r̂.
Given a positive uncompensated employment elasticity, such a shock reduces employment
via standard labor/leisure substitution.28 This labor market effect is represented as a down-
ward shift of the average man’s marginal benefit curve (and a corresponding leftward shift
of the steep blue locus in the bottom graph). But the shock also reduces the economic sur-
plus (S(wmarried;fNC,1 , n
married;f
NC,0 ; f)) generated by a noncollege marriage, both in absolute terms
263 states had unilateral divorce regimes in place before 1965: Alaska, Oklahoma and New Mexico.
Around 30 states adopted unilateral divorce regimes between 1965 and 1980.
27The average commuting zone experienced a 14p.p. increase in the female Bartik instrument: hence the
1.40 average exposure to a 10p.p. shock reported in the table.
28When returns to experience r̂ decline, it is possible to observe a reduction in employment even if the
uncompensated employment elasticity is zero. See Imai and Keane (2004).
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and relative to that generated by a college marriage. This leads to fewer marriages forming
at a lower surplus share (θm(NC)) for noncollege men. These dynamics shift the orange
locus in the bottom graph downward, leading to a further downward shift of the marginal
benefit curve. This further downward shift is the marriage market effect.
The goal of this section is to separately quantify these marriage market and labor mar-
ket effects, and thus apprehend an additional implication of the marriage market channel
for young men’s employment. To do so, I specify an empirical model based on the theoret-
ical framework and structurally estimate its parameters. Then, I impose a negative shock
to noncollege men’s lifetime earning potential and solve for the new model equilibrium.
The structure of the model enables a decomposition of equilibrium responses into labor
market versus marriage market channels.
1.5.1 Empirical setup
I consider the investment-and-matching problem laid out in Section 1.3. Agents come
in two education types: noncollege-educated (NC) and college-educated (C). The shares
cM of men and cF of women are college-educated. There are equal total numbers of
men and women to be matched in period 1, after men have made their labor market
investments. College men are assumed always to be in the labor force. Thus, I abstract
from their initial wage offer and wage growth process: they arrive in the marriage market
with wage wC,1. Noncollege men, on the other hand, receive a period-0 wage offer of
wNC,0 and face Mincerian wage equation (1.1) when deciding how much to work in period
0. Moreover, noncollege men in period 0 receive an amount ŷ in non-labor income. This
is consistent with the fact that many out-of-work young men live with and rely on family
members for income support (Binder and Bound, 2019). I do not model heterogeneity in
non-labor income receipt.
Empirical specification of utilities. Single men face the following direct utility func-
tion in period t:




where λ and γ are parameters to be estimated. This function belongs to the class of
separable utility functions assumed in Section 1.3. Now, define w = exp(ln(wNC,0) − δ).
This is the wage offer in period 1 realized by a man who does not work at all in period 0.
Normalizing the utility of his hypothetical man to 0, it is easy to show that the normalized
indirect utility function for single men in period 1 is simply Ṽ (wm1) = V (wm1; ∅)−V (w; ∅) =
ln(wm1)− ln(w). (See Appendix A.5.)
The economic surplus for a marriage between manm and woman f , form, f ∈ {NC,C},
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is specified as
S(wm1, nm0;m, f) = αf · (1 + µmnm0) · (ln(wm1)− ln(w))− ξ(m; f) (1.14)
where αf , µm and ξ(m; f) are parameters to be estimated. I assume µC = 0 and µNC = µ;
thus, µ is a signaling parameter that captures the degree to which noncollege men can
compensate for their lower earning potential by working hard in period 0. To the extent
that noncollege men have lower marriage propensities than college men, µ is lower than
the college wage premium.
The function ξ(m; f) is specified as follows:
ξ(m; f) =
{
0 m = f
ξ m 6= f
. (1.15)
That is, the economic surplus declines by ξ in a marriage between two individuals of
different education types. This captures assortative matching behavior on the marriage
market.
As specified in Section 1.3, an individual’s gain in a marriage between m and f equals
the individual’s share in the economic surplus, plus a non-economic component captur-
ing idiosyncratic tastes. Each side of the market contains two education types of agents:
thus, in equilibrium, there is a 4-vector of male surplus shares that stabilizes the marriage
market. These shares, θm(m; f), are not parameters to be estimated, but rather are en-
dogenous objects that result from the equilibrium conditions of the model. Idiosyncratic
tastes (for singlehood, for marriage to a noncollege individual, and for marriage to a col-
lege individual) follow a Type I Extreme Value distribution, with scaling parameter σε to
be estimated.
It is instructive at this point to compare the period-1 marginal benefits of period-0
employment between to-be-single and to-be-married men. It is trivial to show that the
marginal benefits realized by a to-be-single man are βr̂. (See Appendix A.5.) A noncol-
lege man marrying woman f receives these marginal benefits plus θm(NC; f) of the total
marginal benefits to the marriage. This yields the following expression:




Marginal labor market benefits
+ βθm(NC; f) · αf r̂(1 + 2µnm0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal marriage market benefits
. (1.16)
Given a positive surplus share and positive parameter values, it is clear that to-be-married
men enjoy higher marginal benefits to period-0 employment than to-be-single men.
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Preset parameters. The baseline model aims to replicate the environment of the early
1980s in the United States. A number of model parameters are preset, consistent with
this baseline, based on external sources of data. First, the model abstracts from education
decisions, so I preset the college shares cM and cF based on data reported by Autor and
Wasserman (2013). I set the earning potential of college men in period 1, wC,1, based
on data reported by Binder and Bound (2019). The initial wage offer for noncollege and
wage growth process—wNC,0, δ and r̂—are set based on estimates in the NLSY79 data
reported by Braga (2018) and to ensure a college wage premium of 0.4 (its value in the
early 80s inferred from Binder and Bound, 2019). Finally, nonlabor income ŷ is inferred
based on data reported by Binder and Bound (2019). Appendix Table A.5 records the
preset parameters, and further information on their calibration can be found in Appendix
A.5.
This leaves 7 parameters to estimate: noncollege men’s preferences for leisure (λ and
γ), marital value scalars for each type of woman (αNC and αC), noncollege men’s signal
value of working hard (µ), the penalty for marrying the opposite education type (ξ) and
the idiosyncratic taste scale parameter (σε).
Identification. I estimate these 7 parameters using the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (Hansen, 1982). I choose 7 informative moments, based on 1980s U.S. data, for
identification. Thus, the model is exactly identified: the GMM estimates are the param-
eter choices that make model-generated behavior exactly coincide with the 7 observed
behaviors in the data.
I provide a heuristic argument that the following moments identify the model. To start,
note that the only parameters that govern the employment behavior of to-be-single men
are the preference parameters λ and γ. The parameter λ is identified by targeting the
labor-force participation rate of “always-single” noncollege men in the NLSY79, over ages
21-31 (recall Section 1.3.3). The parameter γ is related to noncollege men’s willingness to
substitute between consumption and leisure. Thus, I identify γ by targeting an uncompen-
sated labor supply elasticity. I produce this elasticity within the model by measuring the
responsiveness of period-0 employment of to-be-single men to a 10% decline in wNC,0.29
Consistent with small uncompensated elasticities estimated in the literature, I target a
value of 0.1.30
29Note that the structure of direct utility in the model forces the responsiveness of period-0 employment to
wNC,0 to be 0—that is, an exact canceling of the income and substitution effects—unless non-labor income
is present. The existence of non-labor income in period 0 thus not only matches reality, but also generalizes
the model.
30Important to the interpretation is that this 0.1 value captures the effect of a persistent wage change
while holding marriage market forces constant. This is a reasonable interpretation, since microeconometric
studies in the literature tend to leverage changes in the income tax code that implicitly hold family structure
29
Four remaining parameters are identified by marriage outcomes in the data. Suppose
for the moment that the scale parameter on idiosyncratic tastes (σε) is unity: as is standard
in discrete choice models, the following argument identifies payoff parameters relative to
this scale. Consider a woman of education type f . All else constant, the larger αf is, the
more marriages will form involving type-f women. Thus, I identify αf for f ∈ {NC,C} by







This is the ratio of the number of marriages forming involving type f to the geometric
average number of men and type-f women who remain unmarried. See Choo and Siow
(2006) for further discussion of this statistic. The signaling parameter for noncollege
men, µ, is identified by the observed gap in marriage propensities between college and
noncollege men. The larger µ is, the smaller this gap will be in the model. The parameter
ξ is identified by observed assortative matching behavior in the marriage market. The
larger ξ is, the stronger will be the degree of positive assortative matching on education.
I capture assortative matching with the correlation coefficient between married couples’
college statuses.
The last parameter—σε—is identified by the difference in period-0 employment behavior
between to-be-single and to-be-married men. (The observed difference is reported in column
4 of Table 1.1.) Why should the dispersion of idiosyncratic tastes for marriage be at all
related to employment behavior? The answer is relatively straightforward. Note that life-
time utility in this model is denominated in period-0 log consumption units. Noncollege
men in period 0 convert expected period-1 marginal benefits into this scale when deciding
how hard to work. But when deciding whom to marry in period 1, scale does not mat-
ter: one simply picks the option associated with the highest period-1 utility. Thus, σε is
chosen to convert the marriage market parameters that influence to-be-marrieds’ period-0
employment choice—α and µ—into values consistent with this choice.
The following example is instructive. Suppose there is only one type of woman, one
type of man, and µ is zero. Consider one world in which 3/4 of men end up married
and to-be-marrieds work only slightly more than to-be-singles. Consider another world in
which 3/4 of men marry and to-be-marrieds work much more than to-be-singles. Since
marriage outcomes are the same in both worlds, α/σε must be the same in both worlds.
constant. For example, the labor supply of married individuals in response to a change in the rate schedule
facing married couples—or the labor supply of single individuals in response to an expansion of Earned
Income Tax Credits for single individuals—is measured and cited as an uncompensated elasticity.
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But, as stipulated by equation (1.16), σε (and thus α) must be higher in the second world
in order to generate the higher employment of to-be-married men. Thus, we see that α/σε
is identified by marriage outcomes and σε is identified by the employment behavior of
to-be-married men.
Baseline estimation. The presence of a pre-match investment decision makes the
present econometric framework more complex than the standard transferable-utility match-
ing framework (used in Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2017). This is
because an interdependence exists between the surplus shares that stabilize the marriage
market and the overall surpluses—and hence marital matching patterns—generated in
equilibrium. To see this, recall that surplus shares are inputs into the period-0 employment
decision of to-be-married men (by first order condition 1.7), yet this employment deci-
sion affects the overall marital surplus and marriage formation (by equations 1.4 and 1.5).
Such an interdependence does not arise in the former models. To handle this complexity,
I apply the algorithm designed by Galichon, Kominers and Weber (2018) for matching
models with imperfectly transferable utility. In such models, interdependence between sur-
plus shares and total surpluses arises through spousal bargaining processes (e.g. Reynoso,
2019; Gayle and Shephard, 2019). Though the structure of my model differs from these,
the interdependence arises for the same reason: because an equilibrium action taken by
a prospective spouse affects both the overall surplus and its distribution. Following is a
description of the GMM estimation procedure:
1. Guess a parameter vector.
2. Guess nmarried;fNC,0 = 1. This is the period-0 employment rate of noncollege men who
will marry female education type f .
3. Given the guess of nmarried;fNC,0 , use the fixed-point algorithm of Galichon, Kominers and
Weber (2018) to solve for the surplus shares θm(m; f) that stabilize the marriage
market.
4. Use first-order condition (1.7) to solve for the values of nmarried;fNC,0 consistent with these
surplus shares θm(NC; f). This becomes the new guess of n
married;f
NC,0 .
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until the new guess of nmarried;fNC,0 is the same as the old guess.
6. The model is now at equilibrium. Compute the normed distance between the seven
moments predicted by the model and those observed in the data.
7. Repeat steps 1-6 (using a computerized search algorithm) until this distance ap-
proaches zero.
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Table 1.6 presents the baseline estimation results and confirms that the model replicates
the 1980s environment of interest.
1.5.2 Quantifying the marriage market multiplier
With the baseline model, we can now quantify the marriage market channel associated
with a shock to noncollege men’s earning potential. This quantification is straightforward.
Because the employment behavior of to-be-single men is not affected by marriage market
forces, the response of to-be-single men to the shock pins down the labor market channel.
The response of all men to the shock, by definition, includes both labor and marriage
market channels. The size of the marriage market channel is simply the difference between
the response of all men and the response of to-be-single men.
To see this, consider the following decomposition. For illustrative purposes, suppose
there is just one type of woman in the marriage market. Define ηmarriedNC,0 as the difference
in period-0 employment rates between to-be-married men and always single men. This





NC · ηmarriedNC,0 ,
where smarriedNC is the share of noncollege men who marry. Then, the change in the noncol-





+ smarriedNC ·∆ηmarriedNC,0 + ∆smarriedNC · ηmarriedNC,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
marriage market channel
. (1.17)
Alternatively, the marriage market multiplier can be computed as the ratio of the re-
sponse of all men to the response of to-be-single men: ∆nNC,0/∆n
single
NC,0. This describes
how much the labor market shock is magnified by the endogenous response of the mar-
riage market.
The model allows for two different types of labor market shocks to be simulated. One
is a downward shift of the life-cycle wage profile, driven by a reduction in the initial wage
offer wNC,0. Another is a flattening of the wage profile, driven by a reduction in returns to
experience r̂. One can interpret a reduction in r̂ as reflecting fewer opportunities for career
growth among stably-employed men, or an increase in labor market imperfections that
prevent stable job-holding. For example, if increased automation and import competition
from China raises the probability of job displacement—and job displacement results in
lost returns to tenure and involuntary depreciation of skills—then a given amount of time
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spent working or looking for work will result in lower wage growth. I remain agnostic
about the underlying cause of a decline in r̂.
It is important to note that such a simulation is an out-of-sample exercise. The ag-
gregate responsiveness of noncollege men’s employment and marriage outcomes to wage
profile shocks was not targeted in the estimation. Hence the simulation exercise can be
seen as a test of the theoretical model’s predictions. In the next subsection I show that the
simulated responses match up rather well with some recent empirical estimates in the lit-
erature. Both sets of responses lend credence to the marriage market channel emphasized
by the theory.
Table 1.7 reports the equilibrium effects of a 10% reduction in noncollege men’s earn-
ing potential, driven by a combination of a reduction in initial wage offers (wNC,0) and
a reduction in wage growth (r̂).31 All other agents’ labor market opportunities are held
constant. Looking at the first row of Panel B, the shock reduced the share of noncollege
men that married in period 1 by 3.9 percentage points. This was driven by reductions
both in noncollege men marrying noncollege women and in noncollege men marrying
college women, although the former effect dominated. (This is not surprising given that
most noncollege husbands were married to noncollege wives at baseline.) The second
row shows that the shock lowered the economic surplus shares claimed by noncollege
men—particularly in marriages with college women. The third row reports that the shock
reduced the employment of to-be-singles by 1.3 percentage points and aggregate employ-
ment by 2.3 percentage points. Thus, had marriage prospects remained constant, the effect
of the shock on employment would have been a full percentage point—or 1/2.3 = 43.5%—
smaller. In other words, the marriage market multiplied the original employment effect of
the labor market shock by a factor of 2.3/1.3 = 1.77.
In Appendix Table A.6, I consider different 5 different shocks to noncollege men’s wage
profiles. All shocks reduce present-discounted lifetime wages by 10%, but they vary in
their emphasis on reduced returns to experience (∆r̂) versus reduced initial wage offers
(∆wNC,0). I find that a shock that places more emphasis on reduced returns to experience
results in a smaller marriage multiplier. Specifically, as reduced returns to experience
go from accounting for none of the overall wage shock to all of it, the marriage market
multiplier falls from around 2.0 to 1.5. However, such a shock creates a larger period-0
employment response, as both labor market and marriage market effects rise in absolute
terms.32 Thus, labor market shocks that reduce the wage growth of noncollege men play a
31Specifically, I reduce initial wage offers by 9.15% and wage growth by 1.5p.p.. The importance of period
1 relative to period 0, β, is calibrated to 1.33 (see Appendix A.5 for details on this choice). This implies that
the present-discounted lifetime wage reduction is 9.15% · 12.33 + (9.15 + 1.5)% ·
1.33
2.33 = 10%.
32See Elsby and Shapiro (2012) for a model of the labor market effect of a reduction in the experience-
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particularly important role in their falling marriage market value, and in marriage-market-
induced withdrawal from the workforce.
1.5.3 Some external validation
Recent work by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019) has revealed economically signifi-
cant relationships among labor market demand, young men’s employment and marriage.
These authors estimated that rising import competition from China in male-dominated
sectors led to lower marriage and a greater share of men living without children in the
affected communities. They additionally found an increase in the shares of young men not
employed and not in the labor force. Table A3 of their study reports that a 1-unit male
trade shock, over the period of a decade and holding constant female trade shocks, is as-
sociated with a $3, 737 loss in annual earnings for the median-earning man, a 3.06p.p. (or
3.7%) decline in male employment, and a 1.97p.p. (or 2.2%) decline in male labor-force
participation. Under an assumption described in Appendix A.5, I convert this earnings loss
into an 8.5% decline in hourly wages. The elasticities implied by these numbers are 0.41
for employment and 0.26 for participation—larger than nearly all uncompensated labor
supply elasticity estimates reported in the literature.
In Table 1.8, I compare the model-simulated effects of a 10% male wage shock to the
estimated effects of a 1-unit male trade shock. The effects are quite similar. Scaling the
trade shock estimates by a factor of 10/8.5, we see that a male trade shock that induces
a 10% decline in wages results in a 1.97 · 10/8.5 = 2.32p.p. decline in male labor-force
participation, while the model predicts a 2.30p.p. decline. The trade shock results in a 3.57 ·
10/8.5 = 4.20p.p. decline in marriage, while the model predicts a 3.93p.p. decline. Perhaps
most important, the trade shock estimates imply a young male participation elasticity of
0.26, while the simulation estimates imply an elasticity of 0.25. The parity of these results
suggests that a substantial portion of the young male employment effects of rising import
competition from China was generated by marriage market forces. It also suggests that
the model’s predictions have some degree of external validity, at least with respect to the
1990-2014 period examined by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019).
1.6 Conclusion
This paper identifies the changing marriage market as a partial explanation for the
concerning decline in employment of young men in the United States since the 1960s. To
earnings profile.
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illustrate why the marriage market might incentivize young men to seek employment, I
present a marital matching framework in which men take a pre-match employment deci-
sion. When gains from traditional gender role specialization drive the economic benefits of
marriage, the framework predicts that the men who work the hardest before marriage en-
ter the highest-surplus marriages and claim the largest shares of these surpluses. Such men
thus earn a marriage market return—in addition to the usual labor market return—from
investing in stable employment. Changes in the marriage market that affect the economic
benefits of marriage affect this return and, consequently, young men’s equilibrium level of
employment.
I develop and test two implications of this marriage market channel. First, a reduc-
tion in the gains from specialization makes noncollege men less attractive as marriage
partners, and hence lowers the marriage market return they earn from investing in em-
ployment. I test this implication by leveraging two specific marriage market interven-
tions that plausibly reduced gains from specialization: the adoption of unilateral divorce
legislation, and shocks to young women’s employment opportunities (holding men’s op-
portunities constant). I estimate that these interventions generated 29% of the observed
1965-2015 decline in labor-force participation by young noncollege men. Second, a reduc-
tion in noncollege men’s labor market opportunities not only reduces labor market returns
to employment, but also reduces marriage market returns through its effect on gains from
specialization. Simulations of a calibrated structural model find that the “indirect” effect
of a 10% reduction in noncollege men’s wages on employment, operating through the mar-
riage market, is roughly as large as the “direct” labor market effect. These results establish
the marriage market channel as a quantitatively important driver of secular decline young
men’s employment.
These findings enhance our understanding of secular decline in prime-age men’s em-
ployment. Observers of this trend have tended to cite falling labor demand as its primary
cause. This explanation is problematic because it requires a larger responsiveness of men’s
employment to wages than is revealed by the historical record (and in quasi-experimental
studies of wage changes generated by tax policy). An explanation that features interaction
between the labor market and the marriage market helps resolve this problem, particularly
for younger men, given that older displaced workers have greater access to savings and
disability benefits. In addition, the marriage market channel emphasized here likely inter-
acts with the rising fraction of noncollege men with prison records. (See Charles and Luoh,
2010 and Schneider, Harknett and Stimpson (2018) for arguments that mass incarceration
has disrupted family formation). Young men released from prison may invest less in em-
ployment in part because they face lower marriage prospects—especially if discrimination
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in the labor market makes the securing of stable employment harder for such men.
This paper expands a growing body of theory and evidence linking marriage market
forces to human capital investments. The ground seems fertile for seeding further expan-
sions. For example, health can be thought of as human capital (Grossman, 1972). An
important narrative posits that adverse labor demand shocks have increased drug-abuse-
related morbidity and mortality among noncollege men (Case and Deaton, 2015; Coile
and Duggan, 2019; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2019). Such a narrative is potentially too
crude: we may have much to learn from incorporating interactions between labor demand
and marriage prospects into the study of risky health behavior.33 Investments in housing
have also recently been linked to marriage formation (Lafortune and Low, 2017), but a
framework that considers the joint determination of both outcomes is yet to be seen.
Future research should consider extending the modeling framework used in this paper.
The reduced-form results shown here on unilateral divorce causally demonstrate that a
change in contracting technology over an uncertain future affects pre-marital investments.
This suggests a fruitful extension of the matching environment to allow for uncertainty,
limited commitment, and unilateral divorce. Such an extension also pairs with modeling
the choices of individuals to enter non-marital cohabitation—an arrangement that features
low exit costs but also low commitment. Extending econometric matching models in these
ways will likely offer richer quantitative predictions on the forces determining human
capital investments and the socioeconomic returns such investments receive.
33For example, Duncan, Wilkerson and England (2006) reported a decline in male drug and alcohol use
upon transition into marriage.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Labor-force participation rates by education status:
Men aged 25-34
Notes: March CPS data, 1964-2017. Overall sample is white or black non-Hispanic men aged 25-34. Indi-
viduals in the “HS or less” sub-sample completed at most one year of college education. Individuals in the
“BA or more” sub-sample completed at least 4 years of college education. Graph presents 3-year-centered
moving averages.
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Figure 1.2: Average wage and participation trends in modern U.S. history:
Men without college, ages 25-34
Notes: Sample is white or black non-Hispanic men, aged 25-34, with at most one year of completed college.
Reported values are relative to the base year: for example, 0.9 means a 10% decline since the base year.
Panel A: March CPS data, 1973-2016. Graph displays 3-year moving averages. Average hourly earnings
from wage-and-salary income are constructed in a manner described in Appendix A.2. Wage offers for non-
workers are imputed using the method of Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991), described in Appendix A.2. Wage
trends are not sensitive to whether non-workers are included or excluded, or to whether business income
is included. Panel B: U.S. Census data, 1940-2000. American Community Survey data, 2005-2007 and
2014-2016. Average weekly earnings from wage-and-salary income are constructed in a manner described
in Appendix A.2. Wage trends are not sensitive to whether business income is included.
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Figure 1.3: Employment and marriage propensities across birth cohorts of noncollege-
educated men
Notes: March CPS data, 1962-2017. Sample consists of men with at most one year of completed college
and who are not currently enrolled in school. Age 35-39 marriage values for the 1982-84 cohort are not yet
available: these values are predicted based on age 30-33 values in a manner described in Appendix A.2.
39
Figure 1.4: 2-period model of men’s pre-marital employment and marriage
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium employment and marriage for noncollege-educated men
Notes: See discussion in Section 1.3.2
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Figure 1.6: Comparative static: Reduction in marital surplus added by noncollege men
Notes: See discussion in Section 1.3.2
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Figure 1.7: Life-cycle employment behavior among NLSY79 men without college
Notes: NLSY79 non-Hispanic men with high-school education or less. Sample is divided into two groups,
as described in the figure. For group 2, “single” means neither married nor cohabiting with an unmarried
partner. Non-marital cohabitations were identified using the method of Oppenheimer (2003). For each
group, age profiles of labor-force participation and employment rates are plotted. Each point records a 2-
year average of group behavior: for example, the point at age 21 records average behavior over ages 21 and
22. 659 men are in group 1 and 289 are in group 2.
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Figure 1.8: Comparative static: Reduction in noncollege men’s wage offers
Notes: This figure graphs the equilibrium effects of a reduction in noncollege men’s wage offers: some
combination of a reduction in initial wages wNC,0 and a reduction in the returns to experience r̂. The
population employment rate in period 0 is depicted by the vertical dot-dash line. The initial “labor market
effect” of the shock shifts the population marginal benefit curve downward. The subsequent “marriage
market effect” occurs as the marriage market adjusts to the erosion in noncollege men’s earnings prospects,
resulting in fewer noncollege men marrying at a lower surplus share. Such a change is captured by a
downward shift of the orange locus in the bottom graph. This result in a further downward shift of the




Table 1.1: Strong association between initial employment behavior and subsequent marriage propensity: NLSY79 men with-
out college
Outcome: % weeks in LF, ages 21-31 % weeks employed, ages 21-31
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Effect of 0-to-1
increase in marriage, 7.3∗∗∗ 6.7∗∗∗ 8.2∗∗∗ 7.6∗∗∗ 11.9∗∗∗ 10.8∗∗∗ 12.4∗∗∗ 11.3∗∗∗
ages 32-40 (0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5)
Mean outcome,
never-marrieds 85.8 85.8 85.8 85.8 73.5 73.5 73.5 73.5
N 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500 1, 500
Controls
% married X X X X X X X X
% non-marital cohab. X X X X
initial wage offer X X X X
Notes: NLSY79 data. Sample consists of men with at most one year of completed college and who are not currently enrolled in school. Top row reports
estimated marginal effects of a 0-to-1 increase in the share of time spent married over ages 32-40 on the share of time spent employed while ages
21-31. Even-numbered columns control for the log of the individual’s hourly wage, averaged over the first 3 years since the individual left school.
Hourly wage data are processed in a manner described in Appendix A.2. Non-marital cohabitations are constructed using the method of Oppenheimer
(2003). Regressions are weighted by NLSY79 sampling weights multiplied by the number of employment observations in the reference period. Triple
asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.2: Effects of marriage market interventions on noncollege men’s marriage propen-
sities
Currently married: all men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intervention 1: mutual consent→ unilateral divorce
Effect of −1.7∗∗∗ −2.4∗∗∗ −1.3∗∗ −1.8∗∗∗ −2.0∗∗∗ −2.1∗∗∗
legal change (0.6) (0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7)
100−control mean 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2
Pre-trends p-val 0.62 0.44 0.16 0.03 0.19 0.39
N (thousands) 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151
Intervention 2: increased demand for female employment
Effect of 10 p.p. −1.7∗∗∗ −1.1∗∗ −2.5∗∗∗ −1.5∗∗∗ −2.4∗∗∗ −1.6∗∗∗
Bartik shock (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
100−control mean 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2
N 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888
Controls
Baseline X X X X X X
Demos×linear trend X X X
Region effects X X
State/division effects X X
Notes: Sample is single men with 5-20 years of potential experience, not enrolled in school, at least 16
years old, and with at most one year of college education. “100−control mean” reports the percentage of
individuals not currently married in a mutual consent regime (Intervention 1) or in 1980 (Intervention 2).
Standard statistical significance legend used. Intervention 1: OLS models based on individual data from
1960-1990 U.S. Census samples. See text for detail on baseline and additional controls. Robust standard
errors are clustered on state. Regressions are weighted by Census person weights. Pre-trends p-values are
p-values from an F -test of the hypothesis that the effect of unilateral divorce is 0 before the passage of
unilateral divorce. Specifically, event-time is grouped into 5-year bins (due to the decadal frequency of
Census data) and event-study coefficients are estimated relative to the bin containing 5-to-1 years before
law passage. The F -test is whether the coefficients corresponding to “10-to-6” and “at least 11” years before
law passage are jointly zero. Intervention 2: OLS models based on commuting-zone-average data at 4 time
points: 1980, 1990, 2000 (U.S. Censuses) and 2015 (2014-2017 American Community Surveys). Bartik
instruments are constructed using samples of men and women with 0-20 years potential experience, not
enrolled in school, and with at most one year of college education. See text for detail on baseline and
additional controls. Robust standard errors are clustered on commuting zone. Regressions are weighted by
1980 sample population shares for each commuting zone.
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Table 1.3: Effects of marriage market interventions on noncollege men’s labor-force par-
ticipation
In the labor force: single men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intervention 1: mutual consent→ unilateral divorce
Effect of −1.0∗ −1.4∗ −0.9∗ −1.3∗∗ −1.9∗∗∗ −1.9∗∗
legal change (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.9)
100−control mean 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
Pre-trends p-val 0.39 0.62 0.22 0.06 0.84 0.99
N (thousands) 859 859 859 859 859 859
Intervention 2: increased demand for female employment
Effect of 10 p.p. −0.8 −0.8 −1.4∗∗∗ −1.3∗∗ −1.5∗∗∗ −1.3∗∗
Bartik shock (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
100−control mean 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9
N 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888
Controls
Baseline X X X X X X
Demos×linear trend X X X
Region effects X X
State/division effects X X
Notes: See above table. Everything is the same except that the sample is currently single men with 0-15 years
of potential experience. “100−control mean” reports the percentage of individuals not in the labor force in a
mutual consent regime (Intervention 1) or in 1980 (Intervention 2). Standard statistical significance legend
used.
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Table 1.4: Small effects of marriage market interventions on noncollege men’s wages
Log weekly wage/100: single men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intervention 1: mutual consent→ unilateral divorce
Effect of −0.7 −0.7 0.5 0.5 −2.4 −2.2
legal change (2.0) (2.4) (1.4) (1.4) (2.9) (3.2)
N (thousands) 685 685 685 685 685 685
Intervention 2: increased demand for female employment
Effect of 10 p.p. 1.1 −1.6 1.9 −1.0 1.7 −1.2
Bartik shock (1.3) (1.1) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1)
N 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888
Controls
Baseline X X X X X X
Demos×linear trend X X X
Region effects X X
State/division effects X X
Notes: Sample and regression specifications are the same as in the above table. See Appendix B for informa-
tion on computation of log weekly wages. Standard statistical significance legend used.
Table 1.5: Contributions of marriage market interventions to secular decline in young
noncollege men’s LFP
Intervention: Unilateral divorce 10p.p. female employment shock
Time period: 1965-1980 1980-2015
Average effect of
intervention (p.p.) −0.65 −1.35
Average exposure
to intervention 0.54 1.40
Predicted LFP
response (p.p.) −0.35 −1.89
Observed LFP




Notes: Computations based on U.S. Census data and labor-force participation regression results. Sample is
men not enrolled in school, at least 16 years old, with at most one year of completed college, and with 0-15
years potential experience. The first row reports the estimated effect of the intervention on the labor-force
participation rate of this sample, averaged across the 6 specifications (see Appendix Table A.4 for regression
results). The second row reports the increase in national exposure to this intervention over the specified
period. The predicted change in LFP resulting from the intervention, reported in the third row, is the product
of the first two rows. The contribution of the intervention to the observed decline is reported in the last row,
and is equal to the third row divided by the fourth row.
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Table 1.6: Baseline structural estimation results
Panel A: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Symbol Estimated Value
Disutility of participation λ 2.08
Substitution parameter γ 1.14
Marital value scalar, NC women αNC 1.81
Marital value scalar, C women αC 1.70
Signal value of working hard, NC men µ 0.124
Aversion to opposite education type ξ 1.08
Marital taste scale σε 0.181
Panel B: Model Fit
Moment Description 1980s U.S. data Model
Period-0 LFP rate, to-be-singles 0.842 0.842
Period-0 LFP rate, to-be-marrieds 0.932 0.932
Uncompensated supply elasticity 0.100 0.100
Share NC women married 0.768 0.768
Share C women married 0.783 0.783
Share NC men married 0.764 0.764
Share C men married 0.790 0.790
Correlation of marrieds’ C statuses 0.46 0.46
Notes: Parameters estimated by the Method of Simulated Moments. Period-0 labor-force participation for
always-single and always-married groups are computed from NLSY79 data on noncollege individuals aged
21-31, with wages fixed at the noncollege sample average. See Table 1.1 and Section 1.3.3 for further detail.
Baseline marriage propensities are computed on individuals aged 35-39 and born in 1942-48 from the March
CPS. See Figure 1.3 notes for further detail. College is defined as at least 2 years completed college. The
uncompensated supply elasticity of 0.1 is a baseline calibration discussed in Section 1.5.1. The assortative
matching (correlation) parameter comes from Greenwood et al. (2016) and is based on 1980 U.S. Census
data.
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Table 1.7: Simulation of the effect of a 10% reduction in earning potential on noncollege
men’s outcomes
Group: Singles Married to: All
NC woman C woman
Panel A: Baseline equilibrium
Population share 0.238 0.631 0.132 1.000
Marr. surplus share N/A 0.520 0.316 N/A
Period-0 LFP rate 0.842 0.932 0.932 0.911
Panel B: Changes induced by labor market shock
∆ Pop share .039 −.033 −.006 .000
∆ Surplus share N/A −.013 −.088 N/A
∆ LFP rate −.013 −.022 −.022 −.023
Marriage market multiplier: .023.013 = 1.77
Notes: Panel A records baseline equilibrium statistics. Panel B describes how much these equilibrium statistics
change after noncollege men’s wage offers are negatively shocked by 10 percent. See Section 5 of text for
discussion. The marriage market multiplier for labor-force participation is ratio of the “All” response to the
“Singles” response. It measures the extent to which endogenous marriage market responses amplify the
direct effects of the labor market shock. See Section 1.5.2 for further discussion.
Table 1.8: Shocks to young men’s labor market opportunities: comparison of modeled
responses to those estimated by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019)
Empirical setting:
Male trade shock Reduction in wages
identified by simulated by
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019). the model.
Effect of: 1-unit trade shock −10% wage shock
%∆ observed wages −8.5% −10.0%
∆ LFP rate −1.97p.p. −2.30p.p.
∆ marriage propensity −3.57p.p. −3.93p.p.
Notes: Male-specific labor market shocks driven by rising import competition from China were identified by
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019) for the population of men aged 18-39. See Section 1.5.3 of the main text for
further detail. Modeled responses apply to the population of noncollege men at least 18 years old and with
0-15 years of potential labor market experience. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019) found the China shock to
disproportionately affect low-earning men who are likeliest to be noncollege-educated.
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CHAPTER II
Intergenerational Transmission of Women’s Employment
Status: Micro Evidence and Macro Implications
Abstract
Measurement of the intergenerational transmission of women’s employment status has
been limited by a lack of detailed data on mothers’ and daughters’ employment behav-
iors. This paper leverages the genealogical structure and long duration of the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics to construct such a data set and to estimate intergenerational em-
ployment relationships. The intergenerational relationship is found to be strongest at the
full-time employment margin for college-educated mothers, and substantially weaker at
less-intensive employment margins and for less-educated mothers. The paper also docu-
ments a stark rise in inequality in mothers’ full-time employment propensities in the 21st
century, and attributes roughly 36% of this trend to differential intergenerational trans-
mission across education groups. These results suggest a disproportionate influence in
high-SES families of the childhood environment on gender identity, and that family-level
transmission processes deepen the long-run effects of unequal labor market opportunities
on inequality in mothers’ career outcomes.
JEL Codes: E71, J13, J22
Keywords: female labor supply, gender identity, social norms, intergenerational transmis-
sion
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the roles played by gender identity and intergenerational processes in
women’s labor market outcomes has become the subject of a burgeoning literature in the
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study of populations (Bertrand, 2011). An initial contribution by Fortin (2005) found
societal gender-role attitudes to be important in explaining cross-country differences in
women’s employment. Subsequent works examined the persistence of these effects across
generations (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Alesina, Giuliano and
Nunn, 2013), finding strong correlations between the labor market behaviors of second-
generation immigrant women and prevailing gender-role attitudes and labor-force partic-
ipation rates in their countries of ancestry.1 Farré and Vella (2013) found strong associa-
tions between mothers’ gender-role attitudes and those voiced by their children in a U.S.
sample of mother-child pairs.
These findings suggest that gender identities and, possibly, employment statuses them-
selves are transmitted within societies from mothers to their daughters. Yet, empirical
evidence on the intergenerational transmission of women’s employment status is scant
in the literature. Quantifying this relationship can shed light on the possible importance
of transmissions of gender identity and mother-acquired labor market skills to daughters’
employment prospects. These processes, in turn, have implications for how women plan
employment spells around childbirth (Rendall and Shattuck, 2019), and how this behavior
affects female earnings paths and the gender gaps over the life-cycle (Kleven, Landais and
Sogaard, 2019). In addition, intergenerational relationships can inform the long-run evo-
lution of women’s labor market progress, as well as the long-run effects of labor market
policies enacted at one point in time on the employment outcomes of subsequent genera-
tions. In this paper, I present and interpret new estimates of intergenerational employment
relationships for recent cohorts of women in the United States.
Assessing the intergenerational transmission of women’s employment status requires
a consideration of the diversity of choices and opportunities that inform women’s labor
market behavior. This consideration is increasingly important as women’s labor-force ex-
periences have become increasingly complex and unequally distributed since the 1970s
(Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Goldin and Mitchell, 2017). Table 2.1, for example, shows a
modest increase between 1979 and 2015 in the shares of women (and mothers) work-
ing at all, but a larger increase in the shares working full-time.2 The table also shows a
widening education gap in employment propensities, especially for mothers. Between 1979
1The related work of Boustan and Collins (2014) argued that the institution of slavery resulted in trans-
mission of different gender norms by race. Such a process is shown to help explain the racial gap in female
labor-force participation that persisted in the U.S. for most of the 20th century. Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti
(2004) also found that women born in states with larger draft rates of men into World War II—a shock that
pushed more mothers into the workforce—exhibited higher employment rates as adults.
2The table is based on March Current Population Survey data, and the sample consists of white or black
women aged 25-44. Employment measures are based on reported hours worked in the reference year (i.e.
the year preceding the survey year).
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and 2015, the at-all employment propensity gap between college- and less-educated moth-
ers widened from .046 (= .651 − .565) to .123 (= .784 − .661); the full-time employment
propensity gap widened from .033 (= .264− .231) to .164 (= .570− .406). As an increasing
share of daughters are raised by full-time-employed mothers—but disproportionately so
for daughters of highly-educated mothers—intergenerational processes may increasingly
contribute to (inequality in) contemporary women’s employment outcomes.
This paper uses multiple sources of U.S. data to estimate intergenerational employ-
ment relationships between mothers and their daughters, and to roughly quantify the
impact of intergenerational transmission on 21st century developments in mothers’ em-
ployment. Exploiting the genealogical structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), I construct variables summarizing the extent to which a first-generation mother
worked throughout her daughter’s upbringing. I then link these variables to the employ-
ment behavior of the second-generation daughter once she has become an adult and, in
many cases, had children of her own. The resulting dataset is one of few existence in
which it is possible to observe detailed employment information, covering a long time pe-
riod and similar age ranges, of both mothers and their daughters. I analyze heterogeneity
in intergenerational transmission by estimating logistic regressions of second-generation
women’s employment on their mothers’ employment histories, for various employment
margins (e.g. employed at all versus employed full-time) and subgroups (e.g. skilled
versus less-skilled women).
Three results emerge. First, the intergenerational employment relationship is stronger
at more intensive employment statuses. That is, how much a mother worked part-time
while raising her daughter matters only modestly for her daughter’s eventual part-time
employment status. But a mother’s full-time employment history matters much more for
her daughter’s eventual full-time employment status. Second, the intergenerational rela-
tionship strengthens when the second-generation sample of skilled women is limited to
mothers with young children. Third, and perhaps most salient, the intergenerational re-
lationship is stronger in skilled families than in less-skilled families. These results suggest
that the decisions of skilled women to hold on to their full-time careers while raising young
children are particularly sensitive to whether their own mothers did the same.
Motivated by the education gradient to these results, I then turn to a quantification of
the role played by intergenerational transmission in the recent evolution of the education
gap in mothers’ full-time employment behavior. Using a large and nationally representa-
tive sample from the Current Population Survey, I document a marked increase between
1999 and 2016 in the share of college-educated mothers working full-time. Less-educated
mothers, on the other hand, experienced virtually no increase in full-time employment.
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I also document a similarly-timed divergence in gender-role attitudes in the General So-
cial Survey. Using a regression decomposition exercise, I attribute roughly 36 percent of
widening inequality in full-time employment to differential intergenerational transmission
by skill level. Intergenerational forces are substantially more important in explaining this
recent development than the combination of the other “economic” variables considered
(e.g. wages, partners’ incomes, age at childbearing and child burdens).
It is important to note that the intergenerational employment relationships estimated
here lack an explicit causal interpretation, as they are determined by several mechanisms
operating in tandem.3 These include the influence of the childhood environment on gender
identity, the transmission of skills acquired by a first-generation mother that facilitate an
effective balance of work and family demands, and the inheritance of fixed characteristics
that systematically differ between families (e.g. motivation to work hard). However, the
found education gradient to the intergenerational employment relationship suggests that
the transmissions of gender identity and work-family-balancing skills, or the effects of
these transmissions on employment status, are stronger within higher-SES families. These
heterogeneous transmission processes across families play a potentially important role in
emerging inequality in mothers’ career outcomes.
One implication of this paper is that not just inequality between women and men, but
also inequality across women, should be considered in the design of policies to help women
balance work and family demands (Blau and Kahn, 2013). This implication also raises the
question of whether gender identity impacts the responsiveness of women to such policies.
2.2 Intergenerational Perspective on Women’s Labor Supply
The decisions of whether and how much time to spend working in the paid labor force
depend on how one’s market wage compares with the values placed on alternative uses of
time. These alternative uses are usually categorized as leisure or as working in the home
(Gronau, 1977)—the latter of which has long been considered an important determinant
of women’s labor supply behavior (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986).
2.2.1 Incorporating gender identity and family transmission into the economic frame-
work
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) augmented the purely economic calculus by incorporating
the concept of identity. In this augmented framework, the relative valuation of a woman’s
3The intergenerational transmission of earnings status, the subject of a rich literature in economics, is
also a non-causal parameter. See the classic reference of Solon (1999) for discussion.
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time at home depends not just on prevailing economic conditions, but also on norms re-
garding how women ought to spend their time. Another influential framework of Stryker
and Burke (2000) posits the interaction of two forces in the formation of individual iden-
tity: social structures and self-conception. That is, norms about women and work can be
dictated “externally” by society-at-large (i.e. individuals and structures in the woman’s
reference network), as well as shaped “internally” from the woman’s own lived experi-
ences within her household. Societal-level norms may differ from and compete against
household-level conceptions, as found by Fuwa (2004) in a cross-country sample: holding
a household’s own gender ideology constant, more household gender inequality was found
in less-egalitarian countries.
The transmission of gender identity at the family level has long been the subject of a
literature in developmental psychology. Several researchers have mounted evidence sup-
porting a socialization process, in which children learn about prevailing gender norms from
their parents (Marantz and Mansfield, 1977; Eccles, Jacobs and Harold, 1990; McHale,
Crouter and Tucker, 1999; McHale, Crouter and Whiteman, 2003; Galambos, 2004). Thus,
a mother’s employment choice potentially determines the prescriptions associated with
motherhood taken up by her daughter, and affects the daughter’s employment choice when
she raises a family of her own. The mother’s decision to work while raising her daughter
may also reflect certain predispositions or skills that are then transmitted to the daughter,
such as a motivation to work hard, or practical tips about how to balance career and family.
These observations suggest that the strength of a given intergenerational employment
relationship is determined by the interaction of family-level processes with norms dictated
by society-at-large, and with the standard economic calculus:
Hypothesis 2.1: The effect of a mother’s particular employment choice, while raising her
daughter, on her daughter’s eventual choice depends on the extents to which this particular
choice: i) shapes the gender identity, or reflects the employment-relevant predispositions
and skills, carried by the given daughter into adulthood; and ii) is regulated by societal
norms, or is made out of economic necessity.
2.2.2 Possible heterogeneity in intergenerational transmission
To a larger extent than men, women decide between working at all, working part-time
or working full-time (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). These margins of choice inter-
act with family structure: most importantly, the presence of pre-school-age children in the
household. As reflected in Table 2.1, women with pre-school-age children still have low
propensities for full-time employment, but this group has experienced the largest increase
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since the 1970s. Moreover, rising inequality in women’s labor market opportunities (Au-
tor, 2014) presents skilled women with increasingly different cost-benefit analyses than
less-skilled women. This is reflected in widening education gaps, particularly in full-time
employment (Table 2.1).
Drawing on Hypothesis 2.1, there is reason to suspect that these different margins
of choice, in different sub-populations, will be affected differently by intergenerational
dynamics:
• A stronger intergenerational effect is likely to exist at more intensive employment
margins. This is because, by the late 20th century, most women maintained some
degree of attachment to the labor force (Goldin, 2006). The fact that a daugh-
ter’s mother worked on an occasional basis may not constitute an informative signal.
On the other hand, very few mothers worked full-time. A daughter whose mother
worked full-time may enter adulthood with a substantially greater willingness to
balance full-time work with the demands of being a woman in a gendered society,
relative to a daughter raised by a mother without a full-time career. This relationship
could reflect greater gender identity formation, or greater transmission of career-
relevant skills.
• A different intergenerational effect is likely to exist for women with young children,
versus in the full population of women. As suggested by the developmental psy-
chology literature, a daughter’s observation of her mother’s behavior may shape her
identity particularly with respect to the intersection of work and motherhood. On the
other hand, the decision of a mother with young children to enter (full-time) work
may be heavily regulated by societal norms, or may be economically infeasible due
to child care costs (Blau, 2003). Whether the identity effect or the socioeconomic
feasibility effect dominates is an empirical question for the data.
• The intergenerational effect and the above-hypothesized gradients are likely to differ
by family skill level. There are three reasons to suspect a positive skill gradient. First,
relative to skilled women, less-skilled women may choose to work more for reasons
of economic necessity, and less to take advantage of attractive employment opportu-
nities or egalitarian gender identities.4 Second, a slack labor market may present
less-skilled mothers with few attractive opportunities for full-time employment—
whereas highly-skilled mothers have better opportunities to choose between working
4Less-educated women are likelier to be unmarried and to have lower-earning partners (Lundberg, Pollak
and Stearns, 2016).
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part-time and pursuing an attractive full-time career (Goldin, 2014). Third, inegali-
tarian norms appear to be stronger among less-skilled men (Bertrand, Kamenica and
Pan, 2015), suggesting that less-skilled women’s behavior may be more heavily reg-
ulated by societal pressures. On the other hand, a less-skilled mother’s decision to
pursue a full-time career, made despite (even in defiance of) these challenges, may
particularly empower her daughter to behave similarly in adulthood. Once again,
these trade-offs between socioeconomic feasibility and identity are theoretically am-
biguous, and must be assessed in the data.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study assembles a two-generation
dataset that links mothers’ and daughters’ labor supply behavior at similar points in adult-
hood. This permits a direct measurement of the intergenerational transmission mecha-
nism, and an assessment of its variance across these dimensions of heterogeneity. I know
of only two other studies that analyze similar data in a U.S. context: Olivetti, Patacchini
and Zenou (2016), which uses AddHealth data,5 and Galassi, Koll and Mayr (2018), which
uses NLSY data. This study extends these in two ways: first, by testing for heterogeneity
in the intergenerational transmission relationship; and second, by quantifying the implica-
tions of heterogeneous intergenerational transmission processes for aggregate movements
in U.S. women’s employment behavior.
2.3 PSID Data and Methods
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) contains rich information on the work be-
havior of an individual’s parents. The landmark 50-years-and-counting longitudinal study
began following families in 1968, asking respondents about their work behaviors in 1967.
Using the genealogical structure of the survey, which allows one to link individuals to-
gether with their family members (even if they are no longer living in the same house-
hold), one can observe the full work history of an individual’s mother, for any individual
born in 1967 or later to one of the multiple thousands of original PSID families.
2.3.1 Sample construction and summary statistics
Using this information I construct several variables aimed to summarize a mother’s
work history throughout her daughter’s upbringing. The first variable, MOM WORK, records
5One limitation of the AddHealth intergenerational data is that it is only possible to observe the first-
generation mother’s work behavior for one year, when the daughter is 15-18 years old. (See Olivetti, Patac-
chini and Zenou, 2016 for detail.) On the other hand, the PSID enables one to observe the first-generation
mother’s work behavior throughout the daughter’s entire upbringing.
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the share of years throughout her daughter’s childhood that a given mother was employed
at all (i.e. supplied positive hours of work during the reference year). The second variable,
MOM PT, records the share of years that the mother was employed part-time or greater—
defined in this paper as being employed for at least 400 hours during the reference year.
The third variable, MOM FTFY, records the share of years that the mother was employed
full-time—defined as being employed for at least 1600 hours.
I constructed these variables using 3 different daughter age ranges—0 to 17, 0 to 10,
and 6 to 17—and verified that the 3 measures were highly correlated and produced similar
results. The preferred specifications use the 6 to 17 age range because this results in the
largest sample size. Specifically, using the 6 to 17 age range allows me to bring the 1961
through 1966 cohorts into the sample, cohorts which would have been left out if I used
the 0 to 10 or 0 to 17 age ranges (since the observation period begins in 1967). I set these
variables to missing if information on the mother’s work history is missing for more than
6 of the 12 reference years.
Next, I construct a sample of second-generation women who are current heads of their
own households, or are partners of the heads. I keep only women born between 1961 and
1987—the range of years in which it is possible to reliably observe both the first-generation
mother’s full work history and the second-generation woman’s work behavior—and who
are members of original 1968 PSID families. Because I am interested in modeling these
individuals’ employment behaviors relatively early in their career cycles—when they are
likeliest to be raising their own children—I focus on a sample of women aged 22-49. Using
the genealogical structure of the survey, I collect these women’s mothers’ person identifiers,
and then merge information on the women to information on their mothers’ work histories
using these person identifiers.
Table 2.2 summarizes the resulting sample. Statistics are weighted by original PSID
family weights. The sample contains 21, 980 woman-year observations, covering 2, 228
unique women. Thus, the average woman was observed around 9.9 times, with earlier
birth cohorts observed more often: the average birth year of the sample is 1970, though
the range of birth years covered is 1961-1987. The woman-year observations range from
the 1983 interview year to the 2015 year, with the mean observation coming from 2004.
The average age of the sample is 33.5 years, roughy 8 percent of the sample is black,
and one-third of the sample has a 4-year college degree. 44 percent of the observations
correspond to “young mothers:” women who have at least one child under the age of 6
living in the household. These young-mother households have an average of 1.43 young
children. The overwhelming majority of the sample lived in a household with a gainfully
employed male partner: the average male partner earned roughly $54, 000 (expressed at
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2010 prices).
Table 2.2 also records statistics of interest on the second-generation women’s mothers.
41 percent of first-generation mothers had completed some college education. The average
first-generation mother in the sample was employed at all roughly 68 percent of the time
while her daughter was aged 6-17 years old, with some mothers employed none of the
time and some mothers employed all of the time. The average first-generation mother was
employed full-time, full-year only around 31 percent of the time throughout her daughter’s
upbringing—once again, with some mothers fully employed none of the time and others
fully employed all of the time. Thus, there exists substantial variation across second-
generation women in the education and employment experiences of their mothers.
2.3.2 Regression methodology
Consistent with the definitions of first-generation mothers’ employment histories, I con-
struct three corresponding measures of second-generation women’s employment statuses:
binary indicators for being employed at all last year, working at least 400 hours, and work-
ing at least 1600 hours (full-time). For a given second-generation woman i observed in
survey year t, I model the probability of achieving the kth employment status (where k =
“at all”, “at least part time”, or “full-time, full-year”) as a logistic function of the kth mea-
sure of her mother’s employment history:
Pr(2nd gen emp status kist = 1) =
1
1 + e−(1st gen emp statusi·γks+Xit·βks)
. (2.1)
By applying logistic regression to this equation, we can estimate γ, the intergenera-
tional coefficient of interest. As hypothesized in Section 2.2, the strength of the inter-
generational employment relationship likely depends on the measure of employment (k)
and the nature of the sub-sample (s). Regarding the latter, we are interested in measur-
ing how the intergenerational coefficient varies when we restrict the sample to mothers
with young children, and when we vary the sample’s skill level. In the results that follow,
I present two alternative cuts of the sample on skill level: one according to whether the
first-generation mother had obtained any college education, and one according to whether
the second-generation woman had obtained a 4-year college degree.
I gauge the sensitivity of these intergenerational relationships to the inclusion of other
economic and demographic characteristics Xit. One important set of controls, for clar-
ity of interpretation, consists of birth cohort fixed effects. This is because first-generation
mothers’ employments have trended upward throughout the sample period. If second-
generation women born later also work more, for reasons unrelated to intergenerational
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transmission, the coincidental nature of these first- and second-generation trends will
nonetheless lead us to estimate a significant intergenerational response. Controlling for
birth cohort fixed effects rules out such a coincidence. I also include controls for parental
education and race.
In addition to these “background” controls, I also include a set of “contemporaneous”
controls, designed to capture other economic and demographic determinants of women’s
labor supply (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986). These include the log real hourly wage
offer, a quadratic in husband or partner’s earnings, a quadratic in the number of chil-
dren aged 0-5, the number of children aged 6-10, and a quadratic in age. The real hourly
wage offer is simply observed wage income divided by hours employed (expressed at 2010
prices) for women who were employed at all in the given reference year. I impute hourly
wage offers for women who were not employed at all, based on observed wages of demo-
graphically similar women, via a procedure described in Appendix Section B.2.4.
The preferred interpretation of the kth intergenerational transmission relationship is
the effect of a 0-to-1 change in the first-generation mother’s kth employment history mea-
sure, holding these background and contemporaneous variables fixed. This describes the
amount by which being raised by a first-generation mother who achieved employment
status k every year changes the second-generation woman’s probability of obtaining em-
ployment status k, relative to being raised by a mother who never achieved employment
status k. In the results that follow, I present estimates of these marginal effects, holding the
other control variables constant at their sub-sample means (i.e., Xs). I denote the estimate







One can also use logit odds ratio methodology to interpret the results. The estimate of





This expression describes how many times more likely it is that a typical second-
generation woman of sub-sample s, whose mother always achieved employment status
k throughout her childhood, achieved employment status k than a comparable woman
whose mother never achieved employment status k.
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2.4 Intergenerational Regression Results
As a baseline exercise, I start by pooling all second-generation women together and
examining the full-time, full-year (FTFY) employment margin. Table 2.3 reports estimated
marginal effects (expressed in percentage points /100) of a 0-to-1 change in MOM FTFY,
calculated at sample means. Robust standard errors are clustered at the individual level
and appear below the coefficients in parentheses.
Looking at column 1, a simple bivariate regression yields a positive and highly sig-
nificant association between a first-generation mother’s full-time employment history and
the full-time employment behavior of her daughter in adulthood: a 0-to-1 increase in
MOM FTFY is associated with a 10.8 percentage-point increase in the second generation
mother’s probability of working full-time. This amounts to 20 percent of the second-
generation sample’s FTFY employment rate. Columns 2-6 successively add in the addi-
tional control variables described in the preceding sub-section. Inclusion of these controls
does not largely affect the estimated intergenerational relationship: column 6, the pre-
ferred specification, reports that a 0-to-1 change in MOM FTFY is associated with an 11.3
percentage-point change in a second generation mother’s probability of working full-time.
To express this estimate in odds-ratio terms, we require one additional number. Re-
call from Table 2.2 that the average second-generation woman’s mother was full-time-
employed 31 percent of the time throughout her daughter’s upbringing. Combining this
with the second-generation sample’s FTFY employment rate and the estimated marginal
effect yields the following calculation:
ÔRMFTFY =
.502 + .113 · (1− .31)
.502 + .113 · (0− .31)
= 1.24.
That is, a typical woman whose own mother worked full-time throughout her childhood is
1.24 times as likely to be full-time-employed in adulthood as an observationally identical
woman whose own mother never worked full-time throughout her childhood.
Proceeding with the preferred specification (6), I explore heterogeneity in the intergen-
erational transmission relationship in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. Each table presents 12 estimates,
based on 3 dimensions of heterogeneity: labor supply margin (employed at all, employed
at least 400 hours, employed FTFY), motherhood nature of the sub-sample (all women,
women with at least one child under 6 only), and skill nature of the sub-sample (less-
skilled, skilled). Table 2.4 cuts the full sample based on the 1st-generation’s education
level (no college versus some college or more), while Table 2.5 cuts the full sample based
on the 2nd-generation’s education level (no 4-year college degree versus 4-year college
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degree).6 In each table, the 4 columns correspond to the motherhood-by-skill cuts of the
sample, while the 3 rows correspond to the 3 employment statuses investigated. Each cell
reports the estimated intergenerational transmission relationship, its associated standard
error, and the associated share of second-generation women achieving the given employ-
ment status.
Looking at the two tables together, several patterns of heterogeneity emerge. First, the
intergenerational relationship tends to be stronger as the intensivity of the employment
status rises—especially for the skilled sub-samples. Column 3 of Table 2.4 reports that a
0-to-1 increase in MOM WORK is associated with a non-significant 5.4 percentage-point
increase in the probability that a skilled second-generation woman is employed at all (or
1.09 odds ratio). However, a 0-to-1 increase in MOM FTFY is associated with a highly
significant 16.4 percentage-point increase in her probability of FTFY employment (or 1.35
odds ratio). Table 2.5 reveals a similar, if not slightly starker, pattern when the sample is
stratified on the second generation’s education status rather than the first generation’s.
Second, let us compare the odd-numbered columns (full sample) to the even-numbered
columns (only mothers with young children) in each table. The estimates indicate that for
less-skilled women, the intergenerational relationship is slightly stronger in the full sample
than in the mothers-only sub-sample. However, this pattern is reversed for skilled women:
the intergenerational relationship is slightly stronger in the mothers-only sub-sample than
in the full sample. These patterns hold for all 3 employment margins considered.
Third, the intergenerational relationship tends to be stronger for skilled women—
especially for mothers of young children, and most especially for the FTFY employment
status. Comparing column 2 with column 4 of Table 2.5, we see that a 0-to-1 increase in
MOM FTFY is associated with a marginally significant 6.8 percentage-point increase in a
second-generation, less-educated mother’s probability of full-time employment (1.20 odds
ratio). This marginal effect rises to 21.9 percentage points (1.62 odds ratio) for second-
generation, highly-educated mothers. This difference in marginal effects, both here and in
Table 2.4, is statistically significant.
These results align with the predictions outlined in Section 2.2. First, they suggest
that observing one’s own mother participating in full-time employment (as opposed to
occasional employment) is especially likely to lead “occupation and [full-time] employ-
ment [to] define one’s fundamental identity and societal worth” (Goldin, 2006, page 1).
Second, they suggest that college-educated women’s employment decisions, relative less-
6I use a more stringent definition of skilled for the second generation than for the first generation,
given that college completion rates were higher in the second generation. Nonetheless, cutting the second-
generation sample based on college attendance, rather than college completion, produces qualitatively sim-
ilar results.
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educated women’s employment decisions, are more reflective of family-transmitted identi-
ties and skills. This is particularly true for college-educated versus less-educated mothers’
decisions to maintain employment while raising young children. Interacting these two
conclusions, it appears that the intergenerational transmission mechanism is most salient
for skilled women who are considering balancing a full-time career with the demands of
raising young children.
2.5 Implications for Aggregate Change in Mothers’ Full-Time Employ-
ment in the 21st Century
The full-time employment propensity of U.S. married women increased dramatically
throughout the late 20th century (Goldin, 2006), and this aggregate increase was primar-
ily driven by the changing behavior of skilled wives (Juhn and Murphy, 1997). These
changes, combined with the intergenerational transmission relationships estimated above,
suggest that intergenerational transmission has affected particularly the full-time employ-
ment behavior of U.S. mothers in the 21st century. Moreover, the skill-biased nature of
these changes portend a recent rise in skill inequality in mothers’ full-time employment.
The goal of this section is to examine these predictions. To do so, I use data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is better equipped to examine aggregate
employment trends than the PSID, as it contains a much bigger sample (roughly 60, 000
households), and has maintained national representation over time. I use the March sup-
plement to the CPS, which elicits annual employment and earnings information for CPS
households during their March interviews.7 I begin by constructing a sample of March
CPS respondents that is similar to the PSID analysis sample: women aged 22-54, white or
black, and with non-missing economic and demographic information.
I use two different methods of dividing the sample by skill level. One method involves
grouping all women into a high- (low-) skill sub-sample who had wage offers above (be-
low) the median of the hourly wage offer distribution, within a cell defined by survey year
and potential experience bin. To construct this stratification, I adjust wage and business
incomes for top-coding and compute hourly wages as total wage and business income di-
vided by annual hours worked,8 trimming wage outliers from the sample. I then impute
hourly wage offers for non-working women via a procedure described in Appendix Section
7The CPS interviews a panel of households each month for 4 months, then ignores the panel for 8 months,
and then conducts 4 more monthly interviews before dropping the panel from the sample.
8Before the 1976 survey, information used to construct annual hours worked is missing–weeks worked
information is available in the form of intervals. Using education, demographic, and weeks worked interval
information, I impute annual hours worked in a manner described in Appendix Section B.2.3.
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B.2.4.
Alternatively, I use the same definition of skill as used in the PSID sample: having com-
pleted 4 years of college education. This definition has two advantages over the first one.
First, it is not dependent on imputation procedures. Second, it more coherently divides the
population into distinct labor markets. However, this definition has a key drawback: the
underlying skill composition of the college and non-college populations may have changed
over time as the female college attainment rate has increased. The wage-based method of
stratification groups 50 percent of the population into each skill group in each year, and
thus may be more immune to changing composition. In the eventual quantitative analysis,
I average the results from both definitions. The following two subsections supply some
background.
2.5.1 20th century change in childhood environment, from mother-at-home to mother-
at-work
To illustrate the large secular change in the environment in which daughters have been
raised—from mother-at-home to mother-at-work—I manipulate the CPS sample to con-
struct a sample of daughters aged 6-17 living with their mothers. I organize the sample
by the daughter’s birth year and compute mothers’ FTFY employment rate for each birth
cohort of daughters, separately by mother skill level. I use the high-wage-offer defini-
tion of skill. Figure 2.1 plots the resultant series of mothers’ FTFY employment rates, by
mother skill and by daughters’ birth years. It displays a large and skill-biased change in
the environment in which daughters have been raised.
Such a change is potentially relevant for 21st century patterns in mothers’ FTFY em-
ployment. For example, the median-aged skilled woman with at least one young child,
observed in the 1999 CPS sample, was born in 1966. Her counterpart, observed in the
2016 CPS sample, was born in 1983. According to Figure 2.1, the share of daughters
in skilled households raised by full-time-employed mothers increased from 30 percent to
56 percent between these two birth cohorts: a near doubling. The share of daughters in
less-skilled households raised by full-time-employed mothers also increased, but far more
slowly.
2.5.2 The 21st century rise in skilled mothers’ full-time employment
Accordingly, the remainder of this section focuses on the FTFY employment behavior
of young mothers. Figure 2.2 presents time series of young mothers’ employment propen-
sities by skill, again using the wage-based skill classification. The left graph considers
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the propensity to be employed at all, while the right graph considers FTFY employment.
Both graphs show a marked increase in the skill gap in mothers’ employment in the 21st
century. This is particularly true for FTFY employment: between 1999 and 2016, skilled
young mothers’ FTFY employment increased by roughly 12 percentage points, or over 25%
on its base rate. Appendix Figure B.1 confirms that this recent increase in FTFY employ-
ment also occurred among college-educated mothers, and in U.S. Census data as well as
in the CPS.
On the other hand, less-skilled young mothers’ FTFY employment barely changed over
this time period. By 2016, skilled young mothers’ FTFY employment rate was the highest
it had ever been (59 percent), and the skill gap in young mothers’ FTFY employment was
also the highest it had ever been (21 percentage points)—at least since the 1960s, when
these statistics began to be tracked by the CPS.
2.5.3 The 21st century evolution of attitudinal support for mothers’ careers
If childhood experiences shape adult perceptions, a larger share of individuals raised
by working mothers might translate into greater adulthood support for mothers pursuing
careers. Information collected by the General Social Survey (GSS) permits an exploration
of this possibility. Of the 8 questions regarding gender attitudes asked in the GSS, 3 have
been asked systematically over time and pertain to work-family balance. These questions
ask respondents to rate the extent to which they agree (on a 1 to 4 scale) with the following
statements: “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the
home and the woman takes care of the home and family” (FEFAM); “A preschool child
is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” (FEPRESCH); and “A working mother can
establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does
not work” (FECHLD).
All 3 questions were asked in the 1977 GSS and then on a regular basis since 1985. I
aggregate information contained in the individual responses into a single national index,
entitled momWorkAttitude, as follows. I begin by focusing on a sample of individuals with
young children.9 I recode responses to each of the 3 prompts into a binary scale, with 1s
denoting egalitarian views and 0s denoting traditional views. For each year y I compute
sample average responses to each of the 3 questions, and set momWorkAttitudey equal to
the average of these 3 averages. Thus, momWorkAttitude is a continuous variable ranging
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater social acceptance of mothers pursuing
careers.
9Because the GSS does not report the age of the youngest child, I consider all respondents aged 22-45
with at least one child.
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Figure 2.3 plots time series ofmomWorkAttitude for each sample of skilled individuals.
Skilled young mothers’ FTFY employment series are overlaid: the high-wage series appears
in the left graph while the college-educated series appears in the right graph. All series
display substantial increases in the 1980s, slowdowns in the 1990s, and then substantial
increases again after 2000. Thus, the 21st century increase in young skilled mothers’
career involvement has occurred alongside an increase in households’ attitudinal support
for mothers’ careers.10
2.5.4 Quantifying the contribution of intergenerational transmission
The 21st century patterns shown above are all consistent with the facts that skilled
women experienced a larger change in their childhood environments than did less skilled
women, and appear more responsive to these changes in the planning of their careers.
Table 2.6 quantifies the contribution of these intergenerational transmission relationships
to the 21st century rises in: i) skilled mothers’ FTFY employment, and ii) the skill gap in
mothers’ FTFY employment.
The first row of the table reports the estimated intergenerational FTFY employment
responses for young mothers by skill level. These are expressed as marginal effects at
the respective sample means, and are averaged across both definitions of skill used in
the PSID. For example, Table 2.4, which stratifies the sample on first-generation mother’s
college education, reports a marginal effect of 20.1 percentage points for skilled second-
generation mothers. Table 2.5, which stratifies the sample on second-generation mother’s
college education, reports a marginal effect of 21.9 percentage points. Averaging these
together yields the 21.0 percentage-point effect reported in the first entry of Table 2.6.
An analogous procedure, conducted for less-skilled mothers, yields a 5.3 percentage-point
effect.
As discussed above, between the 1966 and 1983 birth cohorts, daughters raised in
skilled households experienced a 26.0 percentage-point increase in their exposure to full-
time-employed mothers. On the other hand, daughters raised in less-skilled households
experienced only an 11.5 percentage-point increase. (These are reported in the second row
of Table 2.6.) For each skill level s, multiplying the intergenerational response together
with this change in environment yields the predicted effect of intergenerational transmis-
10The patterns displayed in Figure 2.1, which show differential growth in the share of daughters exposed to
working mothers by mother skill level, also imply differential growth in next-generation progressive attitudes
by skill. Appendix Figure B.6 graphs time series of momWorkAttitude by skill and confirms that such a skill
divergence has occurred in the 21st century.
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sion on the 1999-2016 change in FTFY employment. I denote this object as ∆IGFTFY,s:
∆IGFTFY,s = M̂EMFTFY,s ·∆MOM FTFY,s (2.4)
Applying this calculation to each skill level yields ∆IGFTFY,skilled = .055 and ∆
IG
FTFY,lessskilled =
.006. The difference between these, or ∆IGFTFY,skillgap = .049. Hence, intergenerational
transmission forces raised skilled mothers’ FTFY employment propensity by 5.5 percentage
point between 1999 and 2016, and raised the skill gap in mothers’ FTFY employment by
4.9 percentage points (third row of Table 2.6).
How important are these intergenerational effects relative to the observed changes in
21st century mothers’ FTFY employment behavior? To answer this question, I first quantify
trend behavioral changes. To do so, I keep only young mothers observed in calendar years
1999-2016, and split the CPS sample by skill level. Within each skill level s, I regress
observed full-time employment behavior on a constant and a time trend τ . The parameter
τ thus equals the per-year increase in the sample’s FTFY employment propensity. The total
observed behavioral change, or ∆OBSERV EDFTFY,s , equals the estimate of τ multiplied by 17 (the
number of elapsed years):
FTFYist = αs + τs · t+ εist (2.5)
∆OBSERV EDFTFY,s = τ̂s · (2016− 1999).
I compute ∆OBSERV EDFTFY for each skill level based on both definitions of skill (high-wage,
college degree), and then average the results. As reported in the fourth row of Table 2.6,
the trend increase in skilled young mothers’ FTFY employment behavior in the 21st century
was 13.0 percentage points; the trend increase in the skill gap was 13.8 percentage points.
Before computing the contribution of intergenerational transmission to these trends, I
first account for the portion that can be explained by other determinants of mothers’ labor
supply. These are the same “contemporaneous” control variables used in the PSID analysis:
the mother’s own log wage offer, her partner’s income, her own age, and the number and
ages of her children. To the extent that these variables have been trending in the 21st
century, we would expect some change in FTFY employment behavior to take place in the
absence of intergenerational transmission. To accomplish this accounting exercise, I first
estimate logistic regression equation (2.1), by skill level, on each 1999-2016 sample of
young mothers. Based on the estimated regression coefficients, I then construct predicted
probabilities of FTFY employment for each individual in the sample (denoted as F̂ TFY ist).
Finally, I repeat computation (2.6), but replace the actual observed FTFY employment
statuses with these predicted probabilities. The resulting quantity, ∆OTHERV ARSFTFY,s , describes
68
the portion of the observed time trend that is attributable to these other variables:
F̂ TFY ist = α̃s + τ̃s · t+ ε̃ist (2.6)
∆OTHERV ARSFTFY,s = ̂̃τ s · (2016− 1999).
The residual portion of the trend equals the observed trend net of this quantity.
As reported in the fifth row of Table 2.6, the residual portions of the trends are quite
large. That is, 10.7 percentage-points of the 13.0 percentage-point rise in skilled mothers’
FTFY employment, and 11.2 percentage-points of the 13.8 percentage-point rise in the
skill gap, could not be explained by movements in observed determinants of mothers’
labor supply. Finally, the contribution of intergenerational transmission to these residual
changes, or IG explainedFTFY can be computed as a simple ratio:
IG explainedFTFY,s =
∆IGFTFY,s
∆OBSERV EDFTFY,s −∆OTHERV ARSFTFY,s
(2.7)
As reported in the second-last row of the table, intergenerational transmission ac-
counted for 42.3% of the total observed increase in skilled young mothers’ FTFY employ-
ment in the 21st century, and 35.5% of the increase in the skill gap. After taking into
account movements in other labor supply determinants, the final row of the table reports
that intergenerational transmission accounted for 51.9% of the residual increase in skilled
young mothers’ FTFY employment, and 43.8% of the residual increase in the skill gap.
While nontrivial shares remain unexplained, these are sizable magnitudes. In raw terms,
intergenerational transmission explains far more of the trends than the combination of the
other labor supply variables. Intergenerational transmission appears to have importantly
shaped the evolution of skilled mothers’ career involvement in the 21st century, as well as
the skill gap in career involvement.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent literature has applied social identity theory and intergenerational models of
identity transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) to the study of women’s labor market out-
comes. This literature has established important qualitative relationships, such as an in-
tergenerational correlation of gender ideology, and a correlation between the labor market
behaviors of second-generation immigrant women and those in their countries of ances-
try. However, quantitative assessments of the extent to which female employment status
is transmitted from one generation to the next have been virtually nonexistent. I have at-
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tempted to address this gap by assembling a data set of over 2, 200 mother-daughter pairs
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The data set records employment behaviors of
both generations over long periods of time and at similar points in adulthood. I have also
argued that the intergenerational employment relationship is likely not monolithic. Rather,
the strength of the relationship plausibly varies according to the employment margin and
demographic sub-group considered.
Analyses of the data reveal considerable heterogeneity in the intergenerational em-
ployment relationship. First, the relationship is stronger at more intensive employment
margins—especially in the sub-samples of skilled women. Second, the relationship de-
pends on whether the second-generation sample is limited to mothers with young children.
For skilled women, this sample restriction strengthens the intergenerational relationship;
for less-skilled women, it weakens the relationship. Third, the intergenerational relation-
ship is stronger in skilled families than in less-skilled families. These findings are consistent
with a labor supply theory in which intrinsic gender identity and extrinsic socioeconomic
concerns interact to produce employment behaviors, and in which such interaction slants
in different ways depending on the specific behavior and subgroup in consideration. In-
deed, the results suggest that the decision to maintain employment while raising young
children is more of an expression of gender identity for skilled mothers, but is more regu-
lated by prevailing societal norms and economic conditions for less-skilled mothers.
This interpretation of the data sheds light on the macroeconomic evolution of moth-
ers’ employment behavior by skill. While skill inequality in mothers’ employment is higher
than it has ever been, gender equality in parental employment within skilled households is
also at an all-time high. I calculate that 37% of widening inequality in mothers’ full-time
employment between 1999 and 2016 is attributable to differential intergenerational trans-
mission of full-time employment status across skill groups. This suggests that a growth in
skilled women’s career opportunities (as occurred in the late 20th century) has a direct
effect on the skill differential in mothers’ career involvement, but also an indirect effect
that operates through the family diffusion of egalitarian gender identities across subse-
quent generations. That is, the U.S. labor market contours of rising skill inequality and
gender equality embed the combined effects of shifting economic incentives and shifting
identities. Even if the growing inequality in labor market opportunities across skill groups
ceases—which seems unlikelier than not—the dynamics found in this study portend con-
tinued divergence in gender identities between more- and less-skilled women.
Combining the intergenerational effects with the other economic variables considered,
these factors can explain roughly 60% of the 1999-2016 rise in skilled mothers’ full-time
employment, and 54% of the rising skill gap in mothers’ full-time employment. Thus,
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a substantial share remains unexplained. Ramey and Ramey (2010) has described an
emerging “rug rat race” among skilled households in the preparation of their children for
college. The rising cost of college, combined with increased willingness of parents to make
expensive investments in their children (Bound, Hershbein and Long, 2009), may create
greater skilled household demand for a second full-time income. Analyzing how this or
other economic concerns (e.g. child care costs; Kubota, 2017) interact with the shift in
gender identities emphasized in this paper is an intriguing possibility for future research.
A related question left to future research is how (inherited) gender ideology impacts the
responsiveness of women to “family-friendly” policies in the workplace such as paid family
leave, flexible work scheduling or tax credits for child care.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Overview of 1979-2015 change in employment, women aged 25-44
All women Mothers with
young children
1979 1997 2015 1979 1997 2015
Panel A: Shares employed > 0 hours
Full sample .723 .821 .803 .581 .732 .721
College grads .827 .882 .876 .651 .778 .784
Some college or less .699 .796 .738 .565 .712 .661
Panel B: Shares employed > 1600 hours (full-time)
Full sample .416 .567 .614 .237 .416 .486
College grads .521 .645 .713 .264 .445 .570
Some college or less .390 .534 .525 .231 .403 .406
Notes: Data source: March Current Population Survey, white or black women aged 25-44. Mothers with
young children have at least one child under age 6 present in the household. College grads have at least
four years of completed college education. Full-time, full-year (FTFY) employment is defined as supplying
at least 1600 hours of paid work in the reference year. Reported statistics for a given year correspond to a
3-year window surrounding that year (e.g. 1978-80 for 1979).
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Table 2.2: PSID summary statistics
Mean Std deviation
Own variables (2nd generation)
N observations 21, 980
N individuals 2, 228
Birth year 1970 7.13
Survey year 2004 7.63
Age 33.54 7.01
Black 0.08 0.26
4-year college degree 0.33 0.47
Young child present 0.44 0.50
Number of young children 0.63 0.82
Number of young children
1.43 0.62
(conditional on having one)
Partner’s real income (1000s) 53.76 51.26
Partner has positive income 0.94 0.23
Log real hrly wage offer 2.72 .60
Mother’s variables (1st generation)
Some college completed 0.41 0.49
When daughter was aged 6-17...
share years employed at all 0.68 0.33
share years employed ≥ 400 hrs 0.57 0.37
share years employed FTFY 0.31 0.34
Notes: The sample consists of all PSID woman-year observations, who are members of original 1968 PSID
families, meeting the following conditions: aged 22-49; born between 1961 and 1987; observed in interview
years ; current head of household, or spouse or unmarried partner of household head; and whose mothers
had non-missing work history information. Statistics weighted by original PSID family weights. See Section
2.3 for information on the computation of log hourly wage offers. Real income and wage figures expressed
in terms of 2010 US dollars.
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Table 2.3: Estimates of intergenerational transmission of women’s full-time employment
status
Logit marginal effects on 2nd gen FTFY employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st gen FTFY employment .108∗∗∗ .105∗∗∗ .101∗∗∗ .112∗∗∗ .119∗∗∗ .113∗∗∗
(.032) (.032) (.033) (.034) (.035) (.035)
2nd gen FTFY emp rate .532 .532 .532 .503 .503 .502
Pseudo R2 .004 .008 .010 .107 .111 .113
N individuals 2225 2225 2076 2204 2204 2063
Controls
Birth cohort FEs X X X X
Background controls X X
Contemporaneous controls X X X
Notes: See Table 2.2 for sample information. Full-time employment is defined as at least 1600 hours worked
in the reference year. The explanatory variable, “1st gen FTFY employment” is the share of years when the
individual was aged 6-17 that her mother worked full time. The outcome variable is a binary indicator for
the second-generation woman working full-time. Background controls consist of parental education fixed
effects and race. Contemporaneous controls consist of the log wage offer, a quadratic in partner earnings,
a quadratic in the number of children aged 0-5, the number of children aged 6-10, and a quadratic in the
individual’s age. The wage offer is imputed for non-working women in a manner described in Appendix
section B.7. Coefficient estimates are marginal effects of a 0-to-1 increase in 1st gen FTFY employment,
expressed in percentage points /100. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, appear below
the coefficients in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by PSID core family sampling weights. Standard
statistical significance legend used.
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Table 2.4: Heterogeneity in the intergenerational relationship by labor supply margin and
mother’s education level
Logit marginal effects of 1st gen’s employment status
on 2nd gen’s employment status
(1) (2) (3) (4)





child only child only
Employed at all .059∗ .048 .054 .062
(.034) (.048) (.041) (.055)
2nd gen sample rate .786 .716 .811 .743
Employed ≥ 400 hrs .094∗∗∗ .073∗ .088∗∗ .107∗
(.034) (.044) (.044) (.058)
2nd gen sample rate .732 .641 .761 .677
Employed FTFY .087∗ .038 .161∗∗∗ .201∗∗∗
(.046) (.047) (.056) (.064)
2nd gen sample rate .498 .375 .509 .394
N individuals 1210 911 868 638
Notes: See Table 2.2 for main sample information. Working at all is defined as positive hours worked in
the reference year; full-time employment is defined as at least 1600 hours worked in the reference year.
Explanatory variables are measured as the share of years when the individual was aged 6-17 that her mother
supplied the given amount of labor (any, at least 400 hours, or at least 1600 hours). Columns (2) and (4)
restrict the second-generation sample to individual-year observations in which at least one child under the
age of 6 is present in the household. Coefficient estimates are marginal effects of 0-to-1 increases in these
explanatory variables on the probability that the second-generation individual supplied the given amount
of labor, based on the full regression (i.e. specification 6 in the preceding Table). Robust standard errors,
clustered at the individual level, appear below the coefficients in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
PSID core family sampling weights. Standard statistical significance legend used.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity in the intergenerational relationship by labor supply margin and
daughter’s education level
Logit marginal effects of 1st gen’s employment status
on 2nd gen’s employment status
(1) (2) (3) (4)





child only child only
Employed at all .051 .032 .053 .073
(.033) (.045) (.038) (.059)
2nd gen sample rate .772 .704 .846 .773
Employed ≥ 400 hrs .084∗∗ .071∗ .083∗ .098
(.033) (.043) (.044) (.065)
2nd gen sample rate .718 .630 .798 .707
Employed FTFY .086∗∗ .068∗ .187∗∗∗ .219∗∗∗
(.040) (.042) (.068) (.074)
2nd gen sample rate .479 .360 .548 .427
N individuals 1445 1109 578 421
Notes: See preceding Table.
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Table 2.6: The contribution of intergenerational transmission to 21st century changes in
mothers’ FTFY employment
Changes in childhood environment, 1966-1983 birth cohorts




∆ share exposed to
.260 .115
full-time-employed mothers




Predicted ∆ due to
.055 .049
intergenerational transmission
Observed ∆ .130 .138
Residual ∆, after
.107 .112
controlling for other variables
% of observed ∆ explained by
42.3% 35.5%
intergenerational transmission
% of residual ∆ explained by
51.9% 43.8%
intergenerational transmission
Notes: The first row reports the intergenerational FTFY employment response coefficient for skilled moth-
ers (column 1) or less-skilled mothers (column 2). See Section 2.5 for details on how these numbers are
computed from Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The second row reports the rise in the shares of daughters exposed
to full-time-working mothers between the 1966 and 1983 birth cohorts, by skill. Rows 3 thru 7 compute
the contribution of these intergenerational responses to the rise in skilled mothers’ full-time employment
between 1999 and 2016 (column 1), or the rise in the skill gap in mothers’ full-time employment. For skilled
mothers, row 3 equals the product of the first two rows. For the skill gap, row 3 equals the product of the
first 2 rows for skilled mothers net of the product of the first 2 rows for less-skilled mothers. The fifth row
reports the residual change in skilled mothers’ FTFY employment behavior between 1999 and 2016 (or the
residual change in the skill gap), after controlling for movements in other observed determinants of mother’s
FTFY employment. The contribution of intergenerational transmission to the total observed change (the sixth
row) equals the third row divided by the fourth row. The contribution of intergenerational transmission to
the residual change (the seventh row) equals the third row divided by the fifth row.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: The change in environment, from mother-at-home to mother-at-work,



















































Notes: Author’s computations based on March CPS data. To construct the series, I considered all girls aged
6-17, born in a given year, and with a mother of a given skill level present in the household. I computed the
mothers’ FTFY employment rate, and then iterated this process over the 1958-1986 birth cohorts of girls,
and over both skill levels of mothers. The skill groups are constructed by imputing wage offers for non-
working mothers and then classifying mothers as above or below the median of the wage offer distribution,
conditional on survey year and potential experience. See Section 2.5 for further detail. Lines display 3-birth-
cohort centered moving averages.
78















































































Notes: Author’s computations based on March CPS data. See Section 2.5 and Appendix Section B.2 for details on sample construction and data
processing. Young mothers are defined as women with at least one child under the age of 6. Full-time, full-year employment is defined as having
worked at least 1600 hours in the reference year. The wage groups are constructed by imputing wage offers for non-working mothers and then
classifying mothers as above or below the median of the wage offer distribution, conditional on survey year and potential experience. Graphs present
3-year centered moving averages.
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1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Mothers’ FTFY employment rate
Progressive work / family attitude index
College−educated sample
Notes on employment series: See section 2.5 of the text for main sample definition. Sample restricted to women with youngest child under 6. The left
graph (right graph) further restricts the sample to high-wage (college-educated) mothers, where “high-wage” means having a wage offer above the
median of the distribution (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Full-time, full-year (FTFY) employment is defined as working at least 1600 hours in the reference
year. 3-year centered moving averages reported.
Notes on attitude series: The work-family attitude index is calculated from responses to 3 questions asked in the General Social Survey (GSS) and
is coded such that higher values correspond to higher support of mothers working while raising family. See section 2.5.1 of the main text for more
details. The questions comprising the index were asked in the 1977 GSS and then on a regular basis beginning in 1985. Due to small sample sizes,
5-year centered moving averages are reported (except for 1977-1985, where the index is linearly interpolated). The target sample is mothers and
fathers of young children. Because the GSS does not provide age of youngest child, I considered all individuals aged 22-45 with at least one child.
The left graph (right graph) further restricts the GSS sample to individuals with at least 2 (4) years completed college education.
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CHAPTER III
Is There a ‘Male Breadwinner Norm?’ The Hazards of
Inferring Preferences from Marriage Market Outcomes
From a work with David Lam
Abstract
Is there a social norm dictating that wives should not out-earn their husbands? Building
on the Beckerian marriage model, this paper shows that a variety of underlying social pref-
erences about a given trait—including indifference about the trait—all generate positive
assortative matching on that trait, and hence the same distribution of spousal trait differ-
ences in equilibrium. Applying this result to U.S. Census and administrative earnings data,
we find that simple empirical models of assortative matching closely replicate the observed
distribution of spousal earnings differences, in which very few wives out-earn their hus-
bands. Further, we show that the recent finding of a discontinuous drop-off in probability
mass as wives start out-earning their husbands is illusory, due to the existence of a point
mass of equal-earning couples that compromises econometric inference. We conclude that
the distribution of spousal earnings differences in the U.S. provides little information about
the existence of a male breadwinner norm or its implications for gender inequality.
JEL Codes: D10 , J12 , J16
Keywords: social norms, gender inequality, assortative matching, dual-earner couples,
discontinuity test
3.1 Introduction
Do men prefer to be taller than their wives? Do women prefer to earn less than their
husbands? Social scientists often use the attributes of spouses to infer individual prefer-
ences and social norms. For example, a number of studies seek to quantify the prevalence
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of a “male-taller” norm in marriage (Gillis and Avis, 1980; Stulp et al., 2013) and the ex-
tent to which this norm affects inter-ethnic marriage patterns (Belot and Fidrmuc, 2010).
Other studies look at differences in earnings between spouses (Winkler, 1998; Brennan,
Barnett and Gareis, 2001; Raley, Mattingly and Bianchi, 2006), inferring from these pat-
terns social preferences about whether husbands should earn more than their wives as
well as implications of these preferences for time allocation, the division of resources, and
marital stability (Schwartz and Gonalons-Pons, 2016).
This paper demonstrates that the standard Beckerian marriage model (Becker, 1973)
generates matching patterns that suggest social norms of husbands being taller and earn-
ing more than their wives, even when individuals prefer the reverse. Taking the example of
height, we show that a broad class of loss functions for deviation from the social norm gen-
erates positive assortative matching on height in equilibrium, regardless of what the norm
dictates about the ideal spousal height difference (including the absence of any norm).
Positive assortative matching together with the prevailing gender gap in height results in
an equilibrium in which few husbands are shorter than their wives—–even if husbands
strictly prefer to be shorter than their wives. While this result is based on features of the
Beckerian marriage model, we argue that it largely applies in alternative conceptualiza-
tions of the marriage market.
We apply this perspective to the context of earnings differences between spouses, a
topic which has garnered significant attention following a prominent paper by Bertrand,
Kamenica and Pan (2015). With data drawn from the 2000 United States Census, we use
the Beckerian framework to match couples based on earnings. We consider two models:
one in which observed earnings are taken as given, and a second in which an endogenous
labor supply decision is made after marriage (to account for the fact that earned income
is not an exogenous attribute). We assume only positive assortative matching—there is no
explicit preference for wives to earn less than husbands. Even without imposing this norm,
our simulations succeed in reproducing the highly skewed distribution of spousal earnings
differences observed in the data. That is, there are far fewer wives out-earning than their
husbands than vice versa, even though positive assortative matching is consistent with a
wide class of preferences—including a preference for wives to out-earn husbands. These
simulation exercises illustrate that a naive interpretation of marital matching patterns may
produce incorrect inferences about underlying preferences.
The empirical strategy pursued by Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) (hereafter BKP)
represents a compelling addition to the literature. Unlike other studies, BKP did not rely
upon broad features of the distribution of attributes in marriage. Instead, they tested
whether the distribution of the wife’s share of total spousal earnings was continuous across
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the 50 percent threshold—–the point at which the wife goes from earning just less to just
more than her husband. They found a discontinuous drop-off in probability mass across
this threshold, suggesting that couples manipulate their earnings to avoid a situation in
which the wife out-earns her husband. Without assuming an explicit social norm that
wives should not out-earn their husbands, it is difficult to replicate this discontinuity in
our simulated matching models, implying an important role for such a norm in marital
matching and earnings outcomes within marriage.
Further investigation into this discontinuity result, however, suggests that it is fragile.
One issue with the spousal earnings data investigated by BKP is the presence of a mass of
couples earning exactly identical incomes. This generates a mass point in the distribution
of the wife’s share of total earned income at 50 percent. BKP tested for a discontinuity just
to the right of 50 percent, consistent with testing for a social norm that the wife should
not strictly out-earn her husband. Using the same data source,1 we first replicate BKP’s
result of a sharp drop-off in probability mass across this threshold. However, when we also
test for a discontinuity just to the left of 50 percent, we find evidence of a sharp gain in
probability mass. This sharp gain in mass as one moves from left of 50 percent (where the
wife earns less than the husband) to 50 percent (equality) could be interpreted as evidence
for a social norm that the wife should earn at least as much as her husband. Thus, the data
appear consistent with two nearly opposite social norms. We show that the point mass
of equal-earning couples is responsible for these seemingly inconsistent results: omitting
these couples eliminates the estimated discontinuities. Moreover, we argue that the point
mass does not necessarily reflect social norms, but instead could be generated by (small)
search frictions within the marriage market or by couples who jointly a business.
Two contemporary studies also probe the robustness of BKP’s discontinuity result and
reach similar conclusions. Hederos and Stenberg (2019) find, in Swedish administrative
income data, that the existence of a point mass of equal-earning couples compromises the
discontinuity test, and that the point mass itself is not indicative of a male-breadwinner
norm. Zinovyeva and Tverdostup (2018) observe Finnish data and argue that the point
mass results from a tendency of spouses to start a business together or co-work at the same
establishment. Our work thus contributes to a growing body of evidence that the earnings
behavior of couples who earn close to the same amount of income does not reflect male-
breadwinner norms.
Our observations are also related to literature on the econometric identification of
1The data are administrative earnings data from the Social Security Administration. These data are linked
to a household survey (the Survey of Income and Program Participation), which permits the researcher to
observe earnings of matched couples. Section 3.4 provides further discussion.
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matching models. A common theme within this literature is that the observation of match-
ing patterns alone is insufficient to identify marital preferences (see, e.g., Echenique et al.,
2013; Chiappori and Salanié, 2016). One strand of work has studied the identification
of average marital returns to individual attributes with certain structural assumptions on
idiosyncratic preferences (Choo and Siow, 2006; Galichon and Salanié, 2017). This class
of models has proven useful in estimating the degree of marital complementarity between
individual attributes like education (Dupuy and Galichon, 2014; Chiappori, Salanié and
Weiss, 2017). Our paper studies the identification not of marital complementarities over
individual attributes, but of societal preferences over spousal attribute gaps. We argue that
when social norms dictate an ideal attribute gap, individual attributes will exhibit com-
plementarity (and hence positive sorting) within marriage, regardless of what is the ideal
attribute gap. Thus, the strong degrees of positive assortative matching on height, earnings
and age that exist in the data appear particularly uninformative about male-taller, male-
breadwinner or male-older norms. While there may be room for progress in the literature
on this front, we believe that fruitful study of social norms in marriage likely requires the
observation of more than just marital sorting patterns (e.g. divorce, labor supply, home
production time, and subjective indicators of marital satisfaction).
3.2 Applying Becker’s Theory of Marriage to the Study of Social Norms
We found our study of social norms on Gary Becker’s economic theory of marriage
(Becker, 1973, 1981). To start, consider a man m and a woman f who are considering
marriage. We assume they marry if and if only if it makes both better off compared to
alternatives. Denote the “output” of the marriage by Zmf . Assume output can be divided
Zmf = mmf + fmf , (3.1)
where mmf indicates what man m consumes when married to woman f . That is, it is
possible for men to make offers to potential wives (and women to make offers to potential
husbands) of some division of output.
Suppose there are multiple men and multiple women considering marriage. Drawing
on results from other matching models in mathematics and economics, Becker showed that
a competitive equilibrium in this marriage market will be the set of assignments that max-
imizes the sum of output across all marriages. The proof relies on a standard argument
about the Pareto optimality of competitive markets. If an existing set of pairings does not
maximize total output, then there must exist at least two couples who could switch part-
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ners and increase total output. Because output is transferable, it is possible to distribute
the total output gains from the switch such that everyone is made better off.
Becker applied this result to the case of sorting on some trait A, where we will consider
woman f to have a trait value Af and man m to have trait value Am. We characterize
marital output as a function of the values of A for each partner: Zmf = Z(Am, Af ). Becker





and negative assortative matching if the cross-partial in (3.2) is negative. If, for example,
having a better-educated husband raises the impact of the wife’s education on marital
output, then we will tend to see positive assortative matching on education. We draw on
this well-known result below.
3.2.1 Illustrative model of sorting on height
We build up to our key point with a very simple model of marital sorting on height.
Denote female height by Hf and male height by Hm. Suppose there are two women: f1 is
60′′ tall and f2 is 66′′ tall. There are two men: m1 is 66′′ tall and m2 is 72′′ tall. Thus, there
are two possible pairings: (f1m1, f2m2), which is positive assortative matching on height,
and (f1m2, f2m1), which is negative assortative matching on height.
Assume that people get utility from their individual consumption and some bonus that
comes from being married. The gains from marriage take the very simple form of some
bonus K (representing, say, economies of scale in consumption or benefits of household
public goods) that is offset by a quadratic loss in the deviation of the given spousal height
difference from the social norm.
Consider three alternative social norms: a 6′′ male-taller norm, an equal-heights norm,
and a 6′′ female-taller norm:
Z(Hm, Hf ) = K − (Hm −Hf − 6)2 [Male taller norm]
Z(Hm, Hf ) = K − (Hm −Hf )2 [Equal heights norm]
Z(Hm, Hf ) = K − (Hf −Hm − 6)2. [Female taller norm]
It is trivial to show that a 6′′ male-taller norm will give rise to positive assortative matching
on height in equilibrium, as this yields two marriages in perfect compliance with the norm.
Notice, however, that positive assortative matching will also prevail in the case of an equal-
heights norm. This is because, even though the alternate sorting yields one couple in
85
perfect compliance with the norm (the short man and tall woman), the other couple has a
height difference of 12′′ and produces a total loss of 144. The positive sorting assignment
yields a lower total loss of 36 + 36 = 72, since each couple is 6′′ from the ideal height
difference. Therefore, positive sorting is the competitive equilibrium.2 The same is true in
the case of a 6′′ female-taller norm: negative sorting creates a total loss of 36 + 324 = 360,
while positive sorting creates a total loss of 144 + 144 = 288. Hence, all 3 social norms are
consistent with the same competitive equilibrium: positive assortative matching.
3.2.2 A more general model of marital matching
This non-identifiability of social norms regarding height generalizes to cases with large
numbers of women and men covering a broad range of heights.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a population with N men and N women, and assume the
following marital surplus function:
Z(Hm, Hf ) = K − λ(gmf ), (3.3)
where the male-female height gap gmf = Hm − Hf . If λ is (strictly) convex in g, then strict
positive sorting on height is a (the unique) marriage market equilibrium.
Proof. Note that ∂
2Z(Hm,Hf )
∂Hm∂Hf
= λ′′(g) > 0 by strict convexity of λ. Thus the payoff function
satisfies condition (3.1), and so strict positive sorting on height is the unique marriage market
equilibrium. If λ is merely convex, then, starting from strict positive sorting, no exchanges of
partners can be made that strictly increase total marital output. Hence, such a sorting is an
equilibrium.
This result establishes that positive sorting on height can be consistent with both male-
taller and female-taller norms, as well without any explicit norms at all. Whatever the
ideal spousal height gap may be, convex losses for deviating from the ideal implies that
marital output is supermodular in spousal heights, creating a tendency for positive sorting
to arise in equilibrium. The next result illustrates that if there is a gender gap in the
2Here is a system of transfers that would support such an equilibrium: suppose we began with the sorting
in which one couple has equal heights while the other couple has a 12′′ height difference. The individuals in
the mismatched couple, f1 and m2, see that their total marital surpluses would be higher if they could switch
partners and have a 6′′ height difference instead of a 12′′ height difference. The question is whether f1 would
be able to induce m1 to switch from f2 to her. Her loss would decline from 72 (half of 144) to 18 (half of 36)
if she changed partners. The loss for m1 would increase from 0 to 18 if he switched partners. Clearly, f1 can
compensate m1 for switching by making him a side payment of between 18 and 56 (= 72 − 18), while still
leaving herself better off from the switch. The exact same story can be told for m2 inducing f2 to switch to
him. Thus, every person will be better off after the re-sorting, even though the original sorting yielded one
couple in perfect compliance with the norm.
86
attribute distributions, as is the case for height and for earnings, the equilibrium implied
by positive sorting is highly skewed in nature.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a population with N men and N women, and assume the
marital surplus function is given by equation (3.5). If the male height distribution exhibits
first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) over the female distribution,3 then there exists a
marriage market equilibrium in which no wives are taller than their husbands. Moreover, if
the loss function exhibits strict convexity, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, a marriage market equilibrium characterized by strict positive
sorting on height exists, and is unique if the loss function is strictly convex in the height gap.
In a strict positive sorting equilibrium, the spouses of each couple have heights of identical
rank in their respective distributions. Therefore, by the FOSD assumption, the husband is
taller than the wife in each couple.
These results suggest important implications for the study of social norms in marriage.
To the extent that society has preferences about the ideal height, age or earnings gap
between spouses, competitive forces operating within the marriage market will push the
equilibrium toward perfect rank-order sorting on these traits. And if men in the marriage
market tend to be taller, older or higher-earning than comparable women, positive as-
sortative matching leads to a situation in which the large majority of wives are shorter,
younger or lower-earning than their husband—suggesting a male-taller, male-older or
male-breadwinner norm when one may not exist.4
It is important to note that the results depend on the convexity of the loss function. This
creates a situation in which the marginal loss from further deviation from the social norm is
larger when the current deviation is larger. With this structure, the competitive equilibrium
is not generally the one which maximizes the number of couples in perfect compliance with
the social norm—–it is instead one in which many couples may deviate from the norm by
small amounts, but few couples deviate by large amounts. Note that increasing marginal
losses from deviating from the social norm is isomorphic to diminishing marginal returns
from greater adherence to the social norm. Social welfare is thus maximized when this
commodity (level of adherence to the norm), is distributed as equally as possible in the
population. Such a situation is realized by positive assortative matching.
Note also that the convex structure nests “kinked” loss functions. For example, a struc-
3That is, at any common rank in the distributions, the male attribute is larger than the female attribute.
Although this may sound like a strong assumption, it is quite realistic in the cases of both height and earnings.
For example, FOSD holds for the earnings distributions of husbands and wives in the 2000 US Census, the
data used in our empirical investigation of income differences between spouses (see section 3.3).
4This conclusion generalizes the findings of Belot and Francesconi (2013), in British speed dating data,
that the pool of potential partners appears to be more important than underlying preferences in the deter-
mination of who matches with whom.
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ture in which households are indifferent when the husband is taller (shorter) than the
wife, but face a loss increasing in the amount by which the husband is shorter (taller)
than the wife, is also consistent with strict positive assortative matching on height in equi-
librium (though because kinked loss functions are not necessarily strictly convex, such an
equilibrium may not be unique). Fisman et al. (2006) found evidence of kinked preference
structures in a speed dating experiment implemented with Columbia University graduate
students: men appeared to value female intelligence and ambition only when it did not
exceed their own.
3.2.3 Extensions of the model
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 predict an equilibrium in which no wives are taller than
their husbands (or, analogously, no wives earn more than their husbands). This stark
result is clearly counterfactual. Several factors are presumably at work in actual marriage
markets—–couples do not match on a single trait, there are search frictions, there is not
perfectly transferable utility, etc. We consider some of these issues below.
Sorting on multiple attributes. It is important to consider matching on multiple at-
tributes in our current context: if the economic gains to marriage depend on attributes
other than height, then the distribution of height gaps in marriage will clearly depend on
how these attributes are correlated with height in the population.
As a simple example, suppose there is an additional attribute X which enters the mar-
ital output function, such that the economic gains from marriage unrelated to the height
gap are no longer constant:
Zmf = Z(Xm, Hm, Xf , Hf ) = K(Xm, Xf )− λ(gmf ). (3.4)




> 0. Thus, K satisfies sufficient condition (3.1) for positive assortative
matching on X in equilibrium, while λ generates positive assortative matching on H by
Proposition 3.1. It is impossible to know without further assumptions whether the prevail-
ing equilibrium will consist of positive sorting on X, on H, or on some function of X and
H. However, given that X and H are positively correlated in the population, some degree
of positive sorting on H must exist in equilibrium. Therefore, given a significant gender
gap in H, this model still predicts that an equilibrium in which few wives are taller than
their husbands is consistent with a variety of social preferences over the spousal height
gap. There could also be no social preferences regarding height whatsoever—–λ could be
constant—–yet the positive correlation betweenX andH would still lead to an equilibrium
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making it look as if a male-taller norm exists.5
As an example, the work of Mansour and McKinnish (2014) illustrates subtle sorting
patterns when individuals care about multiple attributes. Mansour and McKinnish ob-
served that couples in which the husband is significantly older than the wife tend to be neg-
atively selected on education and earning potential. They argued that this pattern results
from the fact that higher-earning individuals tend to locate in marriage markets with more
similarly-aged individuals. That is, the preponderance of “husband-significantly-older”
couples among relatively low-earning individuals may have little to do with a husband-
significantly-older norm in this population.
Non-transferable marital surplus. The Becker model assumes that the gains from
marriage are fully transferable between spouses via monetary payments. In this setup,
the allocation of marriages and the transfers are determined in equilibrium as prospective
partners make binding agreements in the marriage market. If the division of the marital
surplus cannot be negotiated in the marriage market—that is, bargaining over the mar-
ital surplus occurs after marriage, or bargaining weights are fixed ex ante—–the market
clears on the basis of what prospective partners expect to obtain from bargaining within
marriage.6 Pollak (2019) notes that such a setup is consistent with using the Gale-Shapley
framework (Gale and Shapley, 1962) rather than Becker’s framework to analyze the mar-
ital equilibrium.
When the marital surplus is fully non-transferable, equilibrium marital outcomes may
have the potential to offer some identifying information about the underlying social norm.
For example, if the ideal is for husbands to be two inches taller than wives, we might
expect to see a point mass at two inches in the height gap distribution. Though such an
allocation would likely result in some very tall men matching with some very short women,
the impossibility of credible side payments prevents these individuals from attracting more
suitable partners.
This situation strikes us as unrealistic. For example, consider the man who is just taller
than the male partner of the tallest woman. This man would be forced to match with
one of the shortest women and realize a very low marital surplus. He stands to gain a
tremendous amount from matching with the tallest woman, and the total marital surplus
of her marriage would shrink only very slightly from matching with him. Thus, even a
5A systematic analysis of which characteristics significant affect the marital surplus was performed by
Dupuy and Galichon (2014). Applying the analysis to rich Dutch data on married couples, the authors
uncovered significant complementarities between spousal education, height, health and personality traits.
These results underscore the points that multiple characteristics influence marriage formation, and that the
patterns in the data support the prevalence of assortative matching on these characteristics.
6For a survey of the implications of household bargaining models for distribution of resources within
marriage, see Lundberg and Pollak (1996).
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modest degree of credible divisibility of the marital surplus might inspire a reshuffling
of partners in this context.7 The resulting equilibrium will therefore blend elements of
positive sorting with a cluster of couples with height gaps near 2 inches. Its exact nature
will depend not just on preferences but on the prevailing height distributions and market
size (i.e. the availability of close partner substitutes), and on the efficacy of the transfer
technology.
It is also worth noting that in the case of fully non-transferable utility, the equilibrium
allocation of partners is generally not unique (Roth and Sotomayor, 1992). Thus, even
if one is willing to assume fully non-transferable utility, additional structural assumptions
are likely necessary for identification of preferences.
3.2.4 Application to analysis of spousal height differences
Two recent studies of spousal height differences helps illustrate our point about the
difficulty of inferring preferences from equilibrium matches. Stulp et al. (2013) analyzed
the distribution of height differences among couples in the United Kingdom’s Millennium
Cohort Study. They compared the actual distribution of height differences to hypothet-
ical distributions based on random matching, drawing several inferences based on this
comparison. Table 3.1 presents their data, divided into bins of 5 cm (2 inch) height dif-
ferences. A key observation is that the actual distribution has fewer women who are taller
than their husbands than would occur through random matching. The authors argue that
this is consistent with a “male-taller” norm. They also interpret the data as supporting a
“male-not-too-tall” norm, since there are fewer men who are more than 25 cm taller than
their wives than would occur through random matching.
It is easy to see that the data are consistent with other social norms as well. These
include what might be called a “wife-not-too-short” norm or a “heights-not-too-different”
norm. In fact, a better way to describe the norm implied by Table 3.1 might be a norm
to keep the difference in heights between husbands and wives close to the overall average
difference in heights between men and women in the population. The three bins closest to
the actual average height difference of 14.1 cm (5.5 inches) are the bins that occur more
frequently in the actual distribution than in the random matching distribution. The bins
with the height differences farthest from 14.1 cm are the bins that occur with the lowest
frequency relative to random matching. Sohn (2015) found similar sorting patterns in
Indonesia: spousal height gaps closest to the mean gap occurred more frequently in the
observed data than in hypothetical random sortings, while those furthest away from the
7For example, for every $10 the man promises to transfer to her, she believes she will only actually receive
$2 in marriage. This is a situation of imperfectly transferable utility.
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mean occurred less frequently. Notice that this is exactly what will happen if there is a
tendency for positive assortative matching on height, as this pushes the equilibrium toward
an outcome in which the height gap is uniform across all marriages. Thus, it is likely that
a wide variety of underlying preferences could produce these observed distributions of
spousal height gaps.
3.3 The Skewed Distribution of Spousal Earnings Differences in the
U.S. does not Imply a Male Breadwinner Norm.
We apply the above insights to an empirical investigation of earnings differences be-
tween spouses, where, like height, a persistent gender gap also exists. As gender gaps in
wages and hours worked have shrunk throughout the late 20th century, the proportion
of wives earning similar to or more than their husbands has risen (Winkler, 1998; Win-
kler, McBride and Andrews, 2005). However, this proportion remains small (Bertrand,
Kamenica and Pan, 2015), and the gender gap in earnings remains substantial (Blau and
Kahn, 2017). A tendency for positive sorting combined with this gender gap would lead
to a skewed marriage market equilibrium in which most husbands out-earn their wives—–
even if there is no social norm dictating this outcome. Whether the observed gender gap
in earnings is influenced by gender norms operating in the home, independent of the labor
market, is an important question, with implications for family and labor market policy.
Our analysis indicates that this question cannot readily be answered by analyzing the dis-
tribution of spousal earnings differences.
Our approach is to simulate marriage market equilibria using observed earnings in
U.S. Census data and simple matching processes. We start by matching men and women
randomly. Next, we match women and men assuming positive assortative matching on ob-
served earnings perturbed with noise (to approximate characteristics other than observed
earnings influencing the marriage market). Finally, recognizing that earnings is not an
exogenous attribute but is affected via a labor supply decision, we assume positive sorting
on unobserved potential earnings and endogenize labor supply choices made after mar-
riage. The goal of these exercises is to illustrate that simple matching models, which do
not include any specific preference about the husband earning more than the wife, can
reproduce the highly skewed observed distribution of spousal earnings differences.
Following BKP, we summarize spousal earnings differences by plotting the distribution
of the share of the couple’s total earnings that was earned by the wife. Thus, 0.01 indicates
that the wife earned 1 percent of the couple’s total earnings, and 1.0 indicates that she
earned all of it. 0.50 represents a couple in which wife and husband earned equal amounts.
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3.3.1 Empirical distributions of spousal earnings differences
We begin with a sample of men and women drawn from the 5 percent sample of the
2000 U.S. Census (Ruggles et al., 2015). Following BKP, we restrict the sample to couples
ages 18-65 and process earned income variables following the procedure outlined in that
paper’s main text and appendix. We keep only couples in which both spouses report pos-
itive earnings. Figure 3.1 displays two 20-bin histograms of the distribution of the share
of total earnings earned by the wife: the one published in BKP and our replication. As in
BKP, we apply a local linear smoother to the histogram bins, allowing for a break in the
smoothed distribution at 0.50. The two distributions are almost identical, and both display
a substantial reduction in probability mass to the right of 0.50.
For our simulation exercises, we further restrict the sample to relatively young couples
(aged 18-40) without children. Our final sample consists of 109, 569 dual-earning couples.
Figure 3.2 plots the sample distribution of the wife’s share of total earnings. The main
difference between this distribution and that in Figure 3.1 is that there is less mass below
0.25, which likely reflects the impact of specialization after childbearing.8 Our simple
simulations are not set up to handle the dynamic considerations of fertility and its effect on
the wife’s labor supply and earning potential. Nonetheless, imposing this sample restriction
does not change the fact that most of the distribution lies to the left of 50 percent (where
the wife earns less than the husband), and the probability mass drops sharply as one moves
to the right of 50 percent. These are the stylized facts we will attempt to replicate in the
following exercises.
3.3.2 Simulated distributions
Random matching of couples. Figure 3.3 displays a smoothed distribution of the
wife’s share of total earnings based on random matching, again allowing for a break at
0.50, overlaid on the observed distribution. Like the observed distribution, the distribution
generated by random matching contains a mode around 0.42 and a drop-off in mass to the
right of that point. Moreover, significantly fewer wives slightly out-earn their husbands
than vice versa; the point of equal earnings (0.50) corresponds to the 70th percentile of the
distribution. This benchmark exercise demonstrates that the prevailing male and female
earnings distributions exert a strong influence on spousal earnings differences.
8This additional restriction is motivated by the well-known fact that women disproportionately reduce
their working hours or exit the labor force to raise young children and later re-enter the workforce with
lower earnings potential (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Hotchkiss and Pitts, 2007; Attanasio, Low and Sánchez-
Marcos, 2008; Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010). We abstract from this endogenous specialization decision
after childbearing. BKP’s Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2 show similar effects of children and marital tenure
on the observed distribution of the wife’s share of total earnings.
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Notice that Figure 3.3 follows a similar pattern to the distribution of height differences
shown in Table 3.1. The bins in Figure 3.3 that occur more frequently in the actual distri-
bution than in the distribution with random matching are those closest to 0.42, the average
wife’s share of total earnings. (Although Figure 3.3 is in shares rather than differences, the
pattern would look similar if plotted in absolute or proportional income differences.) A
key feature is that the actual distribution is pushed toward the mean earnings difference
and away from extremes, exactly as in our simple theoretical examples.
Positive assortative matching on potential earnings. We take male and female earn-
ings as observed in our sample (denoted as Y mi for males and Y
f
i for females). We create
couples by rank-order-matching individuals not according to observed earnings, but rather
observed earnings perturbed with noise. That is, for each individual i of gender g we assign
W gi = Y
g
i + ui, (3.5)
where u is normally distributed white noise, and pair up males and females according to
their ranks of W . This is consistent with at least two interpretations. One interpretation
is that couples are perfectly sorted on permanent earning potential and the white noise
represents transitory earnings shocks realized after marriage. A second is that men and
women care about other characteristics as well as earnings, or that assortative matching
on earnings is imperfect, for example due to the presence of search frictions. Under the
latter interpretation, equilibrium sorting on observed earnings plus noise is the reduced
form of a more complicated matching process.
Figure 3.4 displays the distribution of the wife’s share of total earnings, simulated from
this simple model, overlaid on the actual distribution.9 The simulated distribution is very
similar to the actual distribution: it exhibits a sharp drop in mass across the 50 percent
threshold and contains few couples in which the wife out-earns her husband.10 Thus, given
the gender gap in earnings distributions, the observed distribution of spousal earnings
differences is largely consistent with positive assortative matching on earnings. As the
previous section indicates, this matching is consistent with a wide variety of underlying
9The standard deviation of u is set to 16,000 for this simulation and is chosen to match the observed data.
This choice is slightly larger than the standard deviation of transitory earnings for males in 2000 implied by
the numbers reported in Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009). Thus, one might prefer to interpret the simulation as
reflecting both elements of transitory earnings variance and imperfect positive sorting on potential earnings.
10The successful fit of this simulation is striking when we consider the fact that the simulation assumes
one national marriage market. If we instead considered separate marriage markets defined by state and
age (or, state, age and ethnicity), and allowed the prevailing earnings distributions and choice of noise term
to vary by marriage market, we would (by greater modeling flexibility) be able to replicate the aggregate
distribution of spousal earnings differences even more closely. The point remains that a simple matching
model with no explicit social norm broadly succeeds in replicating the data.
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preferences. It could be based on a desire for equality in spousal earnings, a preference
for wives to earn more than their husbands, or economic gains from marriage related
to household public goods (i.e. with no explicit preference for equal or unequal spousal
earnings).
Positive assortative matching on potential earnings with endogenous labor supply.
One shortcoming of the previous exercise is that it treats the observed distributions of
men’s and women’s earnings as fixed attributes, determined outside of the household.
Yet, a literature dating back to Becker (1981) argues that household incentives, such as
gains from specialization, influence spousal labor supply choices. Moreover, BKP argue
that social norms themselves may influence how many hours a wife chooses to work in the
market: if she is at risk of out-earning her husband in a full-time job, she may work fewer
hours. To address this shortcoming, we endogenize the wife’s earnings via a simple labor
supply model—that does not assume an explicit male-breadwinner norm—and explore the
model’s predictions about the distribution of spousal earnings differences.
We assume that, for a given male m and female f , the match output function is given
by
Zmf = Z(Ym, Yf , Pf ) =
C1−γmf
1− γ
− ψPf , (3.6)
with Cmf = 0.61(Ym + YfPf ); where C is consumption of a composite good, Ym and Yf de-
note each spouse’s permanent income, Pf is the wife’s labor supply decision (constrained
to be in the unit interval), γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ψ is the disutility
incurred by the household if the wife works.11 This specification of household utility has
been used in recent work investigating determinants of wives’ labor supply (e.g. Attanasio,
Low and Sánchez-Marcos, 2008 and subsequent papers). It assumes household consump-
tion is a public good with congestion; the 0.61 is a McClements scale calibration capturing
consumption economies of scale. In this setup, where spouses consume an indivisible pub-
lic good, positive sorting on permanent earnings occurs in marriage market equilibrium so
long as each member’s permanent earnings positively affects match output (Becker, 1973,
1981). It is trivial to show that this holds here (regardless of the wife’s eventual labor
supply decision).
After marriage, the household takes household potential income as given and chooses
the wife’s labor supply Pf ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the above utility function.12 With an interior
11This parameter could capture specialization incentives or social norms. Notice, however, that the disutil-
ity faced by the household is continuous in the wife’s labor supply decision—–it does not change discontin-
uously if the wife supplies enough labor to out-earn her husband. Thus there is no discontinuous incentive
for the wife to earn less than her husband.
12We assume the household acts as a unitary decision-maker, committing to equation (3.9) at the time of
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If P ∗f lies outside of the unit interval, the appropriate corner solution applies.
We calibrate the model by imposing γ = 1.5, a standard value estimated in the macro
literature. We assume log-normally distributed potential earnings and allow the work
disutility parameter, ψ, to be heterogeneous in the population and negatively correlated
with Yf . In total there are 8 remaining parameters, which we calibrate by targeting 8
moments in our observed data: the means and standard deviations of male and female
log observed income, the observed mean gender earnings ratio conditional on earning
positive income (P ∗f > 0), the observed mean gender earnings ratio conditional on full-
time work (defined in the data as at least 1600 hours worked in the last calendar year;
defined in the model as P ∗f > 0.95), the female employment rate (defined in the data as the
share of wives working positive hours in the last calendar year), and the female full-time
employment rate. We do not target any moment related to marital matching or spousal
earnings differences, as doing so would threaten the external validity of our inferences.
Table 3.2 summarizes the calibration. Overall the model does a good job of replicating
the targets in the data. With the calibrated model we simulate the distribution of the wife’s
share of total spousal earnings (Figure 3.5). The simulated distribution again matches the
actual distribution quite closely, delivering a sharp drop in probability mass at the 0.50
threshold.
3.4 Discontinuity or Point Mass? Assessing Alternative Evidence for a
Male Breadwinner Norm
The above evidence suggests that social scientists wishing to test the importance of
social norms need to find strategies beyond interpreting skewed distributions of spousal
attributes. The challenge in doing so makes the discontinuity found by Bertrand, Ka-
menica and Pan (2015) at the equal-earnings threshold a compelling addition to the lit-
erature. The logic behind BKP’s discontinuity test runs as follows. Suppose we observe
the distribution of the share of total spousal earnings that was earned by the wife in the
neighborhood of 0.50. Suppose we find that this distribution exhibits a sharp change in
probability mass at the 0.50 threshold—that is, there are far fewer wives barely out-earning
marriage and then choosing P ∗f after observing the earnings shocks.
95
their husbands than husbands barely out-earning their wives. Because standard models of
the marriage market, involving agents optimizing continuous utility functions, should not
generate discontinuous equilibrium distributions, such a finding suggests the existence of
a utility penalty that applies if and only if the wife out-earns the husband.
BKP estimated a discontinuous drop-off in probability mass across the equal-earnings
threshold in a variety of Census samples. However, inference is complicated by the fact
that earnings are not precisely measured in Census survey data. Mis-measurement occurs
for several reasons. First, earnings are reported, rather than measured directly. (Moreover,
earnings for both spouses are typically reported by one household member.) Second, earn-
ings are imputed for individuals who do not answer earnings questions, and the earnings
of high-earning individuals are top-coded at a common value. Third, reported earnings
are rounded by the U.S. Census Bureau in public-use samples, usually to the nearest thou-
sand. These issues create a large point mass of couples with identical earnings. Even after
employing several procedures to adjust the data, BKP still found that around 3 percent of
dual-earning Census couples have identical earnings. (We corroborate this finding.)
To overcome these limitations, BKP also assembled a sample of administrative earnings
records from the Social Security Administration (SSA). These data have been linked to a
household survey (the Survey of Income and Program Participation, or SIPP) which allows
couples to be identified.13 In this administrative data sample, the point mass of equal-
earning couples still exists but is much smaller: only around one quarter of one percent
of all dual-earning couples earn identical incomes. BKP obtained a similar discontinuity
result in this sample.
Without the point mass, the straightforward way to implement BKP’s procedure would
be to test for a discontinuity in the distribution exactly at 0.50, and interpret the finding
of a significant drop-off in the density function as evidence for a social norm that the wife
should not out-earn her husband. The presence of the point mass presents a challenge,
which BKP acknowledge in footnote 7 of their paper. To circumvent this problem, they
tested for a discontinuity just to the right of 0.50. One might interpret this treatment of
the data as a test for whether there is a social norm dictating that a wife should not strictly
out-earn her husband. Their finding of a significant drop-off in the density function to
the right of 0.50, combined with the presence of the point mass of equal earners, might
suggest that couples manipulate their earnings on the margin to comply with such a social
13The data come from a pre-linked and cleaned Census Bureau data product called the Gold Standard File
(GSF). Users work with synthetic versions of the data remotely and then have Census run final programs in-
ternally on the actual GSF, subject the output to a disclosure review, and then release the output. More infor-




This treatment of the data seems sensible a priori, but the existence of the mass point
violates one of the assumptions required by the discontinuity test, namely, that the dis-
tribution is continuous everywhere except possibly at the supposed breakpoint (McCrary,
2008). Like a non-parametric regression discontinuity design, the test involves local linear
smoothing of a finely-binned histogram on either side of the supposed breakpoint, and
asymptotic inference is based on the size of the bins shrinking to zero at the correct rate as
the number of observations increases to infinity. In BKP’s application of the test, for a small
bin size, the bin immediately before the breakpoint will (by containing the point mass) be
taller than the bin immediately after the breakpoint. This could exert undue influence on
the discontinuity estimate, especially if a small bin size and bandwidth is used to perform
the test.
3.4.1 Gauging the robustness of BKP’s discotninuity test results
To investigate the sensitivity of the discontinuity test to the presence of the point mass,
we replicate BKP’s SIPP-SSA data sample and analysis. BKP constructed a sample of earn-
ings data for all dual-earning couples aged 18 to 65 observed in the first year they were in
the SIPP panel. They considered SIPP panels 1990 through 2004. We construct a sample
according to the same conditions but include the 1984 and 2008 SIPP panels as well, which
are available in the most recent version of the SIPP-SSA data product. We obtain a sample
of around 83, 000 couples—about 9, 500 more than in BKP’s sample. Despite using a slightly
different sample, the resultant distribution of the wife’s share of total spousal earnings is
virtually identical to BKP’s, as illustrated in Figure 3.6.
In our replicated sample, 0.21 percent of all dual-earning couples earn identical in-
comes, compared to 0.26 percent in BKP’s sample. To see the impact of this mass point
on the distribution, Figure 3.7 zooms in on the portion of the distribution between 45 and
55 percent, displaying histograms with a very small bin size of 0.001 (about the size used
in the discontinuity tests). The top histogram retains the mass point, while the bottom
histogram removes it. The two histograms look very different: the top one exhibits a large
spike right at 0.50, while the bottom one does not. Moreover, though the data are noisy for
such a small bin size, the histogram on the right does not look particularly discontinuous
at 0.50. These illustrations suggest that the point mass may exert an undue influence on
the discontinuity estimates.
Using our sample we perform 3 different versions of the McCrary test for a discontinu-
ity in the distribution at 50 percent, based on three different treatments of the point mass:
keeping the point mass and testing for a discontinuity at .500001, keeping the point mass
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and testing for a discontinuity at .499999, and deleting the point mass and testing for a
discontinuity exactly at 0.50. For each version we use 4 different sets of tuning parameters.
McCrary’s test procedure involves an algorithm which automatically chooses a bin size for
the histogram and a bandwidth within which to apply the local linear smoother to the his-
togram. McCrary (2008) recommends using a smaller bandwidth than the automatically-
selected one (around half the size) to conduct robust asymptotic inference. We consider
the automatically selected bandwidth, which in this case is around .084; and then band-
widths of .045, .023, and .011. The last bandwidth may be too narrow for optimal statistical
inference, but using successively smaller bandwidths allows us to gauge the sensitivity of
the test to the presence of the point mass (which becomes increasingly dominant as the
bandwidth shrinks).
Table 3.3 reports the discontinuity estimates, which equal the estimated log increase
in the height of the density function as one travels from just to the left of the supposed
breakpoint to just to the right. A negative number thus indicates a sharp drop and a
positive number indicates a sharp gain. The first version of the test replicates BKP’s choice
of retaining the point mass of couples and testing for a discontinuity just to the right of
50 percent (.500001). With the standard bandwidth and bin size, we estimate that the
density function drops by a statistically significant 12.4 percent across the threshold. This
is very similar to BKP’s reported estimate of a 12.3 percent drop in their very similar sample
(reported on p. 576). Observe that as the bandwidth shrinks, the estimate of the sharp
drop rises in magnitude, such that with the smallest bandwidth we estimate a 57.5 percent
drop—over 4 times as large as the first estimate. This suggests that the point estimates are
sensitive to the existence of the point mass.
When we retain the point mass and test for a discontinuity just to the left of 50 percent,
we find the exact opposite result: the density function jumps discontinuously upward.
Once again, the estimate starts out reasonably small (6.4 percent) and becomes very large
(45.1 percent) as the bandwidth shrinks. The finding of a sharp increase in the distribution
at 50 percent suggests that couples manipulate earnings to avoid a situation in which the
wife earns strictly less than her husband. Put another way, the data appear consistent with
a social norm dictating that a wife should earn at least as much as her husband. This is
nearly opposite to the social norm dictating that a wife should not earn strictly more than
her husband, which is supported by the first version of the results.
The third column of results derives from deleting the point mass and testing for a
discontinuity exactly at 50 percent. Two features stand out. First, while the estimates
are negative, they are no longer statistically significant–—moreover, the estimate based
on the standard bandwidth matches closely estimates generated by performing the test
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with the standard bandwidth on our simulated data from the above section. Second, the
estimates do not rise appreciably in magnitude or statistical significance as the bandwidth
shrinks, likely because the point mass is no longer present. Therefore, if we ignore the
one quarter of one percent of couples earning identical incomes, the conclusion that the
observed distribution of spousal earnings differences could be consistent with a variety of
underlying social preferences (including no explicit social norm) is supported by the data.
A related conclusion is that while BKP’s discontinuity test eschews the theoretical critique
of the literature we levied in section 2, it does not produce robust empirical results, given
the point mass of couples earning identical incomes.
3.4.2 A further inquiry into the point mass
Considering these conclusions, it is worth exploring why the point mass exists in the
first place, and what it means to remove it from the sample. For example, the existence
of the point mass could indicate a social preference, in the population or a certain sub-
population, for strict equality of spousal earnings. Further exploration of the 2000 Census
data reveals the following facts about the couples who report identical earnings in com-
parison to the full sample.14 15 First, couples who report identical earnings are almost
six times more likely to both be self-employed than couples who report different earnings
(13.0 percent versus 2.3 percent). Among couples in which husband and wife indicate
being self-employed in the same occupation and industry (a likely indicator of running a
family business), 34 percent report identical incomes. (These couples represent 0.18 per-
cent of the full sample of couples.) Since income from a family business can be allocated
in any way between husband and wife on tax returns, this suggests that one source of
identical incomes is couples choosing to divide family business income equally for income
tax purposes.16
In addition, there are couples in which the husband and wife do appear to earn identical
salary incomes. Couples reporting that husband and wife both earn wages (i.e., are not
self-employed) and report identical earnings, occupations, and industries (suggesting that
14The Gold Standard File provides very little occupational information about the couples, which is why
we use the Census for this exploration. It is important to keep in mind that the point mass of couples with
identical earnings is over 10 times as large in the Census data, due to rounding of reported earnings as well
as possible reporting biases. That is, many couples who report identical earnings in the Census data do not
have identical administrative earnings records. However, it is reasonable to assume that couples who report
identical earnings are (much) likelier than those who do not to have identical administrative records.
15All of these facts are based on the sample of couples in the 2000 Census 5 percent sample in which both
husband and wife are age 18 to 65 with positive earnings.
16For couples filing jointly there will generally be no tax implications from the way family business income
is allocated between husband and wife on Schedule C tax forms, though there might be implications for
Social Security.
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they are likely to have identical jobs) constitute 0.34 percent of the sample. Elementary,
middle school, and secondary teachers make up 18.9 percent of this group, by far the
largest occupation. Taken together, the group of self-employed and salaried couples with
identical incomes, occupations, and industries constitute 0.52 (= 0.18 + 0.34) percent of all
couples. Some of these are presumably “false positives,” given the fact that Census data
are self-reported and rounded. But this suggests that it is not difficult to account for the
0.2-0.3 percent of couples with identical earnings in the administrative data. (Zinovyeva
and Tverdostup (2018) found that co-working spouses could account for the entire point
mass of equal-earning couples observed in Finnish data.)
Our interpretation of these cases (couples with family businesses reporting identical in-
comes and couples with identical earnings in occupations such as school teachers) is that
they do not provide much information about a social norm related to husbands earning
more than wives. They could constitute evidence for an equal-earning norm in a sub-
set of the population, but they could also indicate frictions in the marriage market which
lead a disproportionate share of equal-earning individuals to marry, for example, because
they met through work. That is, there could be a small utility loss for the husband not
out-earning his wife which is outweighed by the search cost of finding a more suitable
partner. For example, McKinnish (2007) and Mansour and McKinnish (2018) have pre-
sented evidence suggesting that the workplace plays an important role in marital sorting
and dissolution, consistent with the search-friction paradigm.
Whatever the cause of the point mass of equal earners, we have shown that its presence
compromises the validity and robustness of BKP’s discontinuity test at the equal-earning
threshold. It remains unclear whether observed distributions of spousal earnings differ-
ences offer identifying information about underlying social norms.
3.5 Conclusion
Our theoretical and empirical results demonstrate that it is misleading to infer pref-
erences about spousal attribute differences from their observed distribution in marriage
market equilibrium. Marriage market outcomes are affected by preferences as well as the
underlying distributions of attributes. If men are taller or higher-earning than women on
average, preferences which lead to positive assortative matching will produce equilibria in
which it is unusual for women to be taller or higher-earning than their husbands. Even a
preference for men to be shorter than their wives can lead to positive assortative matching
and, consequently, an equilibrium in which men tend to be taller than their wives.
Our simulations produce distributions of spousal earnings shares which closely resem-
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ble the observed distribution using very simple models of assortative matching—without
making any assumptions about preferences regarding husbands earning more than wives.
The one feature we cannot reproduce with our simulations is the discontinuous drop-off
in probability mass to the right of the equal-earning threshold, reported by Bertrand, Ka-
menica and Pan (2015). However, we show that this discontinuity is less informative than
it first appears, since it is the result of a point mass of equal-earning couples. This mass
causes a sharp drop to the right of 50 percent in the distribution of the wife’s share of total
earned income, which is consistent with a social norm that wives should not earn more
than their husbands. But it also causes a sharp drop to the left of 50 percent, a result that is
consistent with a social norm that husbands should not earn more than their wives. When
we remove the point mass we do not see any evidence of a discontinuity at the equal-
earnings threshold. Whether these individuals are retained or removed from the sample,
their presence compromises the robustness of BKP’s strategy of using a discontinuity test
at the equal-earning threshold to infer the presence of a husband-breadwinner norm.
To be clear, our results do not imply that male breadwinner norms do not exist. The
literature includes other types of analysis, with BKP providing other pieces of evidence
in their paper that are not based on inferences drawn from the distribution of spousal
earnings differences. These include analyses of marriage rates, divorce rates, labor force
participation, work hours, and housework time as a function of the actual or predicted
probability that the wife out-earns the husband.17 We are particularly intrigued by the
release of a study that finds that husbands tend to inflate, and wives deflate, reported
earnings on surveys when the wife’s “true” administrative earnings exceed her husband’s
(Murray-Close and Heggeness, 2018). It is outside the scope of this paper to analyze these
other tests of the social norm hypothesis. Our argument is simply that observed differences
in spousal attributes are not, in and of themselves, good evidence for social norms related
to these attributes.
It is also interesting to consider whether social norms may themselves be driven by the
underlying distributions of traits. In the analysis of Stulp et al. (2013), there is a tendency
for spouses to be pushed toward the actual mean difference in heights of 14 cm. We showed
that this tendency can be explained as the result of positive assortative matching, with no
need for a social norm related to height differences. But if there were a fundamental social
preference for husbands to be taller than their wives, it would seem surprising if such a
preference coincidentally matched the actual difference in mean heights between men and
women. If there is such a norm, it presumably was influenced by the actual differences
in heights between men and women. A plausible explanation is that positive assortative
17For a further analysis of housework time in German longitudinal data, see Wieber and Holst (2015).
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matching produced distributions like those we observe, which in turn led individuals to
perceive that there must be some normative reason for husbands to be taller than their
wives.
This explanation is relevant to the case of earnings differences as well. Women’s la-
bor market opportunities in the United States have increased dramatically in the last 50
years, yet substantial gender career and earnings gaps remain, especially in marriage. It
is possible that labor market change has outpaced social change, and slow-moving gender
norms play a key role in generating these extant gender gaps in marriage. Inquiries into
the existence and potential consequences of these norms are likely to continue to be an
active area of research. We believe this research will be stronger and more convincing
if researchers are sensitive to the challenges involved in drawing inferences about social
norms from observed marriage market outcomes.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Height differences between husbands and wives, UK Millennium Cohort Study
Husband height minus Proportion in: Ratio of
wife height (cm) actual distribution random distribution actual to random
< −10 0.6% 1.3% 0.47
−10 to −5 1.5% 2.6% 0.58
−5 to 0 1.9% 2.5% 0.77
0 to 5 8.5% 8.7% 0.97
5 to 10 16.3% 14.5% 1.12
10 to 15 21.3% 19.2% 1.11
15 to 20 20.7% 19.7% 1.05
20 to 25 15.3% 15.8% 0.97
25 to 30 8.8% 9.4% 0.94
30 to 35 3.7% 4.2% 0.87
> 35 1.4% 2.1% 0.66
Notes: Data taken from Table 1 of Stulp et al. (2013).
Table 3.2: Model calibration
Parameter Symbol Calibrated value
Mean, male log earnings µm 10.350
Std dev, male log earnings σm 0.750
Mean, female log potential earnings µf 10.160
Std dev, female log potential earnings σf 0.700
Mean, disutility of work ψ 0.002
Std dev, disutility of work σψ 0.001
Earnings-disutility correlation, females ρ -0.400
Std dev, transitory earnings shock (1000s) σu 13.000
Targets in the data Data Model
Mean, male log earnings 10.350 10.350
Std dev, male log earnings 0.750 0.750
Mean, female log earnings 10.000 9.980
Std dev, female log earnings 0.870 0.870
Gender earnings ratio, all 0.740 0.71
Gender earnings ratio, full-timers only 0.80 0.79
Labor force-participation rate, females 0.88 0.91
Full-time employment rate, females 0.67 0.67
Notes: Calibration of model discussed in Section 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Different treatments of the point mass produce different discontinuity estimates.
Hypothesized breakpoint:
Bandwidth Bin size .500001 .499999 .50 (omit point mass)
.084 .0016 −.124∗∗∗ .064∗∗ −.034
(.031) (.031) (.032)
.045 .0016 −.184∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗ −.031
(.040) (.040) (.043)
.023 .0016 −.310∗∗∗ .240∗∗∗ −.040
(.055) (.055) (.061)
.011 .0005 −.575∗∗∗ .451∗∗∗ −.078
(.078) (.081) (.091)
Notes: Sample of spousal earnings data taken from the SIPP-SSA Gold Standard Files. See Section 3.4
for discussion of the sample. The first reported bandwidth and bin size correspond to those automatically
selected by the McCrary (2008) test algorithm. McCrary (2008) recommends using a small bandwidth than
the automatically selected one, as is done in the second thru fourth rows. Point estimates report the change
in log height of the density function as one travels from just left of the hypothesized breakpoint to just right




Figure 3.1: Distributions of gender relative income in the 2000 U.S. Census
Notes: Graph A is a screenshot of Figure III of Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015). Graph B is our replication.
Each graph is based on a sample of dual-earning married couples in which both husband and wife are
between 18 and 65 years of age. Each graph plots a 20-bin histogram of the distribution, across couples, of
the share of total household income that was earned by the wife. The dashed lines depict the lowess smoother
applied to each histogram, allowing for a break at 0.5.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of gender relative income in the 2000 U.S. Census:
Couples aged 18-40 without children
Notes: The sample includes dual-earning married couples who do not have children and where both husband
and wife are between 18 and 40 years of age. The figure plots a 20-bin histogram of the distribution, across
couples, of the share of total household income that was earned by the wife. The dashed lines depict the
lowess smoother applied to the histogram, allowing for a break at 0.5.
Figure 3.3: Distributions of gender relative income in the 2000 U.S. Census:
Actual and random sorting
Notes: The sample is the same as in Figure 3.2. The figure plots a 20-bin histogram of the actual distribu-
tion of the wife’s share of total spousal earnings (“Actual Sorting”), and a 20-bin histogram of a simulated
distribution based on random sorting of couples (“Random Sorting”). The dashed lines represent the lowess
smoother applied to each histogram on either side of 0.5.
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Figure 3.4: Distributions of gender relative income in the 2000 U.S. Census:
Actual sorting and simulated sorting with exogenous earnings
Notes: The sample is the same as in Figure 3.2. The figure plots a 20-bin histogram of the actual distribution
of the wife’s share of total spousal earnings (“Actual Sorting”), and a 20-bin histogram of a simulated distri-
bution based on assortative matching of couples on observed income plus noise (“Simulated Sorting”). See
Section 3.3 for further detail on the simulation. The dashed lines represent the lowess smoother applied to
each histogram on either side of 0.5.
Figure 3.5: Distributions of gender relative income in the 2000 U.S. Census:
Actual sorting and simulated sorting with endogenous earnings
Notes: The sample is the same as in Figure 3.2. The figure plots a 20-bin histogram of the actual distribution
of the wife’s share of total spousal earnings (“Actual Sorting”), and a 20-bin histogram of a simulated distri-
bution based on assortative matching of couples on potential income plus noise (“Simulated Sorting”)—and
in which the wife’s observed earnings are endogenized via a neoclassical labor supply decision. See Section
3.3 for further detail on the simulation. The dashed lines represent the lowess smoother applied to each
histogram on either side of 0.5.
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Figure 3.6: Distributions of gender relative income in U.S. administrative record data
Notes: Graph A is a screenshot of Figure I of Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015). The data underlying this
graph are administrative income data from the SIPP-SSA Gold Standard File covering the 1990 to 2004 SIPP
panels. Graph B is our replication. We use the latest version of the Gold Standard File, which includes the
1984 and 2008 SIPP panels as well. The sample in each graph includes all dual-earning couples aged 18 to
65, with income information taken from the first year the couple was observed in the SIPP panel. See Section
3.4 for further discussion. Each graph plots 20-bin histograms of the observed distribution of the wife’s share
of total spousal earnings. The dashed lines represent the lowess smoother applied to each histogram on either
side of 0.5.
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Figure 3.7: Distributions of gender relative income in U.S. administrative record data:
Couples who earn close to the same incomes
Notes: The sample is the same as in graph B of Figure 3.6, but is restricted to couples in which the wife earns
between 45 and 55 percent of total income. The graph in the top panel retains the point mass of couples
earning identical incomes; the graph in the bottom panel excludes it. The bin size used in both graphs is





A.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: The effect of unilateral divorce on marriage propensities was long-lasting, not
temporary.







































Years since UD adoption
Ever married
Currently married
Notes: Event-study regression estimates from 1960-1990 U.S. Census data. Sample consists of less-educated
men at least 18 years old, no longer enrolled in school, and with 6-21 years of potential labor market
experience. Markers display point estimates (in percentage points) for associated outcome; whiskers display
95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered on state. Event studies are estimated in 5-year
bins because Census data exist only once every ten years.
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Table A.1: Probabilities of transitioning back to yearly labor-force participation (P ) for
current-year nonparticipants (N): Men with high school education only, 1978-2011
N → P transition probabilities
Group Race 1 year 2 years 5 years 10 years
Experienced a P → N transition Whites 0.50 0.66 0.83 0.89
in first 15 years observed Blacks 0.40 0.57 0.76 0.83
Non-participant in first Whites 0.43 0.54 0.72 0.81
year observed Blacks 0.34 0.47 0.63 0.74
Notes: Taken from Binder and Bound (2019). Data source: Social Security Administration earnings records
(1978-2011) linked to all Survey of Income and Program Participation panels from 1984-2008. Sample
consists of men with exactly a high school degree, at least 19 years old, and with 0-15 years of potential
labor market experience in the first year observed. Non-participation is defined as having total administrative
earnings for the year less than a minimum threshold of 0.5 times the federal minimum wage times 40 hours
times 13 weeks. Two groups of initial non-participants are considered: men who experienced a transition to
yearly non-participation within the first 15 years of observation, and men who were yearly non-participants
in the first year observed. Columns report the share of each group that had transitioned back to yearly
participation by the given number of years—1, 2, 5 or 10—after the initial experience of non-participation.
Table A.2: 1980 variation across commuting zones in extent of female specialization in
service sectors
All Workers Noncollege Workers
Service sector→ Business− Business All Business− Business All
Percentile Panel A: Share of total female workers employed in given sector group
10th .17 .33 .67 .18 .35 .61
25th .19 .36 .76 .21 .38 .71
50th .21 .39 .81 .23 .42 .77
75th .23 .42 .86 .26 .46 .83
90th .25 .46 .88 .28 .51 .85
Percentile
Panel B: Share of total female workers −
share of total male workers employed in given sector group
10th .09 .21 .34 .13 .26 .39
25th .10 .25 .39 .14 .30 .48
50th .12 .27 .46 .17 .33 .53
75th .14 .30 .51 .19 .37 .60
90th .17 .33 .55 .22 .41 .64
Notes: 1980 U.S. Census data. See Section 1.4 for definition of commuting zones (of which 722 exist in the
mainland U.S.). Sample consists of workers at least 18 years old and with 0-18 years potential experience.
Noncollege workers are those with at most one year of completed college. Sector groups are constructed
using occupation groups defined below in Appendix Table A.8. Business− consists of groups 9-11; Business
consists of Business− plus administrative support, which is group 12; All services consist of groups 1, 3-5,
7-16. There are 24 total occupation groups.
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Table A.3: Effects of the marriage market interventions on ever-married propensities
Propensity to be ever-married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intervention 1: mutual consent→ unilateral divorce
Effect of −1.2∗ −1.9∗∗ −0.9 −1.5∗∗ −1.3∗∗∗ −1.4∗∗∗
legal change (0.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.7) (0.4) (0.5)
100−control mean 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
Pre-trends p-val 0.40 0.69 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.45
N (thousands) 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151
Intervention 2: increased demand for female employment
Effect of 10 p.p. −1.2∗∗∗ −1.1∗∗ −1.7∗∗∗ −1.4∗∗∗ −1.7∗∗∗ −1.2∗∗
Bartik shock (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5)
100−control mean 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0
N 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888
Controls
Baseline X X X X X X
Demos×linear trend X X X
Region effects X X
State/division effects X X
Notes: U.S. Census and ACS data. Sample consists of men with at most one year of completed college, at
least 18 years old, and with 5-20 years potential labor market experience. See notes to Table 1.4 for further
detail.
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Table A.4: Effects of the marriage market interventions on labor-force participation: all
young men
Propensity to be in the labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intervention 1: mutual consent→ unilateral divorce
Effect of −0.4 −0.8∗ −0.3 −0.6∗∗ −0.8∗∗ −1.0∗
legal change (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
100−control mean 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
Pre-trends p-val 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.06 0.80 0.94
N (thousands) 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151 2, 151
Intervention 2: increased demand for female employment
Effect of 10 p.p. −0.8∗ −1.1∗∗ −1.5∗∗∗ −1.6∗∗∗ −1.6∗∗∗ −1.6∗∗∗
Bartik shock (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
100−control mean 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
N 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888 2, 888
Controls
Baseline X X X X X X
Demos×linear trend X X X
Region effects X X
State/division effects X X
Notes: U.S. Census and ACS data. Sample consists of men with at most one year of completed college, at
least 18 years old, and with 0-15 years potential labor market experience. See notes to Table 1.4 for further
detail.
114
Table A.5: Preset parameters in the structural estimation
Parameter Description Symbol Value Source
Importance of period 1
relative to period 0 β 1.33 See notes.
Period-1 weekly wage, Binder and Bound (2019),
college men wC1 exp(6.98) Braga (2018)
Period-0 weekly wage Binder and Bound (2019),
offer, noncollege men wNC0 exp(6.25) Braga (2018)
Share women college-educated cF 0.36 Autor and Wasserman (2013)
Share men college-educated cM 0.42 Autor and Wasserman (2013)
Wage depreciation δ 0.253 Braga (2018)
Returns to experience r̂ 0.636 Braga (2018)
Non-labor income’s share in
period-0 full income ŷ 0.24 Binder and Bound (2019)
Notes: External parameters in the model. The calibration of β = 1.33 is driven by the following assumptions:
there are 6 years in period 0, there are 24 years in period 1, and the annual discount factor is 0.92. This leads
the male agent, at the beginning of his life, to value period 1 by 1.33 times more than period 0. The wage
depreciation and returns to experience parameters are cumulative over the 6 years of period 0. Appendix
Section A.5 contains further detail on the choices of these parameters.
Table A.6: Downward shift of the wage profile versus flattening of the wage profile: equi-
librium employment responses to different 10% wage shocks for noncollege men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





(downward shift of wage profile) −.100 −.075 −.050 −.025 0.00
∆r̂ (flattening of wage profile) 0.00 −.044 −.088 −.131 −.173
LFP responses
∆nsingles0 −.008 −.025 −.042 −.059 −.074
∆nall0 −.016 −.041 −.065 −.088 −.109
Marr mkt multiplier 1.93 1.62 1.55 1.50 1.47
Notes: Results are computed using the empirical model developed in Section 1.5. For each simulation, the
baseline wage processes for noncollege men are changed by the amount specified in the table, and the new
equilibrium is computed. Each simulation imposes a −10% shock to noncollege men’s present-discounted
lifetime earning potential, but varies the degree to which the shock is generated by a downward shift of the
wage profile (caused by lowering wNC0 ) versus a flattening of the wage profile (caused by lowering r̂). The
marriage market multiplier is defined as the ratio of the total employment response to the response for the
always-single men. See Section 1.5.2 of the main text for details.
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A.2 Data details
This section describes the processing of the various sources of data used throughout
the paper.
A.2.1 Census and March CPS data samples.
The main samples used throughout this paper consist of civilian, non-institutionalized
men at least 18 years old, with at most one year of completed college education, and
with non-missing race, ethnicity, nativity, and employment information (i.e. current labor
force status along with weeks spent employed in the reference year).1 Samples for Figures
1.2 and 1.3 stratify on age (25-34 for labor-force participation series; 35-39 for marriage
series), while samples used in regressions stratified on years of potential experience (0-15
for labor-force participation; 5-20 for marriage). Individuals with imputed values for any
of these demographic were excluded from all samples. Individuals with imputed labor
force variables were excluded from labor-force samples, while individuals with imputed
marital status were excluded from marriage sample. When constructing hourly wages, I
additionally excluded individuals with imputed weekly hours worked information (subject
to such information being reported in the given survey year). After verifying that wage
results were not sensitive to whether I excluded individuals with imputed wage incomes, I
elected to keep such individuals in all samples.
For the gender-specific, shift-share demand shock analysis of Section 1.4, I adapted
David Dorn’s code to construct 1990-defined commuting zones for 1980-2015 Census data.
His code is available here: https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm. To calculate the gender-
specific shifts and shares that go into the shift-share instruments, I used the noncollege
population of women (or of men) with 0-20 years of potential experience. See Section 1.4
of the main text for the formula used to construct these instruments.
A.2.2 Construction of hourly wage series appearing in Figure 1.2.
Constructing hourly wages in the March CPS (shown in Panel A) involved several steps.
First, I adjusted observed wage-and-salary incomes for topcoding. Before the 1995 survey,
these incomes were top-coded at a common value. I replaced these cases with the top-
code multiplied by 1.5. From 1996-2010, wage incomes above top-code thresholds were
1Hispanic ethnicity was not tracked by the CPS until 1976 and nativity was not tracked until 1994.
Thus, only individuals with missing values for these variables after these years were excluded from the CPS
samples.
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replaced by means of incomes above the top-code, conditional on certain observed charac-
teristics. After 2010, wage incomes above the state-specific threshold were systematically
swapped with other reported values within a bounded interval. I elected not to implement
any top-coding adjustments after 1995.
Second, I used the Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator to convert nominal
values into 2017 dollars. Third, I computed annual hours worked. After the 1976 survey,
this simply involved multiplying weeks worked by usual hours worked per week. Before
1976, weeks worked information is available only in the form of intervals, and usual hours
worked per week is not available. However, hours worked last week is available. Thus,
before 1976, I separately imputed weeks worked and usual hours worked per week us-
ing observed demographic information interacted with the observed weeks worked bin
and with hours worked last week. I used 1976-1981 data to condition these imputation
regressions.
Fourth, I divided real annual earnings by annual hours worked to compute real hourly
wages. I trimmed calculated wage observations of below $2.50 or above $175 from the
sample. (Trimming wage outliers did not much affect the overall wage trends reported
in the figure.) Finally, I computed the average wage in a given year by applying the
exponential function to the average log hourly wage. I divided the result by the average
wage in 1973. Thus, the series reported in Panel A can be interpreted as the ratio of the
geometric average hourly wage in the given year to that in 1973. (A value of 0.9 in year t
then indicates that the geometric average hourly wage fell by 10% between 1973 and t.)
I experimented with one important adjustment to the above series, which reports ge-
ometric average hourly earnings for those employed in the reference year. Conceptually,
we might prefer the geometric average hourly wage a man might expect (that is, including
those who ended up not employed the whole year). Inspired by the procedure developed
in Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991), I imputed wage offers to these full-year non-workers.
This involved regressing observed wages on demographic variables, limiting the sample to
men who were employed 13 weeks or less in the reference year, and then using the regression
output to predict average wage offers for the non-working population. I performed this
imputation procedure in 6-year bins across time. Panel A of Figure 1.2 includes these im-
putations, which mildly affects the wage series but does not alter the broad pattern across
time.
The construction of geometric average weekly wages in the U.S. Census data (shown
in Panel B) proceeded similarly. I adjusted wage-and-salary income data for top-coding
by replacing top-coded values with the top-code multiplied by 1.5 for 1940-2000 data.
Thereafter, I did not implement any top-coding adjustments. Weeks worked information
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is available only in the form of intervals for survey years 1960, 1970, and 2008 onward.
For 1960 and 1970, I used the same imputation procedure as above on 1950 and 1980
data to impute weeks worked. For 2014-2016 data, I used the same imputation procedure
as above on 2005-2007 data to impute weeks worked. Because usual hours worked per
week information is not available for 1940-1970, I decided to proceed with weekly wages
as my concept of interest. I computed them by dividing real annual wage income by total
weeks worked. Given the long time coverage of the data and the dramatic wage structure
changes that took place during this time, I elected not to trim weekly wage outliers from
the sample.
Because the 1950 earnings data are particularly sparse, adjusting the wage series to
include the wage offers of full-year non-workers was not feasible.2 However, due to large
changes in wage-and-salary versus self-employment that transpired during this time (es-
pecially before 1980—Ruggles, 2015), I found it important to experiment with including
business income in the annual earnings concept. This presented an additional challenge,
since non-wage income is not tracked in 1940: only an indicator for whether the individ-
ual had over $50 in non-wage income is reported. Using 1950 data on total business-and-
farm income, I constructed a similar indicator (adjusting for inflation) for 1950 respon-
dents. Then, using demographic information in interaction with this indicator, I imputed
business-and-farm income for 1940 respondents based on 1950 data. Ultimately, inclusion
of business-and-farm income exerted surprisingly little impact on the resultant series. For
this reason, and to preserve consistency with the March CPS series, the reported series in
Panel B just consider wage-and-salary income.
A.2.3 Construction of predicted marriage values appearing in Figure 1.3.
This figure reports marriage propensities for men aged 35-39, based on birth cohort
group. Because the last cohort group, 1982-84, had not yet completed its 30s as of 2017
(the last year of data), this statistic is not yet observable. Instead, the figure reports pre-
dicted marriage propensities during ages 35-39 based on observed marriage propensities
during ages 30-33. I estimated
marrPropensityc35−39 = C1marrPropensity
c
30−33 + C2t+ error
c
using observed data from the 1952-58, 62-68 and 72-78 cohort groups—where t is the
average birth year of the cohort group (1955, 1965 or 1975). Using the resultant estimates
2Excluding 1950, the weekly wage series were largely not sensitive to the inclusion of imputed wages for
full-year non-workers.
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of C1 and C2 and the observed marriage propensity during ages 30-33 for the 1982-84 birth
cohort, I then predicted the marriage propensity for ages 35-39. I repeated this procedure
for each of ever-married and currently-married propensities.
A.2.4 NLSY79 sample.
I used data on noncollege men from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitduinal Sur-
veys of Youth in Figure 1.7 and in Table 1.1. The NLSY79 contains weekly labor market
histories and annual information on family structure for a population-representative sam-
ple of individuals that were 14-22 years old when first surveyed in 1979. I constructed a
sample of noncollege men, aged 16-40, according to the same specifications as those used
for the Census and March CPS. I used these data to compare the employment behavior
during the ages of 21-31 of “always-married” to “always-single” men. The always-married
group always reported being married during the ages of 32 to 40, while the always-single
group never reported being married or cohabiting with an unmarried partner during these
ages. I identified non-marital cohabitation in the NLSY using a method employed by Op-
penheimer (2003).
Table 1.1 required the measurement of real hourly wages. Because annual earnings and
annual hours worked are reported each year, calculating hourly wages was straightforward
relative to the Census and March CPS. However, I implemented some adjustments for
missing wage data. The regressions reported in Table 1.1 require ln(initial wagei) for each
individual i, defined as the log of average hourly wages observed over the first 3 years after
i left school. Many individuals for whom initial wage information was missing had wage
information later in their career cycles. I imputed initial wages for these individuals based
on later-in-life wages and other variables. Specifically, I took the sample of individuals with
complete wage data and regressed initial wages on later-in-life wages (defined as the log
of average hourly wages during ages 30-31), education and race dummies, and education
dummies interacted with a quadratic in share of weeks spent employed between the ages
21 and 31. I then predicted initial wages based on this regression.
A few individuals had chronically missing wages due to very low attachment to the
labor force. I imputed initial wage offers for these individuals by applying a variant of
the Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) procedure. Specifically, after applying the above
adjustments, I assigned these individuals the average observed wage of individuals in the
bottom quartile of the employment distribution, conditional on race and education. (The
employment distribution is the distribution across individuals of the share of time spent
employed between the ages of 21-31.)
After making the above adjustments, I estimated regression specification (1.9) and
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generated Table 1.1. When estimating the regression, I weighted the individual data by
NLSY79 sampling weights multiplied by the number of employment observations observed
in the 11-year reference period (i.e. ages 21-31).
A.2.5 Coding of divorce legislation dates.
I adopted the coding presented in Appendix Table 8 of Voena (2015). See her paper
and the literature she cites for more information on coding of these laws. The recent
literature has, more or less, followed the original coding of Friedberg (1998), with almost
no discrepancies between papers.
A.2.6 Industry and occupation groups used in Bartik shock analysis.
Table A.7: Crosswalk between sector groupings used to construct male Bartik shocks
and Census industry codes




4 low-tech manufacturing 100-152, 230-262, 220-222
5 basic manufacturing 270-351, 360-370, 390-392, 160-172, 210-212




10 wholesale trade 500-571
11 retail trade 580-691
12 finance, insurance, real estate 700-712
13 business services 721-760
14 personal services 761-791
15 recreation services 800-810
16 health services 812-840
17 other prof. services 841-893
18 public administration 900-932
The ind1990 variable, which captures consistently-coded industries across time, comes from
IPUMS.
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Table A.8: Crosswalk between sector groupings used to con-
struct female Bartik shocks and Census occupation codes
Group # Description occ1990 codes
1 managerial 3-22, 26-34
2 scientists 43-79
3 medical 80-106
4 teachers 113-163, 187
5 law & social science 164-179, 234
6 artists 183-199
7 medical support 203-208, 445-447
8 science technicians 213-233, 235
9 finance, insurance, real estate 23-25, 243-256
10 sales 258-283
11 financial clerks 337-344, 375-383, 386
12 other admin support 37, residual 300s codes
13 housekeepers, child care 405, 468
14 protective services 415-427
15 food prep and service 434-444, 686-688
16 other personal services 448-465, 469
17 agriculture 473-498
18 mechanics 503-549, 36
19 construction 558-599, 35
20 mining 614-617
21 precision production 634-684
22 system operators 693-699, 796-799, 628
23 assembly workers 703-789
24 transportation 803-889
The occ1990 variable, which captures consistently-coded occupations
across time, comes from IPUMS.
A.2.7 Details on administrative earnings data used to construct participation tran-
sition probabilities
Table A.1 is based data from the SIPP Synthetic data product produced by the U.S.
Census Bureau. See Benedetto, Stinson, and Abowd (2013) for further information. The
data contain 4 administrative sources of earnings: total nondeferred earnings from FICA-
covered jobs; total deferred earnings from FICA-covered jobs; total non-deferred earnings
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from jobs not covered by the FICA tax; and total deferred earnings from jobs not covered
by the FICA tax. I sum all 4 sources together to come up with a measure of total yearly
earnings. I computed yearly labor-force participation statuses based on whether total earn-
ings for the year were above a certain minimum threshold. Following Coglianese (2018), I
used a threshold of one-half of the federal minimum wage times 40 hours per week times
13 weeks per year.
A.3 Mathematics omitted from Section 1.3
A.3.1 Proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness
See Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009).
A.4 Demonstration: the effect of unilateral divorce on labor-force
participation in the population of single men is not driven by
selection
I require 4 numbers for this demonstration. The first 3 numbers are drawn from Section
4.3 of the main text. First, I estimate that unilateral divorce reduced labor-force partici-
pation by noncollege single men by 1.4 percentage points. Second, the pre-reform rate of
non-participation for less-educated men is listed at 14.3 percent. Third, the pre-reform rate
of singlehood for less-educated men is 28.2 percent. Finally, unilateral divorce increased
the rate of singlehood by roughly 1.4 percentage points (Appendix Table A.3).
Suppose now that the entire 1.4 percentage-point estimate owes to the fact that uni-
lateral divorce changed the composition of whom is single. Using these numbers, we can
solve for the rate of non-participation n required for this to be the case. Specifically,
1.4 = new nonparticipation rate− old nonparticipation rate
= new rate− 14.3
=
14.3 · 28.2 + n · 1.4
28.2
− 14.3
= (n− 14.3) · 1.4
28.2
.
This yields n = 14.3+1.4·28.2/1.4 = 42.5. Thus, the previously-married individuals induced
to become single as a result of unilateral divorce require a very large non-participation
rate—42.5 percent—for changing selection to be responsible for the estimated effect of
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unilateral divorce on the labor-force participation of singles.
A.5 Section 1.5 details
A.5.1 Derivation of single men’s indirect utility
Note that the utility function in period 1 is equivalent to




since cm1 = wm1nm1. I assume single men do not have access to non-labor income in period
1. The allowance for non-labor income in period 1, such as disability benefits, would make
the algebra not reduce as nicely but would not qualitatively change the analysis.
This separability implies that the period-1 wage offer does not affect period-1 employ-
ment: the first-order condition for period-1 employment is simply
1
nm1
− λnγm1 = 0.
That is, men with the same work preferences λ, γ work the same amount in period 1 and
suffer the same amount of work-induced disutility, regardless of wage offer. Now, define
w = exp(ln(wNC0 ) − δ). This is the wage offer in period 1 realized by a man who does not
work at all in period 0. Normalizing the utility of his hypothetical man to 0, the normalized
indirect utility function in period 1, Ṽ (wm1), reduces to:
Ṽ (wm1) = V (wm1)− V (w)
= ln(wm1)− ln(w)
= r̂nm0. (A.1)
Thus, the period-1 marginal benefit of period-0 employment for a single man is simply βr̂,
where β is the discount factor.
A.5.2 Calibration of preset parameters in the model
As reported in Appendix Table A.5, I preset 8 of the empirical model’s parameters
outside of the estimation. The notes to that table describe the calibration of the discount
factor β. Here I describe how I calibrated the other 7 parameters.
I start with the wage parameters: the model requires an initial (period-0) wage offer
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of noncollege men (wNC0 ), a period-1 wage offer of college men (w
C
1 ), and wage growth
(r̂) and depreciation (δ) processes for noncollege men. According to Figure 1 of Binder
and Bound (2019), the geometric average wage of college graduates aged 25-54 in the
early 1980s was roughly $26.75 (expressed in 2017 US dollars). Assuming a 40-hour work
week returns the weekly wage reported in the table. The wage growth and depreciation
processes are calibrated based on Table 11 of Braga (2018). This table reports Mince-
rian male wage regressions by education status, including estimates of the effect of an
additional year spent unemployed and an additional year spent out of the labor force on
wages. To calibrate the wage depreciation parameter for noncollege men, I average these
two estimates within education group. Then, I take a 3/4 to 1/4 weighted average of the
estimate for high school graduates and the estimate for high school dropouts. Finally, I
multiply the resultant number by 6, as there are 6 years in period 0. The result is δ. Table
11 of Braga (2018) also reports log wage returns to a cubic in cumulative years of prior
work experience. Once again, I take a 3/4 to 1/4 weighted average of the high school
graduate and high school dropout estimates. Using these coefficients, I then predict the
log wage change that occurs when work experience increases by 6 years. Finally, I add the
resulting prediction to the δ. The result is r̂.
3 of the 4 wage parameters have now been calibrated: we still require a value for wNC0 .
I calibrate this value as follows. Figure 1 of Binder and Bound (2019) reports a geometric
average hourly wage among high school graduates aged 25-54 of roughly $19.00 in the
early 1980s. This implies a college wage premium of 26.75/19 = 1.41. This yields the
following equation for wNC0 :
wNC0 =
wC1
1.41 · exp(r̂ − δ)
.
I calibrate the education distribution—the shares of men (cM) and women (cF ) with
college education—based on statistics reported by Autor and Wasserman (2013). Using
U.S. Census data, they report the shares of adults with some completed college and with
a 4-year college degree by birth cohort. I set cG, for each gender G, equal to a 3/4 to 1/4
weighted average of the “some college” and “college degree” attainment rates in the 1945
birth cohort.
Finally, I calibrate the amount of nonlabor income that noncollege men have access to
in period 0 using statistics reported in Table 2 of Binder and Bound (2019). This table
uses 1992-2017 March CPS data to determine an average breakdown of income sources in
households containing a noncollege man who worked less than 13 weeks in the reference
year. I consider men aged 25-34. Taking a 3/4 to 1/4 weighted average across high school
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graduate and high school dropout statuses, followed by a 6/7 to 1/7 weighted average
across whites and blacks, I calculate that the average man in the sample received roughly
$4, 300 in benefits. It is likely that such men also received transfers from household mem-
bers: for example, 25-34-year-old white high school graduates received $4, 700 in own
benefits, but an additional $38, 300 of income was received by other household members.
In absence of specific data on intra-family transfers, I decided to double the own-benefit
figure and use this number—$8, 600—as the the average noncollege man’s total non-labor
income. Dividing this number by the noncollege man’s full income (i.e. non-labor income
plus income from full-time work) yields the figure ŷ reported in the table. Implicit in this
calibration is the assumption that non-labor income is exogenous: noncollege men are
guaranteed ŷ of their full income in transfers/benefits in period 0, regardless of how much
they work.
A.5.3 Setting up the comparison of the simulation results to those estimated by
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2019)
In Section 1.5.3 I compare the effects of the 10% reduction in noncollege men’s wages,
simulated by the model, to the effects of a China trade shock to men’s labor market op-
portunities (holding female opportunities constant), estimated by Autor, Dorn and Hanson
(2019) (ADH).
To do this comparison, it is necessary to determine the effect of the trade shock on men’s
hourly wages—a response that is not reported by ADH. However, the authors do report
effects on annual earnings: according to Table A3 of their study, the median-earning man
in their sample lost $3, 737 in earnings, on a base of $26, 000, as a result of a 1-unit trade
shock. This amounts to a 14.3% loss. In Table A3 they also report that a 1-unit trade shock
caused a 3.06p.p. decline in male employment. A similar study found that a contemporary
Bartik shock to the male manufacturing sector caused a 4.6p.p. decline in employment and
a 7.9% decline in hours worked of noncollege men. These numbers suggest that a 1-unit
trade shock caused a
3.06p.p. employment decline · 7.9% hours decline
4.6p.p. employment decline
= 5.3% hours decline.
To first-order approximation, the percent change in hourly wages caused by the trade shock
is simply the percent loss in earnings net of the percent loss in hours, or 14.3− 5.3 = 9.0%.
This number, combined with ADH’s estimated effects of the trade shock on male labor-
force participation (reported in Table A3) and marriage (reported in Table 3), underlies
the comparison undertaken in Table 1.8 of the main text.
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A.6 A richer equilibrium model of labor supply, marriage, child in-
vestment and divorce
Here I specify and characterize the solution to a male employment and marriage prob-
lem with uncertainty, the possibility of divorce, and imperfectly transferable utility. This
section lays out the model, while the next section derives comparative static results on the
young male labor supply effects of i) a shift in the divorce regime from mutual consent
to unilateral, and ii) an incremental improvement in women’s labor market opportunities.
This model provides further motivation for the reduced-form test undertaken in Section
1.4 of the main text—especially the unilateral divorce test, since the stylized model of
Section 1.3 abstracts from divorce.
As argued in the main text, for a young man, working full-time today plausibly yields
not only higher future labor market returns, but also higher marital surpluses. Competition
over mates in a frictionless, competitive marriage market determines marital assignments
(who marries and who remains single), intra-household division of resources, and as a
byproduct, the marriage market return to male human capital investment. This return,
combined with the known profile of market wages, guides males’ decisions to invest and to
marry. These dynamics give rise to a rational-expectations equilibrium, as in the schooling-
and-marriage framework of Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009).
A.6.1 Preliminaries
The starting point for the model is an economy populated by an equal number of males
m and females f . Agents live for 3 periods: t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2. Life is structured as
follows. In period 0, men decide whether to invest in their labor market skills. Investment
implies working full-time and potentially losing out on utility from leisure, while not in-
vesting implies working part-time.3 Investment in period 0 raises one’s wage in subsequent
periods.
At the beginning of period 1, males and females match in a competitive marriage mar-
ket. Singlehood is an absorbing state: individuals who choose to remain single make
unitary labor supply and consumption decisions over t = 1, 2. Married couples decide on
a child investment strategy in t = 1 (described below), which returns a payoff of child
welfare in t = 2. The model does not rule out the production and raising of children
by unmarried mothers, but it does impose that child welfare is higher on average when
children are raised in married households.
3I abstract from benefit or other non-labor income receipt. Allowing for non-labor income weakens
incentives to supply labor and plausibly strengthens all subsequent results.
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Marriage quality is subject to shocks. At the beginning of period 2, a match quality
shock is realized that causes couples to evaluate whether to remain married. If they do
so, they make joint labor supply and consumption decisions as a couple in t = 2. If they
divorce, they behave as singles in period 2 and additionally enjoy a modified amount of
child welfare.
Each male is endowed with either of two labor market skill levels: sm,0 ∈ {L,H}.
We can think of these as low or high education statuses. Investing men improve their
skill levels, resulting in four possible male skill levels in the marriage market: sm,1 ∈
{L,L+, H,H+}. Females are homogeneous in labor market skill.4 Individuals also vary in
fixed tastes for marriage: each individual i has marital taste θi, where θi is distributed with
bounded support [0, θmax] and mean θ/2 according to an atomless distribution function
G(θ). Marital tastes are independently and identically distributed across gender and skill
level.
Marital taste is additive separable from the “material” payoff to marriage. For a given
individual i who has married an individual j, utility in marriage in period 2 is of the form
ui(j) = material utilityi(j) + θi + ψij. (A.2)
The variable ψij is a random match quality shock that arrives at the beginning of period 2
and takes the value 0 with probability 1/2 and −θ with probability 1/2, where θ ≤ θmax.5
As in Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009), this specification imposes a structure in which
interactions between agents in the marriage market depend on their skill levels only: total
marital surplus for any given marriage is simply additive in individual bliss payoffs.
The life-cycle is depicted in Figure A.2.
A.6.2 The marriage market and household planning problem
Individuals are utility price-takers in a frictionless, competitive, heterosexual marriage
market. In the marriage market, prospective couples commit to a feasible, incentive-
compatible, ψ-contingent plan that includes child investment, labor supply, consumption
and divorce decisions and delivers each individual his or her utility price in expectation.
This is akin to the frameworks of Chiappori et al. (2017); Reynoso (2017); Chiappori, Dias
4All insights generalize to a situation in which females are heterogeneous in labor market skill, although
the analysis becomes more complicated. While this assumption means the model is not suited to understand
changes in assortative matching on skill, it will deliver relevant theoretical predictions on male marriage
and participation rates by skill. The structural modeling analysis, presented in Section 1.5, involves multiple
types of females.
5Thus, ex-ante marital bliss follows a mean-0 distribution; that is, the average individual does not system-
atically prefer married life to unmarried life in an ex-ante sense.
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Figure A.2: Male life-cycle in the model.
and Meghir (2018).
For two individuals i and j of opposite genders, denote the expected material payoff
of i given j’s utility price (material utility + marital bliss) as vi(j;Vj). Equilibrium in the
marriage market consists of an assignment matrix A and material price vector V that yields
a stable matching.
Definition 1. A stable matching {A,V} satisfies the following conditions:
vi(A(i),VA(i)) = Vi ∀ i (A.3)
and no (i, j) pairing exists in which
A(i) 6= j (A.4)
with vi(j,Vj) ≥ Vi
and vj(i,Vi) ≥ Vj,
and in which at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Condition (A.3) links assignments to prices by stipulating that the assignments guar-
antee each individual his or her expected utility price in equilibrium. Condition (A.4)
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requires that the assignment A is a core allocation (Shapley and Shubik, 1971; Roth and
Sotomayor, 1992). That is, in equilibrium, there does not exist a set of individuals who
would be better off dissolving their assigned matches and matching with each other.
Let A(i) = ∅ correspond to a situation in which individual i remains single. Note that
V∅ = 0; that is, each individual matched to “single” pays “single” a utility price of 0 and
retains the total output from remaining single. Thus, by setting j = ∅ in (A.4), we see
that stability also requires the equilibrium assignment to deliver everyone who marries a
(weakly) larger expected utility price than that from remaining single.
I now describe household behavior and its relationship with marriage-market utility
prices. Single individuals derive material utility from consumption of two commodities:
a market-purchased commodity c and a home-produced commodity, which is formed by
combining monetary inputs x with time inputs L. Divorcees have the same structure of
material utility as singles. In married couples, the home-produced commodity is a public
good, creating consumption economies relative to divorced and single households.
Assumptions 1: child welfare. Without loss of generality, normalize the utility from
being single in period 1 to 0. In period 1, married couples invest in their children. Child
investment requires at least 0.5 units of time from the mother and returns the additive sepa-
rable value αwM + k in period 2 (where wM is the father’s wage). Child welfare is produced
according to the following cost function:
χ(wM , LF,1) =
{
0 LF,1 = 1
αwM LF,1 = 0.5
(A.5)
Net child welfare, denoted as ω(wM , LF,1) = αwM + k − χ(wM , LF,1), is a public good in both
married households. Divorced wives continue to enjoy ω, while divorced husbands only enjoy
(1− d)ω.6. I do not assume any loss of child welfare on divorce; only that the ex-husband has
less access to the child. However, all results generalize to a situation in which overall child
welfare decreases on divorce, as suggested by (Gruber, 2004).
For a couple (m, f) that decides to marry, I represent a potential household plan as
follows (m, f arguments dropped after the first line for convenience):
ρ(ψ;m, f) = { ρ1(m, f), ρ2(ψ; ρ1(m, f),m, f) }
= { Lf,1, {D(ψ,Lf,1), Lm,2(D), Lf,2(D), cm,2(D), cf,2(D)} }
∈
{
{0.5, 1} × {{0, 1} × [0, 1]2 ×R2+}
}
.
6The parameter d is a “distance” parameter reflecting a standard custodial arrangement (Chiappori, Iyi-
gun and Weiss, 2015)
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That is, a married couple in period 1 chooses whether the wife f should stay home full-time
while raising the child. In period 2 the couple chooses whether or not to divorce, condi-
tional on the realization of ψ and the child investment strategy from period 1. Conditional
on the divorce decision, labor supply and consumption choices occur.
An individual i deciding to remain single simply chooses labor supply and consumption
in period 2. I represent such a plan as follows:
σ(i) = { Li,2, ci,2 }
∈ { [0, 1]×R+ } .
Cooperation in period 2—I make no assumption about bargaining over the material sur-
plus: as in Chiappori (1988, 1992) and myriad subsequent work, I only require Pareto
efficiency. Given a wife’s labor supply decision from period 1 and her associated utility
price, this property admits a general expression of the husband’s expected payoff in mar-
riage. For a male m marrying a female f ,
vm(f ;Lf,1, Ṽf (Lf,1;m)) = max
ρ2(ψ;m,f)
Eψ[um(ρ2(ψ;Lf,1,m, f))] (A.6)
s.t. [ICC] Eψ[uf (ρ2(·))] ≥ Ṽf
[FLS] Lf,2, Lm,2 ∈ [0, 1]
[FBCM ] cm,2 + cf,2 + x2 = wm(1− Lm,2) + wf (1− Lf,2)
if D(·) = 0
[FBCD ] cm,2 + xm,2 + cf,2 + xf,2 = wm(1− Lm,2) + wf (1− Lf,2)
if D(·) = 1
where ui(ρ2(·)) denotes a given individual i’s total period-2 payoff (material utility + pos-
sible marital bliss) from following plan ρ2. The first constraint is an incentive compatibility
constraint, guaranteeing that female f is paid her utility price Ṽf from participating in a
marriage withm—conditional on her labor supply choice in period 1. The last 3 constraints
are feasibility constraints of time and consumption allocations in period 2.




s.t. [FLS] Li,2 ∈ [0, 1]
[FBC] ci,2 + xi,2 = wi(1− Li,2)
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in period 2.
Possibility of non-cooperation in period 1—When expected utility is transferable between
spouses at a one-for-one rate, the wife and husband will always agree on the child invest-
ment strategy in period 1 that maximizes joint material output in period 2. If contracting
between spouses is imperfect, however, spouses may not agree on how the wife spends her
time.
Assumption 2. The wife retains control over how she spends her time in period 1.





By assumption 1, splitting time between working in the market and in the home lowers
child welfare by αwm in period 2. Despite this loss, the wife may decide to work part-
time in the market if doing so appreciably raises the marital surplus from other goods,
or raises the share of the marital surplus she can claim in period 2. Disagreement be-
tween wife and husband over the wife’s time allocation arises when vm(f, 1, Ṽf (1;m)) >
vm(f, 0.5, Ṽf (0.5;m)) but Ṽf (1;m) < Ṽf (0.5;m). This will become relevant when the di-
vorce regime is unilateral.
It is instructive to characterize each individual’s marriage decision at equilibrium prices.
I operate from the perspective of males making proposals to females, although an equilib-
rium stable matching can be constructed with either side as the proposer. For a given male
m, the marriage decision simply involves choosing the assignment—including possibly re-








where L∗f,1 is the wife’s solution to program (A.8) given a marriage to m. Thus, males take
prospective wives’ period-1 labor supply decision rules as given when deciding whether
and whom to marry.
Given equilibrium prices, each female f remains single if no male desires her, or chooses
whether to marry the given male m who wishes to match with her. Thus:
Vf =
{
vf (∅) if no proposer
max
{




In this way, the assignment problem in the marriage market is decentralized, with each
individual choosing the mate—including possibly remaining single—that yields him or her
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the highest payoff, subject to being desired by the corresponding mate.
A.6.3 Male investment decisions
We are now in a position to describe male investment behavior in period t = 0. In a
rational-expectations equilibrium, each male is aware of the marriage market price vector
VM ∀M . This knowledge, together with the known costs of investing, is sufficient to pin
down equilibrium investment behavior.
For a given male of type M , represent the investment decision as IM . The period-0
“effort” cost of investing is
(uM,0|IM = 0)− (uM,0|IM = 1) = eM .
Male M will invest in period 0 if the effort cost of doing so is expected to be returned in
the marriage market. Thus,
IM = 1{VM+ − VM ≥ eM} (A.11)
for M ∈ {L,H} × {0, 1}.
Definitions 2. The labor market return to investing is the period-2 return enjoyed by a
single male. Thus, for a given male M :
λM = vM+(∅)− vM(∅).
The marriage market return to investing is the additional expected return in period 2 received
from participating in the marriage market:
µM = VM+ − VM − λM .
Thus, for males M who choose to remain single, µM = 0.
With these definitions, we can conveniently re-express the decision to invest as occur-
ring exactly when the sum of the labor market and marriage market returns exceeds the
period-0 cost:7
IM = 1{λM + µM ≥ eM}. (A.12)
7It is worth noting that this specification of investment behavior generally holds, regardless of the utility
specifications underlying the marriage market prices. The only implicit assumption is that each agent i acts
to maximize Vi, which is itself an expected utility outcome. This is equivalent to assuming agents obey von-
Neumann-Morgenstern rationality: ex-post utility is separable across states of the world and expected utility
is a probability-weighted linear combination of ex-post utilities. Equivalently, the happiness an individual
expects to obtain when married is not contingent on the actions he might take were he to remain single.
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A.6.4 Equilibrium
Definition 3. A rational-expectations equilibrium consists of a set of investment strate-
gies, marital assignments, and ex-ante and ex-post utilities—{I, {A,V}, v, u}—satisfying the
following properties:
1. Period-0 male investment decisions I maximize expected utility, as given by (A.12).
2. The marital assignment A is stable, as given by (A.3) and (A.4). Decentralized marital
choices satisfy (A.9) and (A.10). Moreover, the utility prices V clear the market.
3. The ex-ante utilities v and ex-post period utilities u result from solutions to the problems
described by (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8).
As noted by Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009), the rational-expectations structure of
the model transforms male investment and marriage decisions into a multinomial discrete
choice problem. That is, given the investment cost structure and the marriage market util-
ity prices, each male makes the choice in equilibrium yielding the highest expected utility
from the given choice set: {{invest,marry}, {invest, single}, {no invest,marry}, {no invest, single}}.
Section A.8 of this Appendix provides explicit utility and human capital specifications. With
these, I prove 2 propositions that conveniently shrink the set of possible equilibria.
Proposition 1. Highly skilled men (sM,0 = H) always invest. Less-skilled men (sM,0 = L)
only invest if they also expect to marry.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.8.
Proposition 2. All men who choose to marry are better off investing.
Proof. Denote the cost of investing for less-skilled men, net of the labor market return, as
êL = eL − λL. The proof, contained in Appendix Section A.8, shows that the marriage market
return to investing exceeds êL.
Though these propositions are not necessary, they facilitate the claim that a rational-
expectations equilibrium exists. This is proved in Section A.8 of this Appendix as Propo-
sition 3. The proof relies on the adaptation of the salary-adjustment algorithm (Crawford
and Knoer, 1981; Kelso and Crawford, 1982) to the case of a one-to-one matching market
with a finite set of types, suggested by Reynoso (2017). This algorithm guarantees the
construction of a market-clearing stable matching. It is shown that the equilibrium is char-
acterized by a triple of threshold marital taste values (θL, θH , θF ), with each individual i of
type I (less-skilled male, highly skilled male, female) marrying exactly when θi ≥ θI . It is
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shown that these threshold values solve the following system of equations:
UL+ − VF + θL = vL(∅) (A.13)
UH+ − VF + θH = vH(∅)
VF ≥ vF (∅)
1− 1
2
(G(θL) +G(θH)) = 1−G(θF ).
F represents the female with marital taste θF and UM (M ∈ {L+, H+}) is the level of joint
marital output, exclusive of the husband’s marital taste, that is produced in a marriage in-
volving female F . Thus, in equilibrium, it is exactly the males with marital taste above the
threshold value who would prefer to marry the threshold-taste female. The last equation
is the market-clearing condition: in an equilibrium stable matching, the number of males
who marry must equal the number of females who marry.
Even though the marriage market is competitive, the sequential nature of male invest-
ment and marriage decisions generally raises the possibility of multiple equilibria (Nöldeke
and Samuelson, 2015). For example, we could have a possible equilibrium in which the
marriage market return to investing is low and males do not invest, and another possible
equilibrium in which the marriage market return is high and males invest. The structure
of the current model rules out this multiplicity problem (as proven in propositions 1 and
2).
A.7 Equilibria under different divorce regimes and gender gaps
In this section, I analyze equilibria that arise under different divorce law regimes and
women’s relative labor market opportunities. I start from a baseline equilibrium in which
the divorce regime is mutual consent and there is a significant gender gap in incentives
to work in the labor market. I show that a switch to unilateral divorce, under plausible
conditions, leads to a new equilibrium with lower marriage and participation rates for
less-skilled males. Furthermore, I show that regardless of the prevailing divorce regime,
an increase in females’ labor market opportunities also produces an equilibrium decline in
marriage and male labor-force participation.
A.7.1 Base case: mutual consent divorce
Constructing the ex-ante Pareto frontier.—To begin, I make the following simplifying
assumption.
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Assumption 3: Divorce allocations. The Pareto frontier in divorce does not depend on
the wife’s labor supply decision in period 1.
If the wife works in the first period, she prevents her own human capital depreciation
and thus increases the pool of resources to be shared on divorce. But at the same time,
this action decreases child welfare, lowering total resources in divorce. For convenience,
we assume that these effects cancel, and thus that there is one stable Pareto frontier in
divorce.8 This facilitates, although is not necessary, for the following result.
Proposition 4. When the divorce regime is mutual consent, spouses will always agree on
the efficient child investment strategy, which is to have the wife stay home full-time in period
1.
Proof. See next section of this Appendix.
A consequence of proposition 4 is that to construct the ex-ante Pareto frontier we need
only consider the Pareto frontier in divorce and the ex-post Pareto frontiers in marriage
conditional on the wife staying at home in period 1. In a mutual consent divorce, an
allocation must be found that makes both spouses better off than in the current allocation
in marriage. For purposes of exposition, we consider a possible marriage involving a less-
skilled male who has invested, and in which spouses have sufficiently low marital taste
that divorce is sometimes a possibility. It is straightforward to show that the ex-post Pareto
frontier in marriage is the following hyperplane:
Vm + Vf = Vmf + ψmf (A.14)
where Vmf = βwL+ + 2ω + θm + θf + ψmf and ω = αwL+ + k. As a consequence of the
TU property, total resources to be shared do not depend on how they are shared. This
hyperplane defines a straight line with slope −1 in the (Vm,Vf ) Euclidean space.
The Pareto frontier in divorce is defined by the following equation:
Vm(ŷ) + Vf (ŷ) = V
D
mf (ŷ) (A.15)











+ (2 − d)ω (see Appendix calculations). Because
the home-produced commodity becomes private in divorce, utility is not transferable in the
same manner in divorce as it is in marriage. In particular, the total level of resources to be
shared now does depend on the monetary transfer ŷ. This equation defines a downward-
sloping, convex line in the (Vm,Vf ) Euclidean space. Moreover, whenever θm + θf +ψmf ≥
8Leveraging some calculations in the next section, one can show that this assumption is equivalent to





−dω, this frontier is completely contained within the marriage frontier.
Figure A.3 depicts the construction of the ex-ante Pareto frontier when the divorce
regime is mutual consent. First, note that each spouse must receive a preferred allocation
(in expectation) to the allocation from remaining single—otherwise the marriage would
not form. The single allocations are given by the axes of the graph. The straight lines cor-
respond to the ex-post Pareto frontiers in marriage, conditional on each possible realization
of the taste shock ψmf . The convex line is the Pareto frontier in divorce. Next, note that the
bad taste shock happens with a 50 percent probability. Thus, in the region of the Euclidean
space where both straight lines lie to the northeast of the convex line, the ex-ante Pareto
frontier traces out the locus of mid-way points of 45 degree lines drawn between the two
straight lines. Essentially, this is the “average” of the two straight lines.
In the regions of the Euclidean space where the convex line lies to the northeast of the
inner straight line, the ex-ante Pareto frontier traces out the locus of mid-way points of 45
degree lines drawn between the outer straight line and the convex line (by assumption 3).
Essentially, this is the “average” of the outer straight line and the convex line. The result is
the 3-segment, thick red line shown in the figure.
Figure A.3: Construction of Pareto frontier under a mutual consent divorce regime
As described above.
The figure considers a hypothetical marriage involving a less-skilled male, and in which the two partners
have low enough joint marital taste that divorce is a possibility for some allocations.
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Baseline equilibrium.—Figure A.4 depicts allocations in a baseline equilibrium for a
given set of individuals with relatively low marital taste. The left-hand Pareto diagram
considers a marriage involving a less-skilled man and the right-hand diagram considers
one involving a highly-skilled man.
Let us unpack Figure A.4. First, less-skilled men require at least êL of the ex-ante marital
surplus to participate in the marriage—otherwise, their investment cost is not covered
and they would prefer not to marry (and not to invest). This constraint is represented
by the vertical dotted line. Thus, the segment of the Pareto frontier between the two
small black dots describes the range of feasible and incentive-compatible expected utility
outcomes at the moment of marriage for these individuals. The large red dots denote
potential equilibrium allocations resulting from the salary-adjustment algorithm. So long
as at least one male of both skill types desires to marry in equilibrium, reciprocating female
partners must be indifferent about who they marry. Otherwise, the market would not clear:
prices would adjust until indifference was established or until one type no longer desired
marriage. This condition is represented by the horizontal dotted line connecting the two
red dots.
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Figure A.4: Hypothetical couple in baseline equilibrium
Depiction of equilibrium allocations in the baseline scenario (mutual consent divorce, gender gap in labor
market opportunities) for a given set of individuals (less-skilled male, highly-skilled male, female). Each
individual has marital taste above the threshold required for marriage but distinctly below the maximum
taste value.
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A.7.2 Introducing unilateral divorce
I now introduce the first of two novel theoretical results: in the absence of perfect
contracting technology in marriage, laws governing the terms of divorce may change the
ex-ante gains from marriage enough to impact less-skilled males’ pre-marital labor supply
decisions.
Proposition 5. When the divorce regime changes from mutual consent to unilateral, and:
• the returns to female experience (βwF δ) are sufficiently high relative to the loss of child
welfare from the wife working in the market (αwM);
• the marital taste shock θ is sufficiently large;
• and the ex-husband’s access to child welfare (1− d) is sufficiently small,
spouses in relatively-low-taste marriages will disagree on the child investment strategy. As a
consequence, such marriages no longer form in equilibrium, and the less-skilled men who no
longer marry also no longer invest in period 0.
The last claim of the proposition follows from propositions 1 and 2: less-skilled males
who no longer marry will also no longer invest. Thus, the claim to establish is that unilat-
eral divorce reduces formation of certain marriages involving less-skilled males. The proof
of this claim is contained in Figure A.5.
The conditions stated in the proposition give rise to a situation where the maximum
allocation the husband can guarantee the wife within marriage while still respecting his
participation constraint (point A) is inferior to her autarky value (i.e. her value in divorce
in the absence of a divorce settlement) from working in period 1 (point B). Thus, if the two
marry, the wife will work in period 1 regardless of the planned allocation of resources—
which, in turn, violates the husband’s ex-ante participation constraint. (The best he can
do in this situation is represented by point C). Therefore, such a marriage—which was
incentive-compatible in a mutual consent divorce regime—no longer forms in a unilateral
divorce regime.
This result depends on the incomplete-contracts nature of marriage. As shown in Figure
A.5, there exist feasible ex-ante allocations in marriage that make both spouses better off
compared with being single. However, to attain such an allocation, the wife would have to
forego the opportunity to increase her bargaining position in the marriage (by working in
period 1). In the absence of binding agreements that can be made in the marriage market
(e.g. costlessly enforceable prenuptial contracts), there is nothing to prevent the wife from
entering the workforce in period 1. This is an example of Pareto inefficiencies that may
arise in bargaining models of marriage (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994, 2003). While these
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models originally conceived of Pareto inefficient allocations arising within marriage, I show
that bargaining after marriage can lead to an inefficient number of marriages forming.9
In sum, by strengthening a woman’s property right over her earning potential in the
labor market, unilateral divorce reduces the share of the gains from specialization within
marriage that husbands can claim. This makes preparing for marriage by sinking hu-
man capital investment no longer worth it for men with low initial labor market skill and
relatively low taste for marriage. While such men reap enough material benefits from spe-
cialization gains in a mutual consent environment to coordinate on a path of investment
and marriage, unilateral divorce lowers the marriage market returns to their investment
enough to discourage this path.
Figure A.5: Hypothetical marriage no longer forms under unilateral divorce
As described in the text.
The upper horizontal dotted line is the wife’s autarky value conditional on working in period 1. She
requires this value in marriage not to divorce. The vertical dotted line denotes the less-skilled husband’s
participation constraint. He requires this value to invest and marry. The figure considers the same
individuals as represented in the left-hand graph of Figure A.4.
9This is consistent with the recent observations of Pollak (2019).
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A.7.3 Improving women’s relative labor market opportunities
I now introduce the second novel result.
Proposition 6. Regardless of prevailing divorce regime, when women’s labor market op-
portunities improve relative to those of men—that is, wF increases and/or α falls—less-skilled
male labor-force participation decreases.
The proof of this proposition is contained in Figure A.6. We consider a scenario in which
women’s initial wage offers rise from their starting level of wF to a level less than or equal
to wL+—the wage of less-skilled husbands. Additionally, the value of the mother’s time at
home in the production of child welfare (α) declines. So long as α ≥ 0 and wF ≤ wL+,
it remains efficient for wives to stay home in period 1 and continue to specialize in home
production in period 2. Thus, wives generally do not access their increased earning poten-
tial in marriage. The only effect of an increase in wives’ labor market opportunities relative
to husbands’ is a reduction in gains from specialization in period 1. This is represented as
an inward shift of the ex-ante Pareto frontiers in Figure A.6.
On the other hand, an improvement in women’s wages raises the value of single life,
since single women participate in the labor force.10 It also raises wives’ autarky value from
participating in the labor force in period 1, since a unilateral divorce regime grants a wife
property right over her earning potential. Thus, regardless of divorce regime, the level of
utility a prospective wife must be guaranteed to participate in a marriage rises while the
total marital surplus falls. As a result, certain marriages that were incentive-compatible
under a large gender gap in labor market opportunities become incompatible as women’s
opportunities rise. This effect spills over and impacts the pre-marital labor supply behavior
of less-educated men.
It is important to note that this result depends on the assumption that marriage is driven
primarily by gains from task specialization in the production of household public goods. If
consumption complementarities are more important than task specialization—which hap-
pens in the model when each partner has a wage above β—an increase in women’s labor
market opportunities raises the gains from marriage and wives’ corresponding demand
for husbands’ earning potential. In the main text I empirically estimate the effect of an
improvement in women’s labor market opportunities on less-educated male labor supply,
using 1980-2015 U.S. data, and find the effect to be negative.
10Refer to the optimal labor supply decisions calculated in the Appendix.
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Figure A.6: Improvements in women’s relative labor market opportunities reduce mar-
riage formation and less-educated male labor supply.
As described in the text.
These panels consider a combination of an improvement in women’s relative wages and a decline in the
non-pecuniary returns to the wife staying at home while raising the child in period 1.
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A.8 Omitted calculations and proofs
A.8.1 Utility and wage specifications
Singles’ utility (t = 0, 2)—Single men (women) have the following utility function for
periods 0 and 2 (period 2 only):
u(x, L, c) = (x+ βL) · c. (A.16)
Marrieds’ utility (t = 2)—Married couple (m, f) has the following material utility func-
tions for period 2. Utility is conditional on period-2 allocations as well as the child invest-
ment strategy from period 1:
um(x, Lm, Lf , cm, wm, Lf,1) (A.17)
= (x+ β · [Lm + Lf ]) · cm + α · wm1{Lf,1 = 1}+ k
= (x+ β · [Lm + Lf ]) · cm + ω
uf (x, Lm, Lf , cf , wm, Lf,1)
= (x+ β · [Lm + Lf ]) · cf + α · wm1{Lf,1 = 1}+ k.
= (x+ β · [Lm + Lf ]) · cf + ω
where ω = ω(wm, Lf,1) is defined by (A.5). These utilities belong to the quasi-linear class
described by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983), and thus satisfy the property of transferable
utility in the presence of public goods. Married spouses in period 2 thus allocate time and
consumption to maximize total material utility, and then use private consumptions cm and
cf to transfer to each spouse his and her requisite shares of the pie.
Divorcees’ utility (t = 2)—Divorced couple (m, f) has the following utility functions for
period 2:
um(xm, Lm, cm, ω) = (xm + βLm) · cm + (1− d)ω (A.18)
uf (xf , Lf , cf , ω) = (xf + βLf ) · cf + ω.
Thus, there are two sources of material utility loss on divorce: less enjoyment of child
welfare and a loss of efficiency in home commodity production and consumption (because
the home commodity is no longer public). These losses are weighed against the innovation
in marital bliss (the match quality shock ψ) in the decision to divorce.
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The wage structure—Initial wages satisfy the following inequalities:
wF,1 < wL+ < β ≤ wH .
Next-period wages increase by a factor of R > 0 if the individual works full-time in the
current period, stay the same if the individual works half-time and depreciate by a factor
of δ if the individual does not work at all in the market. That is:
wL+ = wL(1 +R)
wF,2 =
{
wF,1(1− δ) LF,1 = 0
wF,1 LF,1 = 0.5
Optimal labor supplies in t = 2—Given these specifications, it is straightforward to show
the following (full derivations in the next subsection):
• Married couples in t = 2 fully specialize, with the wife staying at home and the hus-
band working full-time. Couples involving a less-skilled husband achieve a joint ma-
terial utility of βwL,2 + 2ω, while couples involving a highly-skilled husband achieve
a joint utility of (β + wH,2)2/4 + 2ω.11
• Divorced wives and less-skilled husbands, in the absence of a divorce settlement,
work half-time in t = 2, while divorced highly-skilled husbands continue to work
full-time. In divorces without settlements, less-skilled ex-husbands obtain βwL,2/4 +
(1 − d)ω; highly-skilled ex-husbands obtain w2H,2/4 + (1 − d)ω; and ex-wives obtain
βwF,2/4 + ω.
• Single individuals choose the same labor supplies in t = 2 as divorced individuals
who do not negotiate a settlement. Thus, single and divorced less-skilled males
generally work less than less-skilled husbands.
A.8.2 Solutions to static labor supply problems in period 2
Married couples—Because utility within marriage is transferable, married couples in
period 2 behave as a unitary decision-maker in choosing efficient time and aggregate re-
source allocations (Mazzocco, 2007; Chiappori, Dias and Meghir, 2018). Thus, a married
11Recall that the husband’s wage in period 2 depends on his investment decision from period 0.
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couple (M,F ) in period 2 solves
max
x,LM ,LF ,C
(x+ β[LM + LF ]) · C
s.t. wM(1− LM) + wF (1− LF ) = x+ C
and feasibility constraints on time allocation decisions (LM , LF ).
By assumption 4, the wife has a lower market wage than the husband and so has a




(x+ β[LM + 1]) · C (A.19)
s.t. wM(1− LM) = x+ C.
Notice that the marginal utility of x is C, while the marginal utility of C is x + β[LM + 1].
Hence, optimization dictates spending the first β[LM+1] of income on C and then equating
marginal spending on C and x thereafter. Recall that for a less-skilled husband M , full-
income wM is below β. Therefore, regardless of the less-skilled husband’s time allocation
decision, the efficient demand for x is 0. These considerations imply the following problem
max
LM




which is clearly solved by setting LM = 0. Thus, total joint from consumption in a marriage
with a less-skilled husband is βwM and private consumptions satisfy cM + cF = C = wM .
For marriages involving a highly-skilled husband M , full specialization prevails as well,
although the spending allocations differ. Because the highly-skilled husband’s wage ex-
ceeds β, some money will be spent on x. Specifically, the first order conditions to program
(A.19) dictate the spending of (wM − β)/2 on x and allocating the rest to C. Total joint
utility from consumption is thus (β + wM)2/4 and individual private consumptions satisfy
cM + cF = C = (β + wM)/2.
Divorcees with a settlement—I start by considering a divorce involving a less-skilled
husband. In addition to the indirect utilities from consumption derived below, divorcees
also enjoy child welfare. Ex-husbands enjoy (1 − d)ω on top of consumption utility and
ex-wives enjoy ω.
Suppose a court orders, or the ex-couple agrees, for the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife
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s.t. wM(1− LM) = cM + xM + ŷ.
Because a less-skilled husband’s wage does not exceed β, the marginal utility of time at
home exceeds the marginal utility of x. Accordingly, he will not work full-time and will




subject to the time constraint on LM . For ease of exposition, suppose that the space of
possible transfers ŷ is such that an interior time allocation always prevails for less-skilled
ex-husbands and ex-wives. (This will imply |ŷ| ≤ wF .) This problem has first-order condi-
tion
β(wM(1− LM)− ŷ) + βLM(−wM)
and second order condition
− 2βwM < 0.
Setting the first order condition to 0 and solving for LM returns the Marshallian leisure
demand

















Running through an analogous set of derivations for the wife returns a Marshallian
leisure demand of




and indirect utility of














Highly-skilled ex-husbands have a wage exceeding β. Thus, the marginal utility of
x exceeds the marginal utility of time at home, and so these individuals work full-time
regardless of the divorce settlement. Standard optimization dictates that these men equally
divide total income, wM − ŷ, between x and c, reaching an indirect utility of




Singles, divorcees without a settlement—Divorces without settlements are equivalent to
divorces with settlements in which ŷ = 0. In these “autarky allocations,” less-skilled ex-
husbands and ex-wives each work half-time and obtain consumption utilities of βwM/4 and
βwF/4, while highly-skilled ex-husbands continue to work full-time and obtain a consump-
tion utility of w2M/4. By definition, singles in period 2 behave the same way as divorcees
who do not negotiate a settlement. The only difference between singles and divorcees
without a settlement is that the latter group enjoys additional utility from child welfare.
Hence, less-skilled single and divorced men generally do not work full-time, but less-
skilled husbands do.
A.8.3 Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The first claim is that highly skilled men always invest in period 0. Recall the investment
decision rule:
IM = 1{λM + µM ≥ eM}
First, note that the marriage market return to investing, µM , is weakly positive for all
men M . This is because men always have the option of remaining single and simply
enjoying the labor market returns to investment. Because the wage return to investing, R,
is strictly positive, the labor market return to investing is strictly positive. From the above
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calculations, we can show that the effort cost of investing for skilled men











is weakly negative, since wH ≥ β. Thus, λH+µH > eH , so highly skilled men always invest.
The second claim is that less-skilled men who do not marry choose not to invest. This
would happen if λL < eL. To prove this claim, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4. R < β−wL
β
.
From the above calculation,






















By assumption 4, R < β−wL
β
and so λL < eL. Therefore, less-skilled men who choose to
remain single also do not invest.
Proof of Proposition 2. The claim is that all men who choose to marry are better off
investing. To prove this, it is convenient to introduce the following assumption and lemma.










Lemma 1. No marriage forms simply as a route to divorce.
Proof of lemma. Consider a marriage involving a less-skilled man. According to the
above derivations, total utility in marriage in period 2, exclusive of marital bliss, is βwM +

















































given the feasible set of transfers |ŷ| ≤ wF . Notice that this quantity, in turn, is strictly
less than total consumption utility in marriage (βwM). Moreover, total child welfare in
divorce (2− d)ω is less than that in marriage (2ω), so total material utility is strictly lower
in divorce. Because utility in marriage is transferable, it is possible to guarantee each
spouse a higher material utility in marriage than in divorce, for any given feasible divorce
allocation. Thus, regardless of the divorce regime, it is better for the marriage to continue
when the match quality shock ψ = 0; only when ψ = −θ is divorce a possibility.
As a consequence, any marriage that forms in period 1 involving a less-skilled man
dissolves in period 2 with probability at most 1/2—the chance of drawing a bad match
quality.
The same logic holds for marriages involving a highly-skilled man.
Proof of proposition. Denote the cost of a less-skilled man investing, net of the labor
market return, as êL = eL − λL. What we must show is that this net cost is more than
returned in the marriage market; that is, that µL ≥ êL. From the proof to proposition 1,
we have












By the lemma, a less-skilled husband divorces with probability at most 1/2. Suppose
for the moment that the couple has zero marital taste and that α = 0, so child welfare does
149
not depend on the husband’s wage. This yields
µL = VL+ − VL
= (VL+ + VF )− (VL + VF )
≥ 1
2


















































where the second-last line is derived from factoring a wL out of the last term and then
applying the definition of ξ under the assumption that ŷ = wF . By this assumption, the
equality in the second-last line becomes an inequality, since the feasible set of transfers
|ŷ| ≤ wF .
















(β(1−R)− wL) ≥ 0
1
2








which is true by assumption 5.
Notice that the above scenario is a “worst case.” In reality, α ≥ 0, the divorce probability
is weakly decreasing in the male’s wage (since the material marital surplus rises in the
male’s wage), the marital taste may be positive, and the divorce settlement |ŷ| ≤ wF . It is
easy to show that each of these possibilities raises the expected marriage market returns to
investing further.12 Thus, if investment conditional on marriage is profitable in this worst
12Calculations available upon request.
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case scenario, it is profitable always.
Notice that assumption 5, then, is sufficient but not necessary for this proposition to
hold.
Proof of Proposition 3. The claim is that a rational-expectations equilibrium exists. To
begin, it is convenient to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Take two individuals of the same skill type, i and j, with θi > θj. No equilibria
exist in which j marries while i remains single.
Proof of lemma. Suppose such a marriage market allocation arose in equilibrium.
Suppose that j preferred to be single at the given price vector. Then, by definition, such
an allocation is not an equilibrium. Suppose instead j was indeed best off marrying and
promising his/her partner her equilibrium marriage market price of P. Then i would
prefer to be married as well, and can promise j’s partner a price of P + θi − θj − ε, where
ε ∈ (0, θi − θj). Both i and j’s initial partner will be better off in the new allocation.
Therefore, the initial allocation is not an equilibrium.
Proof of proposition. By the lemma, the algorithm converges toward a triple of marital




Then, define conditions on the θ values. Link the output of the algorithm to male
investment strategy. Skilled males always invest. Less-skilled males invest only if they can
get at least êL of the marital surplus from marrying.
Investing when expected marital gain is less than êL is not rational. Not investing and
marrying is ruled out by proposition 2. Hence this investment rule and associated stable
matching is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. The claim is that in a mutual consent divorce regime, and
where the initial female wage is less than β, spouses will always agree on the efficient
child investment strategy, which is to have the wife stay home full-time in period 1.
At the initial wage structure, regardless of the wife’s labor supply decision in period
1, a married household will fully specialize in period 2—with the wife staying at home
full-time (see above calculations). Thus, the only impact in marriage of the wife working
in the market in period 1 is to decrease total enjoyment of child welfare. Because utility
within marriage is transferable, this implies that for any marital allocation in which the
wife works in the first period, there exists an allocation in which the wife does not work
that both partners prefer. That is, the ex-post Pareto frontier in marriage conditional on
the wife staying at home is dominated by the ex-post frontier conditional on her working.
By assumption 3, the Pareto frontier in divorce is unaffected by the wife’s labor supply
choice. Moreover, by Lemma 1, no marriage forms simply as a route to divorce: regardless
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of male and female types, any marriage that forms has at most a 50 percent chance of
dissolving in period 2: i.e., the probability of drawing a bad match quality shock. Thus the
ex-ante Pareto frontier is a convex combination of the ex-post frontiers in marriage and the
frontier in divorce. As a consequence, the ex-ante Pareto frontier conditional on the wife
staying at home dominates the frontier conditional on the wife working. That is, given any
ex-ante allocation in which the wife works in the first period, there exists a feasible ex-ante
allocation in which the wife stays home that both partners weakly prefer.
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APPENDIX B
Chapter II Supporting Material
B.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
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Notes: See Section 2.2 for main sample definition. These graphs restrict the main sample to the sub-sample of individuals with at least one child under
the age of 6, and stratifies this sub-sample by 4-year college attainment status. The March CPS series consists of 3-year centered moving averages.
The Census / ACS series consists of 1990, 2000, and 2005 data followed by 3-year centered moving averages for 2006-2015. The CPS series defines
full-time, full-year (FTFY) employment as at least 1600 hours worked in the reference year. The Census series defines FTFY employment as having
been employed for at least 40 weeks and working at least 35 hours per week in the reference year.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Less than 4 years college At least 4 years college
Notes: The progressive work-family attitude index is calculated from responses to 3 questions in the General
Social Survey and is coded such that higher values correspond to higher support of mothers working while
raising family. See section 2.4 for further detail. Due to small sample sizes, 5-year centered moving averages
are reported. The main sample considered is individuals aged 22-45 with at least one child.
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B.2 Data Details
This section describes in detail the processing of the various sources of data used
throughout the paper.
B.2.1 Adjusting for top-codes
Around 3 percent of women and 5 percent of men in the data have their earnings top-
coded by the CPS. I followed a procedure similar to Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) adjust
for top-coded values. The CPS separately top-codes the primary earnings source (ERN-
VAL) and “other” earnings sources (WS-VAL). Before 1996, both sources of earnings were
top-coded at 99,999. I replaced top-coded values with the top-code multiplied by 1.5.
Between 1996 and 2010, primary earnings above the top-code threshold are assigned the
average value of other top-coded earners.1 I did not further adjust these values. Secondary
earnings are top-coded at 25,000 between 1996 and 2002, and at 35,000 between 2003
and 2010. Once again I replaced top-coded secondary earnings values with the top-code
multiplied by 1.5. Since 2011, and for both sources of earnings, reported earnings above
the top-code threshold are systematically swapped with other values above the top-code,
within a bounded interval. I elected not to adjust these values.
B.2.2 Imputing annual hours worked before the 1976 survey
The March CPS sample used throughout the paper begins in 1964. Before the 1976
survey, only binned weeks worked per year and the number of hours worked last week
are reported, instead of the actual number of weeks worked and usual hours worked per
week. For these years, annual hours worked were in the following manner. I consider
a sample of women from the 1976-1981 survey years, where all 4 items are observed
(binned weeks, number of weeks, hours worked last week, and usual hours worked per
week).2 On this sample I regress the number of weeks worked last year on a race dummy,
region dummies, 6 educational attainment dummies (0-8 years, 9-11 years, high school
degree, some college, BA, post-BA), a quadratic in potential experience, and the education
dummies interacted with the experience quadratic. I perform this regression within each
weeks worked bin (1-13, 14-26, 27-39, 40-47, 48-49, 50-52). I then impute the number
1The top-code threshold and replacement value is conditional on race, sex, and FTFY employment status.
2I use only 1976-1981 to impute the data instead of all years post-1976 in case the relationship between
actual weeks and binned weeks, or between usual hours and hours worked last week, has changed over
time.
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of weeks worked, for the 1964-1975 sample of women not in the 0 weeks worked bin, as
fitted values from these regressions.3
Next, I do a similar imputation for usual hours worked per week. On the 1976-1981
sample I regress usual hours worked per week on a race dummy, regional dummies, educa-
tion dummies, all of the above interacted with the number of hours worked last week, the
number of hours worked last week, and weeks worked interval dummies. I impute usual
hours worked per week, for the 1964-1975 sample of women not in the 0 weeks worked
bin, as fitted values from these regressions.
Imputed annual hours worked is the product of imputed weeks and imputed usual
hours worked per week.
B.2.3 Imputing wage offers for non-working women in both the PSID and CPS
Hourly wages are calculated as total wage and business income divided by annual hours
worked. Wages are converted to 2010 US dollars via the Consumer Price Index. To reduce
measurement error, I trim wages below $2.50 or above $150 from the sample.
I use a Heckman two-step procedure to impute wages for non-working women. First
I perform a probit regression of labor-force participation status on education dummies, a
quadratic in potential experience, their interaction, education dummies interacted with a
race dummy, a race dummy, education dummies interacted with metropolitan central city
status dummies, metro central city status dummies, education dummies interacted with re-
gion dummies, region dummies, education dummies interacted with survey year dummies,
survey year dummies, a 3-level education variable (high school or less, some college, BA
or more) interacted with marital status dummies (married, separated or divorced, never
married), marital status dummies, and marital status dummies interacted with the number
of children under age 5. (The geographical variables are not used in the PSID, due to lack
of sufficient sample size.)
Next I perform a Mincerian regression, on the sample of working women, of the ob-
served log hourly wage on all of the above controls, excluding the interaction between
marital status dummies and the number of young children, and including an inverse Mills
ratio control function. Finally I impute log wage offers for non-working women using fitted
values from this regression. I iterate this imputation procedure over 6-year bins to allow
the wage and selection equations to change over time.
3In a few cases the fitted value was larger than 52. I replaced these fitted values with 52.
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B.2.4 Constructing the high-wage-offer / low-wage-offer classification
As discussed in the main text, the main sample contains individuals with 0-40 years
of potential labor market experience. Following a procedure used by Juhn and Murphy
(1997), I partition the main sample into cells defined by survey year and potential experi-
ence group. I consider 16 potential experience groups: 0 − 2, 3 − 4, 5 − 6, 7 − 8, . . . , 27 −
28, 29 − 30, 31 − 40. Within each cell, I compute the median of the population-weighted
sample and assign as high-skill (low-skill) each woman with a wage offer above (below)
the median. Note that the grouping of those with 31-40 years of potential experience into
one bin is done in recognition of the fact that the main sample only includes individu-
als aged 22-54. Because of this age ceiling, variation in potential experience above 30 is
almost certainly due to variation in educational attainment rather than variation in age
conditional on educational attainment. Thus, using a finer binning would group too many
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Belot, Michéle, and Marco Francesconi. 2013. “Dating Preferences and Meeting Oppor-
tunities in Mate Choice Decisions.” Journal of Human Resources, 48(2): 474–508.
Benedetto, Gary, Martha Stinson, and John M. Abowd. 2013. “The Creation and Use
of the SIPP Synthetic Beta.” Accessed at https://census.gov/content/dam/Census/
programs-surveys/sipp/methodology/SSBdescribe_nontechnical.pdf.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Richard C. Cornes. 1983. “Independence of Allocative
Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods.” Econometrica, 51(6): 1753–
1765.
Bertrand, Marianne. 2011. “New Perspectives on Gender.” Handbook of Labor Economics,
4: 1543 – 1590.
160
Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2010. “Dynamics of the
Gender Gap for Young Professionals in Corporate Sectors.” American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 2(3): 228–255.
Bertrand, Marianne, Emir Kamenica, and Jessica Pan. 2015. “Gender Identity and Rel-
ative Income within Households.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2): 571–614.
Binder, Ariel J., and John Bound. 2019. “The Declining Labor Market Prospects of Less-
Educated Men.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2): 163–90.
Bisin, Alberto, and Thierry Verdier. 2001. “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and
the Dynamics of Preferences.” Journal of Economic Theory, 97(2): 298 – 319.
Black, Dan A., Natalia Kolesnikova, Seth G. Sanders, and Lowell J. Taylor. 2013. “Are
Children “Normal”?” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(1): 21–33.
Blau, David M. 2003. “Child Care Subsidy Programs.” In Means-Tested Transfer Programs.
Vol. 76, , ed. Robert Moffitt, Chapter 7, 455–469. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2013. “Female Labor Supply: Why Is the
United States Falling Behind?” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
103(3): 251–256.
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2017. “The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends,
and Explanations.” Journal of Economic Literature, 55(3): 789–865.
Borusyak, Kirill, Peter Hull, and Xavier Jaravel. 2018. “Quasi-Experimental Shift-Share
Research Designs.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24997.
Bound, John, and Harry J. Holzer. 2000. “Demand Shifts, Population Adjustments, and
Labor Market Outcomes during the 1980s.” Journal of Labor Economics, 18(1): 20–54.
Bound, John, and Richard V. Burkhauser. 1999. “Economic Analysis of Transfer Pro-
grams Targeted on People with Disabilities.” In . Vol. 3 of Handbook of Labor Economics,
3417 – 3528. Elsevier.
Bound, John, and Timothy Waidmann. 1992. “Disability Transfers, Self-Reported Health,
and the Labor Force Attachment of Older Men: Evidence from the Historical Record.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(4): 1393–1419.
Bound, John, and Timothy Waidmann. 2002. “Accounting for Recent Declines in Em-
ployment Rates among Working-Aged Men and Women with Disabilities.” The Journal
of Human Resources, 37(2): 231–250.
Bound, John, Brad Hershbein, and Bridget Terry Long. 2009. “Playing the Admissions
Game: Student Reactions to Increasing College Competition.” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 23(4): 119–146.
161
Boustan, Leah Platt, and William J. Collins. 2014. “The Origin and Persistence of Black-
White Differences in Women’s Labor Force Participation.” In Human Capital in History:
The American Record. , ed. Leah Platt Boustan, Carola Frydman and Robert A. Margo,
205–240. University of Chicago Press. Chapter 6.
Braga, Breno. 2018. “Earnings Dynamics: The role of Education throughout a Worker’s
Career.” Labour Economics, 52: 83 – 97.
Brennan, Robert T., Rosalind Chait Barnett, and Karen C. Gareis. 2001. “When She
Earns More Than He Does: A Longitudinal Study of Dual-Earner Couples.” Journal of
Marriage and Family, 63(1): 168–182.
Buera, Francisco J., and Joseph P. Kaboski. 2012. “The Rise of the Service Economy.”
American Economic Review, 102(6): 2540–69.
Bumpass, Larry L. 1990. “What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions between Demo-
graphic and Institutional Change.” Demography, 27(4): 483–498.
Case, Anne, and Angus Deaton. 2015. “Rising morbidity and mortality in midlife among
white non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st century.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 112(49): 15078–15083.
CEA. 2016. “The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participa-
tion.” Accessed at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160620_cea_primeage_male_lfp.pdf.
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Melvin Stephens, Jr. 2004. “Job Displacement, Disability, and
Divorce.” Journal of Labor Economics, 22(2): 489–522.
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Ming Ching Luoh. 2010. “Male Incarceration, the Marriage
Market, and Female Outcomes.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3): 614–627.
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, Erik Hurst, and Mariel Schwartz. 2018. “The Transformation of
Manufacturing and the Decline in U.S. Employment.” In . NBER Macroeconomics Annual:
Volume 33, , ed. Martin Eichenbaum and Jonathan A. Parker. University of Chicago Press.
Cherlin, Andrew. 2014. Labor’s Love Lost: The Rise and Fall of the Working-Class Family in
America. Russell Sage Foundation.
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Farré, Ĺıdia, and Francis Vella. 2013. “The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender
Role Attitudes and its Implications for Female Labour Force Participation.” Economica,
80(318): 219–247.
Fernández, Raquel, Alessandra Fogli, and Claudia Olivetti. 2004. “Mothers and Sons:
Preference Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 119(4): 1249–1299.
Fernández, Raquel, and Alessandra Fogli. 2009. “Culture: An Empirical Investigation of
Beliefs, Work, and Fertility.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1): 146–77.
Fernández, Raquel, and Joyce Cheng Wong. 2017. “Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis
of Divorce Regimes.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(3): 72–115.
Fisman, Raymond, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson. 2006.
“Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 673–697.
Fortin, Nicole M. 2005. “Gender Role Attitudes and the Labour-market Outcomes of
Women across OECD Countries.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(3): 416–438.
Friedberg, Leora. 1998. “Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel
Data.” The American Economic Review, 88(3): 608–627.
Fuwa, Makiko. 2004. “Macro-level Gender Inequality and the Division of Household Labor
in 22 Countries.” American Sociological Review, 69(6): 751–767.
Galambos, Nancy L. 2004. “Gender and Gender Role Development in Adolescence.” In
Handbook of Adolescent Psychology. Vol. 2, , ed. Richard M. Lerner and Laurence Stein-
berg, 233–262. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
164
Galassi, Gabriela, David Koll, and Lukas Mayr. 2018. “Intergenerational Correlation of
Employment: Is there a Role for Work Culture?” European University Institute, working
paper.
Gale, D., and L. S. Shapley. 1962. “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage.” The
American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1): 9–15.
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